A legal crisis is brewing in Europe over the status of German public-sector banks that, taken to its extreme, threatens the EU itself.
The European Commission (EC), urged on by private-sector banks, says guarantees for state-owned Landesbanken and municipality-owned Sparkassen are incompatible with EU law.
The public banks refute these allegations and argue that German private banks are seeking to enforce their privatization as a prelude to scooping up efficiently functioning Sparkassen and Landesbanken to cover their own embarrassing failure to build decent banking businesses in Germany.
Will the private banks get their way? Will the dispute over the Landesbanken be taken to the European courts? Or will the Landesbanken and Sparkassen turn the tables on their private-sector opponents and merge into new powerful banking franchises? Investors are looking on with some anxiety.
Already, the German public-bank sector is showing the first signs of change. Discussion about the scope and scale of restructuring is intensifying. That’s something new. Even discussing the state guarantees, Anstaltslast (institutional obligation) and Gewährträgerhaftung (guarantee obligation), that characterize the peculiar network of Sparkassen and Landesbanken is a big step in Germany.
The scene for the dispute was set in December 1999 when the European Banking Federation put forward a formal complaint. The EBF represents the private-sector banks that have long grumbled about state subsidies to public banks, which have expanded their activities to compete with the private banks in markets far removed from their local origins.
The stakes were raised dramatically on January 26 this year, when European competition commissioner Mario Monti sent a letter to the German government, formally requesting proposals that would tackle the EC’s competition concerns within 30 days.
The EC made its position clear: “it considers the guarantees in favour of the country’s public law credit institutions, in as far as they affect the competitive position of the institutions and trade between Member States, to be State aid which is incompatible with Community law.” In other words, state guarantees are unlawful if they lead to a competitive advantage in fields where commercial banks are active as well. “That is very likely to be the verdict since the Landesbanks enjoy better refinancing advantages due to explicit state support,” says Niall O’Connor, German banks analyst at Deutsche Bank.
A working group, headed by state secretary at the ministry of finance, Caio Koch-Weser, is striving to get the German public-banking system in line with EU law. It had been set up last year, but stopped talks after only meeting four times. It’s now back in session.
And this time, analysts expect that a proposal will be offered to the EC – maybe not within the stated 30 days but perhaps after an extension of another month or so. This is because the government and the public-sector banks are fearful of a prolonged dispute with the EC that might put at risk investors’ confidence. Credit spreads on securities issued by Landesbanken already widened by up to five basis points in recent months, as concerns mount over the possible removal of state support.
Having pressed for a speedy resolution, the EC stresses that it is “neutral to any particular model”. But despite hinting that they may accept some sort of compromise, the public-sector banks themselves are nowhere near presenting any sort of detailed model for how they should be restructured.
|
View graph. |
||||||
The smaller saving banks have relatively little to gain from any compromise that might make sense from the perspective of the internationally active Landesbanken. Because the guarantees – or rather liabilities, say the public banks – are intrinsically linked to the ownership structure of the banks, nothing less than the continued existence of public-sector banks is at stake. (see box) If the public-sector banks should change their legal status into an entity with limited liability, even if still publicly owned, they would have to run on the basis of profit maximization.
That would open the gates for privatizations and a gradual demolition of the sector would surely follow.
The Deutscher Sparkassen-und Giroverband (DSGV), the German Savings Bank Association, wrote in a reply to the private banks’ complaint: “Anstaltslast and Gewähr-trägerhaftung are not support obligations of a third party, but rather those of an entrepreneur. Unlike a proper guarantee, the public owner (sponsor) is not liable for another, third enterprise, but liable only for himself. The sponsor simply provides the capital – as any private entrepreneur would.
The liability structure of the public law institutions is therefore an expression of the state’s freedom to choose any legal form. As such it is not subject to state aid control and complies with European law.”
Furthermore, says Christian Achilles, director at the DSGV: “It is not within the EC’s competence to change the ownership structure of an EU member state”. The DSGV and the public-bank lobby group, Bundesverband öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands (VÖB), the association of German public sector banks, quote article 295 of the EU treaty, which states that the EC is not authorized to interfere in the ownership structure of a state’s public sector. It reads: “This treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in member states governing the system of property ownership.”
Commissioner Monti has indeed repeatedly stated: “we do, of course, not question the ownership structure of Germany’s public banks”. But EC spokesman Michael Tscherny also helpfully points out that: “the European Commission would not have taken up the EBF’s complaint if we had not thought there was something to it.”
A recent report by rating agency Moody’s Investors Service attempts to clarify the matter: “It is likely that if the legal form itself contains State aid elements, ultimately it is unlikely to matter whether these explicit support mechanisms are inherent or not. If they are seen as ongoing State aid, the Commission will be expected to push for their removal or neutralization”.
Still, the Sparkassen and Landesbanken are defiant. “We face the legal side of the complaint with calm, since the liabilities are clearly in line with the EU treaty,” says Achilles. “We are confident that we can convince the EC of our view.” And the DSGV questions the private banks’ true motives.
“The European Commission cannot allow itself to become an instrument of the political aims of individual market participants. The issues raised in this context [of state support] are apparently merely a pretext,” writes the DSGV. “The [private-sector banks’] ultimate objective is the privatization of the public law credit institutions. The private-sector banks, which urgently need new revenue potential and economies of scale, want to take over well-established and functioning institutions instead of building up a strong presence in the retail market with their own efforts. Buying some – not all – of the savings banks would be the easy way to acquire one of the last remaining jewels in the German banking landscape.”
The end of cuddly capitalism
Those who follow these developments from outside Germany rarely understand why giving up the guarantees should be such a big deal. It has been done in other EU countries, such as Italy and Austria, after all.
The public-sector banks’ reluctance seems even more puzzling considering they have little to fear. They enjoy a dominant market position.
The 562 separate Sparkassen institutions supply services to about 55 million Germans and have a market share of 55% – a unique position in the banking systems of EU countries. Market researchers have also discovered that the Sparkassen “S” sign is recognized by 98% of the German population. Only the crucifix is more widely recognized.
“Retail customers really don’t bank with the saving banks because they have the guarantees, but mainly because they trust and know the savings banks,” says Otto Dichtl, assistant vice-president at Moody’s. “Most savings banks would not be directly affected by the loss of the guarantees. They could indeed be strong institutions without the guarantees.”
Apparently confirming this view, the heads of some of the bigger Sparkassen have said that they might as well continue without the guarantees. A look at the seven savings banks that are already privately-owned – though not listed on the stock exchange – supports this.
Among those Freie Sparkassen (free savings banks) is the biggest saving bank in Germany, the Sparkasse Hamburg, as well as the Frankfurter Sparkasse, which plans to become a limited company this year. Free savings banks were privately founded before the savings banks law in 1934. After that date, the savings banks could only exist in public-law form.
Such statements have, however, been an exception. One reason for the reluctance to change is that the idea of a public service mission is still very much alive in Germany, where entrepreneurial private banks are not always trusted as much as sleepier public banks. Even Chancellor Schröder has strongly supported the Sparkassen until now.
The notion that there are viable alternatives to the pure shareholder value approach partly springs from the strong and tested three-tier banking structure – comprising the private, public-sector and cooperative banks – that has contributed to Germany’s economic success.
Of course there is another consideration here. The Landesbanken and savings banks have also been superior instruments for the implementation of policies at state and municipal levels – the saving banks being owned by municipalities, and the Landesbanks partly by the federal states and partly by the regional savings bank associations. This is not a hidden agenda. President Edmund Stoiber of the federal state of Bavaria has said that the Landesbanks are a vital and necessary tool for any government, and that he will not be prepared to give up control.
“The public banks as means of allocation can guarantee benefits for the economy as a whole,” claims Achilles at the DSGV. Clearly such a system can also guarantee, or prevent voters’ support. The biggest of the Landesbanken, Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB), is often cited as the most blatant example of the nexus between politics and banking. In 1998 for example, WestLB, as the biggest shareholder of steel company Preussag, planned its sale to a job-cutting Austrian company, which should have prevented the victory at the state election by then president of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder.
Some groups within the party did not want Schröder to become so successful as to be a viable candidate for the position of chancellor, but Schröder got his way and Lower Saxony bought Preussag back – with the help of its own Landesbank, NordLB.
It is a Catch-22 situation that the politicians in a position to implement change have nothing to gain from any changes in these public law institutions that are so central to the system dubbed Kuschelkapitalismus (cuddly capitalism). WestLB’s recent proposal to the EC is a case in point.
WestLB’s splitting plans
Parallel to the talks with the German government, WestLB has addressed the EC’s concern directly with a proposal of its own. This was presented to the EC on February 9 by WestLB president Friedel Neuber, finance minister of Nord-Rhine Westphalia Peer Steinbrück and Caio Koch-Weser.
WestLB was specifically cited in the European Banking Federation complaint, and now seeks to satisfy the EC’s demands with a model that would involve the bank being split up into a commercial and a public business bank. The public bank would be the parent of the private subsidiary and would, according to the proposal, “retain responsibility for the functions as state, municipal and central bank of the savings banks, as well as shareholdings in other Landesbanks and issuing business for which the public law status is indispensable”.
All other banking activities would be spun off into a commercial bank with public company status but fully-owned by WestLB. WestLB’s public-sector functions would thus be separated from those businesses in which it competes with private-sector banks, which should be in line with EU law. Estimates that this would result in 80% commercial and 20% public business have been neither confirmed nor denied by WestLB. But Schmidt-Bürgel at Fitch says: “this is a good guideline of where the Landesbanken stand. One can assume that the biggest part of their business lies on the commercial side.”
Splitting a Landesbank into two seems, at first glance, an eminently sensible basis for negotiations. The precise nature of the commercial and public activities would, of course, have to be clarified. But it was WestLB’s next step that raised eyebrows among European Commissioners. WestLB, rated at double-A, proposed that the public mother company should continue to be liable for the private subsidiary via a letter of comfort.
The subsidiary would then still have a “competitive rating”, according to WestLB’s London-based spokesperson John Godfrey. But this strikes many as absurd.
“What’s the point of going through the whole business of splitting a bank,” asks Schmidt-Bürgel, “just to come up with a situation in which the guarantees continue to bring refinancing advantages for commercial banking business?” Indeed, put on the spot, Godfrey says the bank “would not have any significant disadvantages after the split”.
This was surely not the solution intended by commissioner Monti. He said in a press release that the letter of comfort would transfer Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung to the private subsidiary, which would be “unacceptable”. WestLB insists that there is no institutional and guarantor liability between the public law WestLB and the AG, only a letter of comfort.
The bank argues that this is customary market practice and points to the case of French public bank Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) which spun off CDC IXIS as a commercial subsidiary at the end of last year. CDC IXIS got a full government guarantee through a letter of comfort, which seems to be renewable indefinitely, in return for a fee. The precise conditions of the contract, including the size of the fee, have never been published. But it is unlikely that WestLB can get away with a similarly opaque deal. Its case is already too public.
Yet despite the many questions that surround the idea of splitting the Landesbank model, many analysts think it is an approach likely to be taken further, and copied by other banks – “simply because of the lack of alternative options,” says one German banker.
“The EC might also prefer such compromise,” suggests one source at a Landesbank, pointing out that: “the EC has no enforcing power and needs a compromise as much as the other side. Here is an approach that the EU can at least start to work with”.
But Monti appeared to shoot this hope down by making an unexpectedly forceful statement after the meeting with WestLB. He said that the proposal does not address the question of guarantees for the saving banks as well as for the other Landesbanken. “We must find a simultaneous, overall solution for all cases where there is a distortion of competition as a result of these guarantees,” he said.
The Koch-Weser working group then promptly fell in with Monti, saying after their second meeting on February 15 that they would work on a comprehensive proposal.
Sparkassen issue unresolved
Monti had even more substantial objections: “The split proposed seems to pose problems, because it would maintain preferential financing of all savings banks in Nordrhein-Westfalen.” Such refinancing advantages are strongly denied by the savings and Landesbanks alike. Firstly, “the interbank business plays a small part for the Sparkassen, because 67% of the saving banks’ balance sheets are retail deposits,” says Ulrich Gröschel, bank director at Helaba. In any case, their refinancing activities with Landesbanks are low, says Gröschel: “Because the Landesbanken are on equal competitive footing with other banks, the Sparkassen conduct business with other players in the market.”
| Schmidt-Bürgel | ||||||
It may be that the EC chose to ignore such arguments after reading a 1997 paper by one Horst Köhler, then president of the DSGV. He noted: “The Landesbanken are involved primarily in large-scale trans-regional and international banking business, which they conduct in their own interest and on behalf of the savings banks.” It also stated that: “the issuing of securities plays a major role in the refinancing of the Landesbanken and enables them to offer their savings banks attractive investment opportunities for their savings deposits.”
Still, the Sparkassen are less likely to be affected by an EC ruling than the Landesbanks which are the main focus of the private banks’ concern. O’Connor at Deutsche Bank says: “They are not such a great threat and a solution would also be less straight forward to implement. Splitting the Sparkassen is certainly not an option.”
Previous reports have suggested that the EC would indeed exclude the Sparkassen from their enquiries, simply on the grounds that they are not involved in cross-border activities, which is true for most of them. In November, EC spokesperson Michael Tscherny said: “the Sparkassen do not fall into our sphere of responsibility”. But by February his tone had changed. “The complaint is clearly directed at the Sparkassen [i.e. the Stadtsparkasse Köln], so we have to look into this sector as well,” says Tscherny. “It is hard to see how we could draw a clear dividing line between the Landesbanken and the savings banks.”
Such an approach would, in any case, be likely to incite further complaints from the private banks. “The Sparkassen have the same sort of competition-distorting advantage in the retail market. Because these banks are supported by Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung, it is almost impossible for a foreign bank to compete in the German retail market,” says Karl-Heinz Boos, member of the executive board at the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (BdB), the Association of German Public Banks.
Now that the spotlight is on the matter, it is hard to see a half-baked compromise that leaves the link between the Landesbanken and Sparkassen intact. The most clear-cut solution would be to abolish the liabilities for all business activities conducted in a competitive market. If that were to be enforced, the Sparkassen would face declining profits from credit business without their public guarantees and cost of funding subsidy, whereas the Landesbanken could follow West LB’s business model of wholesale banking or develop a universal banking role.
A vertical integration with the regional saving banks would be the most effective solution for the smaller Landesbanken with less commercial business volume than WestLB – which means all of them. So while all the talk is about splitting up the public banks, a better solution might be mergers of Landesbanken and savings banks with each other. That would at least allow the public banks the satisfaction of wrong-footing their private-sector opponents.
“Some form of vertical integration with the savings banks plus mergers of Landesbanken could create some of the world’s strongest banks,” says Schmidt-Bürgel at Fitch. By taking up the opportunity and getting together the public banks could nullify the efforts of the private banks to take over parts of the sector. “The private banks would reproach themselves for having initiated this,” says one analyst. “The public law institutions should see the debate as a historical chance.”
If only it was that easy to get together. The saving banks are reluctant to give up their communal and decentralized system. Achilles at the DSGV says: “our commitment to decentralization is the foundation of our strong market penetration”. He thinks that this system will not only be able to survive within global economic structures that become more and more centralized, but that it will be the model of the future. “In the course of globalization, regions will experience a come-back. A decentralized system with decision making on a local level is far more flexible and can adapt far better to those developments.”
Handing over local power to a bigger regional or national association also means that the Sparkassen would become mere distribution centres, without the power to preside over the allocation of credit.
The attempt to create a regional holding company owning the Landesbank Sachsen and the Sparkassen of Saxony is a sad proof of the banks’ reluctance to give up their positions.
Of the 22 saving banks in the state only six decided to join the Sachsen Finanzverband. And the final structure they created looked nothing like what then finance minister Georg Milbradt had in mind when he initiated it.
The municipalities negotiated to maintain their local management and decision-making authority over the Sparkassen, and not to transfer their Trägerschaft (sponsorship) to the holding company – as was originally planned. They also demanded, and got, a three-year protection against dismissal for their 5,100 staff and a voting system in which decisions are made only if the municipalities have a majority even within their own group.
The biggest gain, in terms of enhanced banking efficiency, is the merging of the back offices. But even such modest compromise was incredibly hard-won. Opposition (SPD) members of the Saxon parliament filed a complaint with the constitutional court. And a pressure group, Pro kommunale Sparkassen, which feared a restriction in the allocation of credit to small enterprises, claimed to have collected well above the 450,000 signatures needed to force a plebiscite. Thanks to a rigorous counting technique, worthy of Palm Beach, Florida, the initiative fell short by 500 signatures, and the whole matter ended up in court.
The Finanzverband finally came into being on October 1 2000, after the court decided that the merger was indeed in line with the municipalities’ right of self-government. “But this is a poor compromise solution that won’t take them very far,” says one observer. “It allows them to have some sort of co-ordinated action at the top, but also that everyone can keep a slice of the action. And for that sort of co-operation they would not even have had to go into a holding company.”
Saxony’s essentially unsuccessful efforts have so far been the only valid example of a vertical merger of Landesbanken and Sparkassen. Two other cases are historical exceptions hardly applicable elsewhere. The Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG, a private-law holding company, was founded in 1994 by bringing together Berliner Bank, Berlin Hyp, and Landesbank Berlin. It was well ahead of its time when linking public structures (Landesbank Berlin) with a listed public limited company (Berliner Bank). But the merger was also a politically-engineered deal to save the troubled Berliner Bank, and it could be done without the conflict of interests between savings bank and Landesbanken: the Landesbank Berlin already incorporated the Berliner Sparkasse.
The second vertically integrated bank, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, began its life in 1999 when the LandesGirobank (regional savings bank), Südwest Landesbank and L-Bank (the state guaranteed development division of the universal L-Bank) merged. Again there was a key political impetus, in the form of finance minister Erwin Teufel, who pushed through the necessary changes in the regional parliament law. But the merger was exceptional in that the LandesGirobank had already been a big regional savings bank, so that negotiations were able to go ahead with one single partner on the savings bank side.
The other unique constellation in the Baden-Württemberg merger was the state’s strong influence. This ultimately enabled the integration to proceed. A 40% share of the Landesbank made the federal state the biggest single shareholder. The lack of such strong state influence is the reason why such vertical integration of Landesbanken and Sparkassen would rarely work elsewhere. The Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen (Helaba), for example, is 85%-owned by the Sparkassen, and their owners, the local municipalities, would strongly oppose integration.
Landesbank survival problems
Consolidation amongst Landesbanken is therefore more manageable. Tellingly, Helaba is strategically co-operating with the Bayerische Landesbank. They merged their commercial subsidiaries in Switzerland and Luxembourg in December 2000 and future mergers of other activities are likely. “For Helaba the way for any solution lies in a closer co-operation with Bayern LB,” says Gröschel.
| Mario Monti | ||||||
Some analysts envisage a north-south alignment of consolidating activities, focusing on the two biggest Landesbanken, WestLB and Bayern LB.
Joining forces will be of vital importance since Landesbanken, shorn of their guarantees, will face enormous refinancing problems.
Without the guarantees they will have to raise the level of core capital from present levels of about 4%-5% to over 7%, in line with levels at international commercial banks. And irrespective of the EC investigation, says a Moody’s report, “some German Landesbanken are approaching a potential core capital bottleneck”. The stand alone ratings – measuring the creditworthiness for fictitious Landesbanks without state support – given out by Moody’s (“financial strength rating”) and Fitch (“individual rating”), indicate that refinancing efforts would have to be big to avoid substantial downgrading after the loss of state support. Fitch rates most banks at C, with Baden-Württemberg being the best rated at B, and the lowest WestLB with C/D.
“The current individual ratings should not, however, be taken as an indicator of future debt ratings,” says Schmidt-Bürgel. “Practically, we expect mergers, restructuring and recapitalization of the Landesbanken which would impact any future rating.” The likely rating would be a single A for most of them – with smaller banks falling more notches.
So how could Landesbanken prop up their capital to at least make it into the single-A rating zone? Transferring housing assets – as did the state Nord-Rhine Westphalia when it transferred the ownership of the Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt (WfA) to WestLB – is not an option. “Investors and rating agencies want to see real tier-one capital,” says one analyst.
One possibility might for the owners of the Landesbanken – the states – to inject capital. After all, if this political instrument is worth a fight with Brussels, it should also be worth investing a few millions in. But recapitalization will require more than one or two million and it is, very visibly, voters’ money. Taking out millions of euro from a state’s budget could raise political opposition and also economic concerns. Indeed, far from investing in their banks, state bodies might wish to cash in on them. “Wait a couple of years when the boom is gone,” speculates Thorsten Polleit, director at Barclays Capital in Frankfurt, “and the new financial realities will force the communes and the Länder to consider selling their family silver.”
Economical forces won’t stop at savings and Landesbanks. Mayors and ministers will have to deliver support to their banks that involves palpable sacrifices. This is when a fine public law bank could turn into a political burden – public mission or not.
The alternative to a cash injection is the sale of Landesbank assets, or the sale of the Landesbank itself either to a trade buyer or through public flotation. Schmidt-Bürgel remarks that it will be “difficult to go public any time soon because it will not be easy to sell a good equity story to investors.
Establishing a vertically-integrated bank would probably be the best solution, as it would create a strong regional bank with a diversified revenue structure.” Apart from a better story, the saving banks’ deposits would also help ease core capital shortages considerably.
The challenge of generating sufficient capital will be one of the key drivers for further consolidation in the sector. “Chances are pretty good that, say, in five or 10 years’ time the Landesbank sector in its current form will no longer exist,” says Polleit.
But one Landesbank director whole-heartedly disagrees. He believes that there will be just as many Landesbanken as today but that they will focus on the development activities (Fördergeschäft) that allow for continued guarantees. Of course those activities – social and housing promotion, export guarantees, regional development – could be taken on by already established national Förderbanks such as KfW and DtA. “But we will see some political compromise with a development bank in each state,” predicts one analyst. “You simply cannot get the politicians to agree to the banks’ complete demolition in the foreseeable future,” he says. “They know it is impossible to stop this development, but they will fight to hang on to some sort of their own regional bank as long as possible.”
| Landesbank and Sparkasse Leipzig – united | ||||||
For the private banks, too, it would be the preferred solution to have a development bank only, and to spin off all other activities, says Boos at the BdB, “because the legal side would be clear cut.”
If only the Landesbanken would agree with the private banks on which activities are worthy of a guarantee. WestLB’s split model, for example, includes the central bank function for the Sparkassen, as well as the function of state bank (issuing securities for the Länder) into the public bank. “These activities are part of our public mission,” says Godfrey at WestLB. Therefore the public Pfandbriefe, too, should be issued by the public mother bank, while the mortgage Pfandbriefe should be issued by the commercial arm. This suggestion draws a strong reaction both from private banks and the rating agencies. “The central bank function must clearly be part of the commercial house,” says one analyst. “Why would you need a state guarantee for issuing securities? It would be just as distorting because the Landesbanken are still competing with private players.”
If the EC forces through this line the Landesbanken would have to set up a separate Hypothekenbank to continue issuing Pfandbriefe, because of the special bank principle that requires an issuer to be a special low-risk business bank. But a new pure Hypotheken bank would not have enough collateral to survive, which is why the Landesbanken would pledge to become a mixed Hypothekenbank. This, however, would require a change in the Hypothekenbank law which would ignite anger at the pure Hypothekenbanken.
Alternatively, the Landesbanken could gain the privilege of issuing covered bonds. However, these are less accepted internationally and would considerably raise their refinancing cost.
Grandfathering
Bondholders, especially recently converted international investors in the Pfandbrief market, might be forgiven for getting very nervous at all this. But existing Pfandbrief holders have nothing to fear, say the Landesbanken, because they will be grandfathered – granted the continued support of existing debt. The German legal principle of Rückwirkverbot (the prohibition of ex post facto laws) ensures that under a moratorium the creditor is still entitled to claim payment directly from the guarantor, the Gewährträger. “That existing Landesbank securities will be grandfathered is not an issue,” says O’Connor at Deutsche. “Investors know that.”
The only point where legal experts disagree is on the timeliness of the payment. Investors have had reason for concern at the privatization of the DSL bank, where debt only benefited from a continuation of a deficiency guarantee, which in itself does not guarantee timely repayment. A deficiency guarantee would not represent a suitable alternative for Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung of the Landesbanken, says Moody’s. However, unlike the Landesbanken, DSL had only benefited from the Anstaltslast under which creditors do not have direct recourse to the guarantor. Moody’s points out that it would be deemed unconstitutional if current Landesbank creditors were put into an inferior position as a result of grandfathering.
Schmidt-Bürgel at Fitch also thinks that, although according to some legal experts the current wording of Gewährträgerhaftung clauses may not guarantee timely repayment to a creditor, timeliness will still be guaranteed. “The legal bodies in each of the states will tighten the wording of a grandfathering clause at the latest at the time when the state support mechanism is abolished for future liabilities,” he says.
But even though investors have been assured about the continued guarantees of their bonds, spreads have been widening. Explicit support alone does not ensure a good rating. Implicit support, defined by Moody’s as continuing majority ownership, could – perverse as it may seem – come before any legal requirement of support. Thus, concludes Moody’s: “if the support providers envisage no further business and/or ownership relationship with their bank, the rating could suffer.”
Landesbanks would be well-advised to create clarity about their future status and direction, preferably without a time-consuming lawsuit.