Pfandbrief issuers’ business overhaul

The German Pfandbrief market, in particular the jumbo sector, has grown dramatically in recent years and assumed a larger and larger slice of European bond fund managers’ portfolios. But now many of the leading issuers face significant challenges in the underlying lending businesses that generate Pfandbrief collateral. The German mortgage banks are seeking non-traditional business opportunities, as well as starting to sort out their underperforming mortgage lending businesses. Volumes are likely to shrink.

       
Bernd Knobloch

These are hard times for Germany’s mortgage banks. After having been spoilt by exorbitant growth rates in the 1990s, they now have to face a significant slowdown in new business.

New loans to the public sector declined by 24% in 2000, reflecting low demand as a result of shrinking state budget deficits, as well as borrowers’ aspirations to go straight to the capital markets to raise funds. Even worse, a flattening yield curve has shattered the excellent earnings that were easily made by mismatching collateral assets and Pfandbrief liabilities before interest rates started to rise in 1999.

Mortgage lending has also declined, by 15% in 2000, as a result of higher interest rates and economic downturn. The favourable environment for both mortgage and public lending – especially the boost in investments after German reunification – is gone.

In fact, 2000 was the first year since the take-off of the jumbo market in 1994 that total new issue volume of jumbo Pfandbriefe fell below the level of the previous year. At e99.85 billion ($88.78 billion), new-issue volume in Germany was 19% lower than in 1999, according to figures from WestLB. Analysts will deem 2001 to be a good year if total jumbo issuance reaches e100 billion, says Peter Kirchner, bond analyst at WestLB. “This will be the level of 1998, which still represents a sizeable market.”

The trend of decreasing issuance could become more visible after March 2002, when the newly implemented withholding tax regime prevents issuers from increasing their existing issues. Until that date, many issuers will keep coming to the markets to increase their issues to at least the e3 billion benchmark that makes a jumbo Pfandbrief eligible for trading at the EuroCreditMTS platform.

Given the downturn of Pfandbrief issuance and underlying lending activities, it is little wonder that one mortgage bank after another is refocusing, restructuring, splitting or merging in order to seize new and sustainable business opportunities.

Arrival of the supertanker

The latest example of a mortgage bank in a restructuring frenzy is HypoVereinsbank in Munich. In February, the bank announced a strategic initiative with the promising name of lead competence real estate, that will involve HypoVereinsbank’s mortgage banking activities being combined into an as yet unnamed real-estate bank. Three of its five mortgage banks – the Nürnberger Hypothekenbank, Süddeusche Bodencreditbank and Bayerische Handelsbank – will be merged under the roof of the Bayerische later this year. By the end of 2002, HypoVereinsbank’s own real-estate division will also be transferred to the new bank.

Such a merging of the mortgage business has been interpreted as a step towards the kind of split-business model that brought Depfa into the limelight last autumn. Depfa is to separate its property business and its public-sector lending into two independent entities in 2002. Depfa says that the two separate businesses, which boast few, if any, synergies, will be more focused and hopefully produce better returns. A split makes particular sense for Depfa, whose public-sector activities have the critical mass to generate collateral for public Pfandbriefe on a stand-alone basis.

       
Claus Nolting

However, HypoVereinsbank has no such plans for its new bank. “We will combine our real-estate businesses, but we won’t split it off from the public-sector lending side,” says board member Claus Nolting, who will head the new subsidiary. “We don’t see how a split of our activities would benefit us.”

That’s an opinion many mortgage bankers share, as they ponder restructuring models. “Why split a business for ever?” asks Bernd Knobloch member of the board at Eurohypo. “Once the capital is allocated to one unit, a bank becomes inflexible since it will be unable to distribute resources to areas in need. Especially under current market conditions, a stand-alone unit is very vulnerable.”

HypoVereinsbank’s merger of its mortgage banks has been long expected. After all, there are synergies of around e160 million a year after 2004, and the newly created bank will be the largest mortgage bank in Germany, with total assets of about e180 billion.

So why has HypoVereinsbank not acted before? Deutsche Bank, for example, merged its mortgage banks, Frankfurter Hyp and Zentralboden, back in 1995 and added Lübecker Hypo in 1998 to create Eurohypo. Dresdner Bank’s subsidiary Deutsche Hyp took over Nordhyp, another Dresdner subsidiary, in 1998.

Nolting explains that: “Our bank was occupied with merging the Hypo-Bank and the Vereinsbank.” But even before the merger, which was finalized only last year, the Vereinsbank had in fact resisted a business model based on the paramount importance of size. The bank embraced the poetic concept of owning a fleet of several small ships that are far more flexible than a supertanker, which takes half a day to turn.

“The numbers showed that it was a successful model, but market conditions have changed and require a new model,” says Nol-ting. “The new bank will have the critical mass that guarantees the best refinancing conditions we can get for our jumbo Pfandbriefe.” So far, HypoVereinsbank had been far less renowned as a jumbo Pfandbrief issuer than such banks as Depfa or Rheinhyp.

But Nolting says there have also been significant structural changes in the property markets that called for an end to the fleet model. Nolting cites the change from a hold-and-buy attitude among real-estate investors to a trader mentality as a factor demanding know-how that cannot be as successfully developed in smaller banks.

Another factor depressing real-estate lending is the reduction of tax advantages. “Profits in real estate mainly derived from after-tax gains,” says Nolting. “But now real estate competes with other asset classes, and banks have to offer better services and more competency in financing and structuring than their competitors.”

But the downturn of earnings from the property business is only part of the reason for the new focus at many mortgage banks. “The mortgage business was not necessarily more attractive in the past,” says Friedrich Munsberg, head of capital markets at Württemberger Hypo. “This side of the business has always been very competitive.” In Germany, every bank and insurer can grant mortgage loans, and even the small savings and cooperative banks, which can cross-sell other products, are able to offer prices that prevented mortgage banks from making reasonable margins.

What has changed though, is that banks started to calculate earnings in each segment of their business, and were for the first time able to see whether their efforts in mortgage lending are really worthwhile.

The shock of business line reports

The vast majority of banks only started business segment reporting after 1999, when a less promising business backdrop sharpened this need. “There had not been the same sort of pressure to report in detail under a steep yield curve that guaranteed huge earnings from the public-sector side before 2000,” says Henning Rasche, member of the board at Deutsche Hyp. “But after the collapse in earnings from this sort of business, the banks felt, most of them for the first time, the need to actually look into their business fields to see where the earnings come from.”

Not only did banks find their mortgage businesses to be weaker than they had assumed, but also that earnings in public-sector lending were deteriorating to an extent that did not allow them to continue subsidizing their underperforming mortgage businesses.

Chances of a full recovery of those earnings are slim because demand from the public sector is unlikely to return, and even if a steep interest yield curve would make up for the slump, banks could not even jump on to this opportunity.

Starting this month, mortgage banks will have to conduct their business within new limits that regulators have set for the interest rate risks they can take relative to their regulatory capital.

The leading German bank regulator, the Bundesaufsichtamt für das Kreditwesen (BAKred), introduced non-binding guidelines – a gentlemen’s agreement – last December that require mortgage banks to report monthly the change of net present value of their combined interest-bearing positions (including equity capital) following a hypothetical shift of the yield curve by 100 basis points. If this value exceeds 10% of a bank’s regulatory capital, BAKred will intensify its supervision, especially on the expected operating results.

At a ratio of more than 20%, BAKred will review the bank’s business activities to see if they still comply with the principles of properly conducted management. In this case, but not on the sole reporting of a ratio above 20%, the BAKred can dismiss the management.

This 10% limit poses a constraint for many mortgage banks, say the mortgage bankers themselves, except, of course, for their own banks which have never taken risks close to this limit. In truth, their recent efforts to restructure their mortgage businesses show a need to find revenues outside the public sector, which certainly suggests that BAKred has had every reason to be worried about the risks taken in public sector financing.

An institution reflecting this trend is Allgemeine HypothekenBank. AHB, the bank that made its name and a fortune in public lending and in yield-curve positioning, is now refocusing on its mortgage lending, which had shrunk to just 20% of total assets in 1999.

AHB reduced its public-sector activities by half last year, and aims at a 10% annual growth rate of its real-estate financing activities. With this new programme, the bank has earned a rating confirmation from Moody’s, based on the rating agency analysts’ understanding that AHB is de-emphasizing asset liability mismatches as a main source of income and has materially reduced its market-risk appetite. AHB says the interest rate risk taken is down to 3% of regulatory capital.

Another step to strengthen its position in mortgage lending is the merger with Rheinboden that will bulk up its mortgage portfolio. “Synergies arise mainly on the mortgage business,” says Joachim Goldbeck, a director at AHB. “We could have continued with public-sector lending on our own. But with the help of Rheinhyp, we will become one of the leading banks in real-estate financing.” When Rheinboden’s shareholders give their final approval in May, the new bank, called All-gemeine HypothekenBank Rheinboden AG, will have total assets of e93 billion and be one of the biggest issuers of Pfandbriefe.

New models for old business

The question, however, remains how the banks can turn their property businesses into profit spinners that offer any more than the paltry 6.8% return on equity that HypoVereinsbank’s mortgage business produced last year. Size helps, but banks also have to find out what strategy fits best with their existing expertise.

Becoming a real-estate investment bank is a path that Eurohypo, HypoVereinsbank and Deutsche Hyp are pursuing through closer cooperation with the big commercial banks, while smaller mortgage banks are more likely to specialize in particular real-estate market niches.

All of them are seeking new business opportunities outside Germany, where real-estate markets often promise more growth, and are not yet as competitive. One mortgage banker estimates mortgage lending margins at 60bp to 100bp in the UK, compared with 30bp to 80bp in Germany.

Already, German mortgage banks are very active in the UK, France, Switzerland, Spain and the Netherlands. In 2000, they have increased their lending to residential and commercial property by 36% in Europe, while in Germany this figure has dropped by 27%.

HypoVereinsbank already generates 26% of new mortgage business in other EU countries, Rheinhyp and Württemberger Hypo more than 50%.

But they all want to increase this share considerably by expanding farther afield – the US and Canada are priority destinations.

At the moment, though, the mortgage bank law restricts pure mortgage banks to doing business in European OECD countries plus Slovakia – which became an OECD member in December – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Most of these loans can, however, only be used as collateral of up to 10% of the total Pfandbrief collateral. Only loans from France, Austria, Denmark and Luxembourg, which acknowledge the Pfandbrief holder’s priority claim, can so far be used without limits. It is expected that a new version of the mortgage bank act allowing mortgage lending in the US, Canada and Japan will be implemented early next year. Again, these loans will not be eligible as collateral for the mortgage Pfandbriefe.

Mortgage banks hope that broadening their regional activities will also revive their public-sector lending. The Association of German mortgage banks would like to see Switzerland, the US, Canada and Japan, as well as regional governments – all of which will be refinanced with the Pfandbriefe – to be included in the new version of the law.

But since the pure banks cannot wait until 2002, their repositioning efforts also include two other goals. They will restrict themselves to more profitable existing activities, while expanding into promising growth areas. Most banks are exploring the potential for providing more comprehensive services relating to the core businesses of mortgage banks.

HypoVereinsbank’s new entity will be concentrating its efforts on real-estate markets but, says Nolting, only those “with growth potential. The bank cannot cover every location. We have to be very focused to produce the returns on equity of 13% to 15% which we have set ourselves by 2004.”

The new bank is likely to continue to offer retail services through HypoVereinsbank’s wide branch network. Such a step has also been taken at Deutsche Hyp, which decided in March to close its 25 branch outlets and transfer customer acquisition to Dresdner Bank.

Eurohypo’s acquisition of residential loans has been handled by Deutsche 24 since the beginning of 2001.

Margins in retail lending, which were already very competitive in Germany, became ever tighter with the arrival of low-cost offers via the internet. Banks without wealthy universal banking parents may get out of retail lending altogether. Depfa, for example, disclosed in an analysts’ meeting last September that it is not making any money on retail and will review the validity of the current business model.

Rheinhyp is one of the few banks taking a different view. “We will be in retail. We think it is a great opportunity to keep our business diversified. Retail lending is a much lower risk activity and, when run properly, there are good margins to be made,” says Rüdiger Luchmann, head of capital markets.

HypoVereinsbank new mortgage bank will not only focus on real estate but, being a mixed bank, will also conduct business that mortgage banks have so far not been known for. “Apart from the classical relationship lending, we will provide transaction banking or so-called real-estate investment banking,” says Nolting.

Real-estate financing services include the securitization of mortgage or public-loan portfolios for third parties and consultancy services for clients who want to finance real-estate projects. And if a mortgage bank can specialize in relative-value credit analysis, it can offer portfolio management for smaller banks or insurers, as well as research on specific credits.

The real-estate investment bank will also develop classic wholesale functions, such as loan syndication, and offering structured loans. But do the mortgage banks have any real chance of competing successfully with the investment banks that are already established in the business? “Of course,” says Knobloch at Eurohypo. “Mortgage banks offer expertise and know-how in real-estate financing that few of the investment banks can offer. For example, structuring complex real-estate financing, analyzing mortgage portfolios, or the securitization of such portfolios.”

Within this model of a real-estate investment bank, public-sector lending will be no more than a sideline. “There will be some cherry-picking. If we get interesting deals, we do them. But I don’t expect there is growth potential in that market,” says Knobloch.

So the traditional mortgage banks that provide funds are turning into mini investment banks that provide real estate-related services.

This model is, for example, also being pursued by Eurohypo, which specializes in commercial real-estate financing. Eurohypo, which, unlike HypoVereinsbank, is not a mixed bank, is still able to offer the whole range of products, says Knobloch, “because anything that we cannot do gets handed over to Deutsche Bank – for example, advisory or portfolio structuring expertise. Eurohypo is a virtual mixed bank.”

Dresdner Bank’s subsidiary, Deutsche Hyp, also specializes in real-estate financing and capital markets activity, but is part of a broader real estate group at Dresdner. The actual investment banking activities are placed under Dresdner’s direct control although, as a mixed bank, Deutsche Hyp could also undertake them.

No future for tradition

In any case, Rasche at Deutsche Hyp agrees with his colleagues at HypoVereinsbank and Eurohypo that the traditional mortgage bank concept has no future. “We were a traditional mortgage bank until last year, but have been inefficient in some areas, for example in retail. To increase our return on equity our real estate group has to turn to some more profitable areas. We have to offer the whole range of products, from credit analysis to structured equity to succeed.” Deutsche Hyp targets a 15% return on equity by 2004.

The pure mortgage banks without the opportunity to develop investment banking functions are focusing on other services related to property. These could include the valuation of property for third parties – mortgage banks already do it for themselves – the provision of real-estate leasing, managing residential property, as well as extending loan and mortgage portfolio services for banks and companies with less sophisticated technology.

Rheinhyp and DG Hyp are both specializing in these services. DG Hyp’s main business areas will be risk management, as well as securing optimal refinancing. DG Hyp, a subsidiary of cooperatively owned DG Bank, predicts a split of the traditional mortgage banks into distribution, production and portfolio banks.

Since its own future lies in the last function, including the issuing of Pfandbriefe, it decided last year that other activities would largely be outsourced. Retail distribution had always been done by its owners, the local cooperative banks. Its production side was outsourced in July 2000, when the administration of loans has been put into the hands of a credit factory, the Kreditwerk, run together with Schwäbisch Hall, a cooperative building society.

The factory settles about 2.6 million mortgage loans from the two banks, processes all stages of real-estate lending or leasing and also hopes to attract more business from the cooperative sector. Such factories for the standardized mass production of loans have been set up by other banks, for example, Depfa’s Hypothekenmanagement GmbH.

But, where DG Hyp aspires to become a more specialized bank, Rheinhyp has decided, quite uniquely, to defy this trend. “We are a classic conservative mortgage bank with a lot of innovative ideas. We think that by broadening our business activities we reduce the risk that arises from a dependency on market cycles, and will thus be better placed in the market,” says Luchmann.

Rheinhyp will continuing to provide services around property through its subsidiary, Prompter. It will provide mortgages to retail clients and it boasts a new real-estate investment unit specializing in financial engineering for commercial real-estate financing. The bank has also set up a securitization team – an independent group called Eastec – which has produced one residential MBS offering, Europa I, and is working on Europa II. The group will be built up to offer its services to third parties, such as smaller banks or insurances that lack expertise.

DG Hyp is also keen to offer MBS and portfolio consultation especially, though not exclusively, to the cooperative banks. Last year, DG Hyp issued a e1 billion MBS transaction called Bauhaus, and wants to further securitize its own assets. However, before offering its services to third parties, it must await changes in the law, which are expected to feature in the new version next year.

But not every bank plans to become a service provider. “Württemberger Hypo’s main focus remains international real estate,” says Munsberg. “That’s where we see the biggest potential for growth. We don’t lay claim to being a complete service provider. As a medium-size mortgage bank, we prefer to operate in niches that we have expertise in.”

Württemberger Hypo particularly looks for growth outside Germany, where already more than 60% of its new mortgage loan commitments were generated in 2000.

Other smaller banks hope to escape the pressure to consolidate by choosing business areas that do not depend on size. They have a fair chance considering that institutional investors still very much demand classical, tailor-made, small-sized Pfandbriefe.

But many doubt that niche players can survive in the medium term. Knobloch, who said five years ago that there would only be 10 to 12 mortgage banks left by now – there are presently 25 mortgage banks – restates his forecast for another five-year period. “A bank with less than e50 billion million in assets cannot survive.” Five years ago, Germany counted 28 mortgage banks. But in 2001 “there will be a wave of mergers and acquisitions,” says Kirchner at West LB. “Mergers will be spurred by synergy and diversification effects and the need to realize the critical issue volumes necessary to maintain competitive status in the capital markets.”

However, Munsberg at Württemberger Hypo doesn’t expect a huge amount of M&A. “The smallest players might disappear, but apart from that, which other merger would make strategic sense? The obvious mergers, on a banking group level, have gone through.”

Merger possibilities

The mortgage banks that could still consolidate are thought to be the cooperative owned banks – DG Hyp, Münchener Hyp, Westfäli-sche Landschaft and SHL Hyp – and Commerzbank’s mortgage banks, Rheinhyp and HypEssen. A merger between the latter would, however, not bring any benefits from a strategic point of view, says Luchmann. “A merger purely driven by volumes is unlikely since it does not add any new focus.”

Württemberger Hypo provides a good example itself that size alone is not everything. The bank was one sibling of HypoVereinsbank not to be merged into the Bayerische Handelsbank. The parent bank’s explanation for excluding Württemberger “to leave its strategic options open” has been interpreted to mean that some close cooperation – maybe even a merger – with BW Bank, which has a 7% share in Württemberger, lies ahead. Another explanation is given by Ted Packmohr, fixed-income strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein: “A merger with the other mortgage banks would not have created much value for the Württemberger Hypo. Württemberger is already where the new mortgage bank wants to go. Württemberger has made a name in the international capital markets, it has issued MTN programmes, and it has also produced a far better return on equity than the other three banks.”

Apart from Württemberger Hypo, another of HypoVereinsbank’s mortgage banks was left out of the merger, though this was rather less expected. After having announced that WestHyp would be part of the new real-estate bank, HypoVereinsbank must have received an irresistible offer, as yet undisclosed. On March 14 it surprised the market with the announcement that it would sell its 75% share in WestHyp to Signal Iduna (24.9%) and WGZ Bank (50.1%), which is thought to integrate WestHyp into their mortgage bank WL Bank.

HypoVereinsbank said that “the gains will contribute to the establishment of the new real estate bank”.

MBS as an alternative

One way for smaller banks to resist consolidation pressures is by securitizing their assets, so freeing up capital and offloading credit risks. “While in the past, asset growth alone signalled the strength of a bank, we now need to deliver growth in efficiency, improved cost ratios and a higher return on equity,” says Munsberg at Würrtemberger Hypo. “Mortgage-backed securitization is a welcome tool for mortgage banks to optimize their capital structure, and thus increase shareholder value. We will see a lot more MBS.” Already, MBS were issued by Rheinhyp and DG Hyp last year. Eurohypo came out with a credit linked note, and Württemberger issued and arranged a credit default swap.

Securitizing mortgage loans also fulfils the original task of mortgage banks: to refinance their assets. Only 60% of any mortgage loan can go into the collateral pool, and more assets, for example from Spain and the UK, where jurisdictions do not recognize the priority claim of a Pfandbrief holder, are not eligible for Pfandbrief collateral. “These assets are refinanced through uncovered bonds, but now that the MBS market is growing in Europe, securitization represents a useful alternative,” says Knobloch.

Assets and jumbo Pfandbriefe outstandings of Germany’s mortgage banks (?bn)
  Total assets Mortgage Loan Portfolio Public Sector Finance (loans and bonds) Jumbo Pfandbriefe
  31.12.2000 2000 1999 2000 1999 outstanding+
HypoVereinsbank 336.3 109.6 108.5 24.2** 26.8** 23.6
HypoVereinsbank “real estate” 186.1          
Bayerische Handelsbank 29.8 11.7 10.8 15.5 14.5 2.76
Nürnberger Hyp 23.6 12.2 11.04 8.6 7.9 6.3
Südboden 23.1 9.9 9.1 11.9 11.1 5.8
Mortgage Portfolio of HVB 109.6          
Depfa 160 23.0* 21.9 113 107 38.5
AHB/Rheinboden 94.3          
AHB 63.8 9.3 7.5 47.5 43.5 40.1
Rheinboden 30.5 7.1 6.5 21.5 17.9 4.8
Deutsche Hyp (Frankfurt) 92.7 31.4* 31.7 49.4** 48.3** 29.2
Eurohypo 73 30.6 28 35.3 34.6 21.2
Rheinhyp 72.6 26.6 23.4 40.1 35.9 25.2
DG Hyp 70.6 24.2 23.5 42.5 36.6 22.6
HypEssen 58.8 2.3 1.8 52.6 50.5 35.6
Berlin Hyp 45.2* 19.3* 18.9 20.8** 19.7** 9.8
WestHyp 36.4 7.7 7.2 16.4 15 12.9
Württemberger Hypo 30.7 8.8 7.5 20 20.2 11.8
Münchener Hypo 27.8 10.1 9.5 14 12.8 9.7
Dexia Hypo Berlin 27.4 0.3 0.4 18.8 19.4 5.4
Deutsche Hypo (Hannover) 24 6.6 5.8 15.6 15.5 6.4
BfG Hyp 14.8 4.3 3.8 9 9.1 3.8
Westfälische Landschaft 13 4.8 4.3 7.7 5.2 0
SHL Hyp 12.2 1.4 1.3 10.6 9.6 5.2
Wüstenrot 11.0* 2.5* 2.3 7.7* 7.6 0.8
Düsseldorfer Hypo 9.2 0 0.1 7.0** 6.8** 3
HKB 2.6 0.04 0 2.4 1.5 0
MM Warburg 2.2 0.3 0.3 1.4** 1.4** 0
 
* as of 30.9.2000
** loans only
+ WestLB Research, 23.3.2001

“It’s a good additional tool,” agrees Munsberg. “But it’s no substitute for the Pfandbrief, because it’s simply too expensive. A bank doing an MBS needs to pay – on a relative basis – a higher coupon and a lot of fees to rating agencies, arrangers and underwriters of MBS.”

Rheinhyp’s Europe I MBS took about six months to structure. “A Pfandbrief, on the other hand, has a simple structure, can be structured within days and is at Libor flat, about 30bp cheaper,” concludes Luchmann. “It is a superior financing tool, and I don’t see that changing any time soon.”

But others, such as Eurohypo and Depfa, have had different experiences with MBS deals. Knobloch at Eurohypo finds that “MBS is indeed an attractive alternative finance tool. We have been very satisfied with the costs involved in our credit-linked note in 2000.”

Depfa also presumably hopes that MBS becomes very competitive, considering that its new restructuring plans do not explicitly state that a Pfandbrief issuing bank will be set up in the mortgage business group at Depfa Bank AG Bauboden in Wiesbaden. The existing issuing right will stay with the Depfa AG that will be part of Depfa Bank Europe in Dublin. “We could easily set up a new mortgage bank, or in fact reactivate a dormant entity,” says Jürgen Junginger at Depfa. “But that’s still in the stars. It might turn out that securitization will be the more efficient way forward. It is a few basis points more expensive, but then again it’s off balance sheet. And the real money in property financing is made in risk management anyway, not by saving a few basis points.”

The new Basle proposal will play into Depfa’s and Eurohypo’s forecasts. Risk weightings for MBS will be reduced from 100%, depending on the rating. Higher demand will stimulate the markets and drive down spreads, though thanks to Germany’s clever negotiation techniques at the first Basle accord, Pfandbriefe have little to fear with an amazingly low weighting of 10%.