| Elena Titova | ||||||
The international strategic investor has become and will continue to be the key figure in eastern European privatization. After a decade trying to adapt the principle of privatization to the region’s needs, investment bankers and governments have concluded that the most effective sales have involved transferring a substantial equity stake to a foreign company.
The investor must also receive a guarantee of management control, whether or not it holds more than 50% of the shares. This has proved to be the only way to attract the managerial and technical expertise needed to transform loss-making state enterprises into efficient, competitive companies. Strategic investors are also able to make the capital commitment needed to modernize factories and equipment that are mostly many years out of date.
“The only form of privatization that has clearly contributed to the post-privatization performance of enterprises is the sale of assets to strategic investors,” says the OECD.
Central European governments have also concluded, after years of trial and error, that sales should be as rapid as possible, because governments are reluctant to accept the social cost of redundancies when the companies are state-owned. There is also growing acceptance that tenders have to be transparent and competitive.
Western investment banks are needed to devise structures that will appeal to potential buyers, as Hungary’s abortive attempt to sell the energy sector in the mid-1990s demonstrated. The sale went smoothly once western banks became involved.
The privatization of the banking sector is essential for the creation of an efficiently functioning economy, as the Czech government discovered when it tried to leave the sector in state hands to ease the social cost of change.
Central European countries have also realised that voucher privatization, where citizens were given vouchers to exchange for shares, does not work. It was a disaster in the Czech Republic in the early 1990s.
“There are three goals of privatization: transferring ownership, improving corporate governance and maximizing revenue.
The trouble with voucher sales is that they only achieve the first one,” says Elena Titova, executive director at Goldman Sachs.
Equity flotations alone have also proved inadequate as they also do not attract western managerial expertise. Nor has the sale of small stakes to a number of strategic investors worked effectively. According to Nick Parker, head of project finance and privatization in Europe at international accountants PricewaterhouseCoopers: “The strength and structure of the economy, the development of local capital markets and various political pressures all have to be taken into account.”
| Nick Parker | ||||||
The challenge for central and eastern European countries was to satisfy popular expectations that were sky high after the collapse of communism, while providing the necessary solutions to modernize their economies without alienating popular support. Often, in the early 1990s, the result was that companies were sold in the wrong way for the wrong reasons.
The main drivers for privatization tended to be the demand for revenue, followed by the desire to create a share-owning democracy, with corporate governance often a poor third. According to Yahya Said, a central European specialist at the London School of Economics: “Improved efficiency and competition, which are frequently represented as the main goals, are more often than not an afterthought and only materialised in certain cases and in other cases not at all.”
However it is effective corporate governance that makes the real difference in a company’s ability to compete – that was impossible to achieve through voucher privatisation or share sales which tended to leave existing management in position.
Even though this lesson has been learnt there are additional pressures on government, particularly on the question of price. In Poland, for example, the National Audit Office is always asking if the government has got the best price. Ministers are increasingly tempted to protect themselves by making an initial IPO before selling a large stake to a strategic investor.
Because it was the first to sell off most of its industry to strategic investors, Hungary has avoided many of these problems. Nowhere has the impact of its approach been felt more strongly than in banking, which has now moved on to the next stage of restructuring with mergers and consolidation. The Czech Republic has now started to catch up by selling strategic stakes, though it had to learn the further lesson that it was not possible to sell banks with non-performing loans.
Foreign investors have learnt lessons as well. An executive at one multinational acquirer says that “as the foreign investor you have to have control of the company. You either do this through having a majority stake or a shareholders agreement, but you must have it.”
Even then there can be difficulties. The main one, particularly in the utilities sector, is that governments are reluctant to put up prices in the run-up to an election even though there is an agreement with the strategic investor to do so. Increasingly, companies are trying to give themselves stronger legal protection from the vagaries of government policy. “Investors in Poland are trying to get the agreed price increases put into statutory documents rather than the contract as they think this gives them more protection,” says Olga Grygier, a partner at Pricewaterhouse-Coopers.
There are also lessons to learn about operational control. An executive at one western company points out that in Poland the supervisory board has much less power than it would elsewhere in Europe. “When you make an acquisition, you have to make sure you have a strong position on the management board.” he says.