Chicago Exchanges: Working against the grain

Last month the grain floor at the Chicago Board of Trade voted in a chairman after its own heart. To the big banks trading on the Chicago exchanges it looked like another setback for the modernization they crave. It's not just electronic trading that's at issue, but also cooperation - and possibly mergers - between Chicago's three derivatives exchanges that may prove vital to stave off competition.

A light Cantor on Chicago’s home turf

Near the entrance to the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s trading floor is a notice detailing member seat prices. Early last month the bid stood at $500,000, the offer at $525,000, and the last seat sold had gone for $500,000. It’s a number the CBOE is proud of. The exchange hit its 25th birthday last year, making it the youngest of Chicago’s three derivatives exchanges, yet its seats are dearer than the Chicago Board of Trade’s. A full seat at the CBOT, 150 years old in 1998, fell to $400,000 early that year, down from a high of $850,000 (it has since rebounded to near $500,000).

That a newer exchange, with a 50% market share in the high-growth product of stock options and a more technologically advanced trading floor, should cost more to join might not seem surprising at first sight. But the CBOE was an offshoot of the CBOT, and any full member of the latter is automatically allowed to trade at the former. This highlights the rut the CBOT finds itself in. It is saddled with a huge mortgage and is rumoured to have paid anything between $30 million and $80 million for its link-up with Eurex in Frankfurt, and maybe as much again for the right to trade Dow Jones products. What’s more, it is facing threats to its franchise from start-up companies offering the same products more cheaply by electronic trading alone.

And in the midst of all this the CBOT’s members voted for a change of chairman early last month. It was a close call, as many had predicted – the winner got 608 votes, the loser 589. Most had expected the incumbent to scrape through, but out went 62-year-old Pat Arbor, who had held the post for six years, and in came David Brennan, a 42-year-old soyabean trader.

The sentiment on the trading floor in the week of the election pointed more to dissatisfaction with Arbor than any resounding endorsement of Brennan. Arbor, speaking to Euromoney a week after the election, claimed that it was “the often parochial and provincial views expressed on the grain-trading floor which lost me the election. They don’t share my view of the world, and, as the election proved, you should never underestimate the power of the grain traders at CBOT.”

Brennan’s campaign was vague, expressing concern at the cost of the link with Eurex (underlying this were hints of annoyance, even fear, that Arbor was linking the CBOT with an exchange that was wholly electronic), the cost of other projects, and at how little Arbor consulted the members.

Flat earth brigade

Arbor accused Brennan of conducting a negative campaign and called his approach “immature”. Brennan and Arbor had clashed before: three years earlier, when the new trading floor was under construction, Arbor appointed Brennan to a committee overseeing part of the work.

Brennan started to push for the tiers of the pit to be flatter than the steep design already agreed on; the design Brennan favoured suited the local traders more. “I had to marshall my forces back then to fight him off, which I did in the end,” says Arbor. “He thought the floor design should favour the locals, and keep the public at bay. I had to explain to him that this was an exchange for everyone’s benefit, not just for the locals, and the design had to reflect that. We weren’t going to spend $175 million on a floor which would be no bigger than the old one.” The dispute led Arbor to dub Brennan the chairman of the “flat earth society”, a tag regurgitated by the local media throughout the election campaign.

It’s a rather arcane dispute, but Arbor regards Brennan’s attitude as typical of the old guard in the grain pits: “He’s very vocal, immature, and has a narrow, parochial view of the world. He’s never been to Europe, and today he’s visiting the FCMs (futures commission merchants) in New York – I think that’s the first time he’s been there.”

Brennan’s victory was rooted in the pits where he trades. “For the first time, I think, the [grain] floor came together for one candidate,” said Joseph Bedore, an associate member of the CBOT, the day after the result. “In the past the wheat pit might have supported one man and the corn pit another. The majority in all pits wanted David Brennan this time.” The voting system is in any case weighted in their favour: most of the full seats are owned by the agricultural side, whereas the associate members – mainly trading financial contracts – only have one-sixth of the voting power.

It’s no surprise, then, that the sentiment in the financials pits and the bank offices was rather more gloomy. Two days before the election several of the big banks on the exchange – the FCMs – were less than complimentary about Brennan. “If we get that grain trader running the show it’ll be a complete disaster,” says one FCM. “He seems to be an open-outcry nut at the expense of any progress on electronic trading. It’ll spell the end of the CBOT.”

The FCMs, however – especially those based in New York – have long since lost patience with the Chicago exchanges, especially the CBOT, considering them parochial, archaic, isolationist institutions. But there is a definite pecking order. The CBOE is reckoned the best. It has the most up-to-date technology, combining open outcry with handheld electronic trading pads that obviate the need for paper and runners, so cutting down costs, and is run by Bill Brodsky, who is widely regarded as smart and progressive. Its products are in a high-growth area, it has a less cumbersome management and decision-making process than the other exchanges and it is forming a strategic alliance with the Pacific Exchange that should increase its share of traded stock options from 50% to 66%.

Next is the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, or the Merc), run by chairman Scott Gordon, who was elected at the beginning of last year. He has been active in pushing for change, in new technology, the governance structure, cooperation with the CBOT, even alliances with banks or technology companies. “Scott’s on top of all the issues,” says David Pryde, managing director at JP Morgan and a CME board member. “He has the charm, and more importantly the credibility with the members, to build a consensus. He’s a good leader and forward-thinking.”

Way behind these in the eyes of the bankers is the CBOT, the oldest and biggest exchange, which has the least amount of trading-floor technology, the highest costs, and seat prices that have fallen dramatically. The CBOT has been less constructive than the CME in discussions about cooperation between the two exchanges. Last year the CME suggested joint technological development programmes (admittedly using its own system, Globex2, offering it to the CBOT after that exchange was already committed to buying the Eurex system) and that the two exchanges cross-margin their interest-rate products.

Hedging possibilities

Cross-margining means that the exchanges would finally catch up administratively with what traders have been doing for years: using one or more products from each exchange as a combined hedge. At present this strategy is treated as two unrelated trades but cross-margining would allow clients to book it as one and so make significant savings on use of capital.

The CME and the CBOE already have an agreement to do it for for trades involving the S&P index and individual stocks. This idea is still on the table between the CME and the CBOT, but little progress has been made.

This lack of progress annoyed the FCMs: all of them are members of both exchanges, and they would benefit from a combined electronic trading platform rather than two, or more; and the benefits of cross-margining are self-evident. The banks were particularly keen to establish a common clearing platform for the two exchanges. The CME and the CBOT have their own clearing houses – the former’s is an integral division, the latter’s – the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation – is nominally independent of the exchange.

The issue here for the FCMs was not saving money (or rather cutting the amount of capital they need to put against their trades). That could be achieved by the CME alone changing its clearing method, since it clears on a gross basis (so the banks have to set aside more capital to trade there) not on a net basis like the BOTCC. Rather, the FCMs decided to regard the issue of a common clearing platform as an indication of whether the two exchanges were capable of working together at all. The banks have a vested interest here: the top 10 FCMs probably provide 80% of the capital for the clearing operations, but the membership structure, based on one member-one vote, does not give them voting power equivalent to their financial commitment. “The FCMs have very little say in the clearing operations,” says Carver Winckman, managing director at Goldman Sachs. “That it failed poses a major problem. We want a bigger say on how our capital is put at risk.”

The banks had been working with the two exchanges and the financial investment authority for over a year on common clearing and had, says one FCM, “given up a lot of ground to the exchanges in an effort to get them to agree on something”. Each exchange wanted its own clearing organization to prevail and was wary of giving away too much. And, says another FCM, “they use a lot of the proceeds from clearing to fund their research and development arm”. By March the various parties had come to an agreement, which was to be put to a vote at the respective exchanges’ boards, and would then go before the members for approval. But in early September the CBOT board rejected the proposal.

The response from the FCMs was immediate. “They had warned us that this was our chance to prove that we could work together,” says Gordon at the Merc. “And that if we couldn’t, they’d go and look at other options. Once the CBOT rescinded its support, the FCMs refused to talk to us for a while.” This continued for several weeks, despite Gordon frequently contacting them and asking for meetings. But the banks followed through on their threat, and have spent the last three months in discussions with several partners for providing the same services for less cost and less hassle – technology firms have been high on the list, as have independent clearing operations such as the London Clearing House. In the week of the election it was leaked that the National Association of Securities Dealers (the parent company of Nasdaq) has held talks and has expressed an interest in helping to form a new derivatives exchange.

Strategic review

Back in Chicago, the CBOT’s rejection had several consequences. It spurred Gordon into adding a review of clearing into the strategic review of the whole exchange he had set up earlier in the year – the result being that it appears the Merc is willing to offer clearing on a net basis and even change the governance structure of the clearing house to give the FCMs a bigger say.

Up the road at the BOTCC the penny has also dropped, but action seems to have been limited. One senior executive, Les Rosenthal, has been sounding members on whether the governance structure should be changed from one-member-one-vote to one share-one vote. And most of the FCM houses have been offered seats on the BOTCC board, but have all rejected the offer, believing it would leave them compromised.

Many regard the rejection of common clearing as the beginning of the end for Arbor, who had supported it. As a result of his stance, they say (and Arbor agrees) he was passed over as the candidate for chairman in favour of Brennan. Whatever the truth of this, the FCMs believe it and regard it as yet another example of the old guard winning out. “To the guys there stuck in the past it’s very simple,” says a banker. “As far as any cooperation with the Merc goes, it’s a no-no: they hate the Merc, and will tell you how it screwed up the butter futures contract, for example. But that was back in 1960-something, and is completely irrelevant. As for their views on us, it’s a zero-sum game: what’s good for us must be bad for them.”

At the root of it all is a fear, not just of change, but of an end to a way of life. The CBOT and the CME aren’t teenagers like Liffe and Matif. Open-outcry trading in its various forms has been a major employer in Chicago for 150 years, has spawned many small trading and broking firms, many of them family businesses, and has been a major money-spinner especially in recent years when the locals have been earning more than their New York counterparts. As many as 150,000 jobs in and around Chicago are directly or indirectly dependent on the three derivatives exchanges.

Yet City Hall appears to have largely kept out of the dispute. All exchanges talk of good relations with the mayor of Chicago, Richard Daley, yet in all the wrangles and setbacks of the last year, he has stayed on the sidelines. “What we really need is for Daley to do what Clinton did with the Israelis and the PLO,” says a locally based FCM. “Put the Merc and the CBOT in a room together and keep them there until they come up with a combined plan. If someone doesn’t force them to talk to each other, they’ll only do it properly for themselves when it’s too late.” Others don’t expect the mayor to be proactive: “He’s told both us and the Merc that he’d like to see us get together, but he’s put no pressure on us,” says Arbor. “He’s very supportive of us, especially on regulatory issues, as are our local senators and representatives. But it’s not his job to take sides.”

Some entertain their own theories as to why there is so little input from the city. All lead back to CBOT president Thomas Donovan. He is regarded as the real force at the exchange – he earned $2 million last year, Arbor $200,000), and he has direct access to the mayor: years earlier Donovan was chief of staff for a previous mayor, Daley’s more famous father – also Richard. “He’s a political animal,” says one FCM. “Over the years he’s made enough friends, and bankrolled enough senators and representatives in Washington to be able to call in a few favours now they’re needed. And he’s probably telling Daley junior that there’s nothing to worry about.” It’s not Brennan who’ll scupper any chance the CBOT might have to be competitive, says this FCM, and even several local traders, but Donovan. “I doubt we’ll see much progress until he goes.”

The spat between Liffe and the Deutsche Terminbörse early last year showed Chicago that, whatever the reasons, a wholly electronic derivatives exchange could wrest a contract – admittedly the German exchange’s national contract – from an established open-outcry operation. Threats from other new electronic exchanges – especially the Cantor Fitzgerald operation which at the time was still seeking regulatory approval – added to the fear, and panic quickly set in in Chicago. “In April,” says Gordon at the CME. “I told them that we expected to have the review completed by the fourth quarter, and the response was instant: ‘We’ll be dead by then!’ Well, that hasn’t happened.”

Says Arbor:”The main problem for us is competition. The new companies now proposing to join the battle have excellent technology, are run as a for-profit business rather than by a series of conflicting vested interests, have access to the capital markets, and their governance structure is less cumbersome and so more responsive than our own. Those are big challenges for us.”

The CBOT faces a threat from the Cantor Fitzgerald-New York Cotton Exchange joint venture called the Cantor Financial Futures Exchange (CFFE – see box) launched in September, although it has yet to make any significant inroads into the US treasury futures market. The CME’s Eurodollar contract is facing a more immediate challenge from the multi-bank-owned Electronic Broking Service (EBS), which launched forward-rate agreements on the Eurodollar in mid-November.

Even if EBS doesn’t make a big impact, says Gordon, “it’ll be someone else. We’re a service industry and offer a successful product, so naturally there will be others coming along to take a slice of our pie. It’s not that we’re going out of business, but we must modify the way we conduct our operations.”

Gary Sagui, an independent trader who has worked on the floors of one or both exchanges for the past 19 years, sent a letter in June to members of both exchanges outlining why he thought they should merge and asking them to sign a petition supporting it. Costs would be shared, but also, the letter says, “the merger of our two organizations would create a dominant and unassailable brand name in the world of risk management … Any new ventures we chose to pursue whether they be in futures or other instruments would have instant credibility.”

The other option, Sagui writes, is too catastrophic to contemplate: “The whispers that send shivers down my spine are scenarios where the CBOT and the CME would list each other’s products on an electronic platform. This would be MAD (mutually assured destruction).” Why? Because “it would likely be a catalyst that inspires the large FCMs to start their own electronic exchange, and pull their capital and business out of both the CBOT and the CME. A merger would prevent this catastrophe.”

Of the responses Sagui received, 94% supported his plan; getting the responses in was not easy, however, and some estimate that only 10% of the members replied. Gordon and Arbor both believe that a merger, in theory, would be desirable, but practicalities again get in the way: for one, would such an idea get past the minority of grain traders who hold such a large share of the vote? But also how would a merger be possible given the two exchanges’ transatlantic link-ups, the CME with Matif, and the CBOT with Eurex? Each is now committed to developing its own electronic system.

Although it would be ironic if the two Chicago exchanges were forced to set aside years of enmity and failed cooperation by a merger or joint venture between their two European partners; it might not be on the cards at present, but the momentum started in the cash equities market in Europe by the London and Frankfurt stock exchanges soon proved hard to resist for the other European exchanges – the same could happen to the derivatives exchanges.

Small beginnings

Other locals have idea similar to Sagui’s. “There’s a groundswell of opinion on the CME floor that we should cooperate more with the CBOT,” says Ron Pankau, a local trader and vice-chairman of the CME’s Eurodollar pit. “A full merger would probably be best, but we need to start off with the smaller things, such as common clearing, cross-margining and technology. It would be a sign of our intent and commitment to the market.”

Another is John Newhouse, a local broker in the Eurodollar pit at the CME. Arguably the brokers have most to lose if the exchanges are forced to go electronic, but he is sanguine about the development. “The more efficiencies we can work into the system, the better it’ll be for all of us. I, for example, have 15 brokers working in this pit, and I need 26 runners just to take the orders to and from the pit. A good mix of technology and open outcry would be an ideal solution. Yet we have our techno guys working here, the CBOT have theirs, as do the CBOE. We might be trading different products, but we all need the same up-front technology, so why not put them all together?”

Nor does the cliché that the open-outcry traders are scared of electronic trading appear to ring true. “A lot of these guys disappear up to their offices and trade Nasdaq stocks when the market down on the floor is slow,” says Robin Ross at JP Morgan’s trading desk at the CME. “There’s a lot of support for more computerization on the floor, especially to get rid of all the paper and and streamline the clearing process. A lot of us feel that a hybrid system using computers and open outcry, much like that at the CBOE or the New York Stock Exchange, would work well here.”

Pankau agrees. Adaptability is hardly alien to the traders, he says. “When I started here in the early 1980s we didn’t even use hand signals, we just went into the pits and shouted. Now, if customers want us to use computers, we will, which is why most of us are in favour of the side-by-side trading which Scott Gordon has proposed. We trade on computers after hours in any case, so it’s hardly something new.”

But open outcry is still the favoured method of price discovery, and with the high volumes and huge liquidity that the CME and the CBOT have in their main products it will take time for a serious competitor to break in. Liquidity doesn’t transfer immediately, as the CME has discovered with its EuroCanadian dollar contract introduced in the early summer of last year.

The hope was that the CME could break the stranglehold of the large banks in Montreal, but liquidity is so high there that potential clients have so far been loth to move the business.

Recent market events have bought the exchanges some breathing space: the high levels of volatility after the Russian crisis in August brought the benefits of highly liquid exchanges to the fore again.

Liffe has not capitulated to the DTB as some had predicted it would, and now the advent of the euro and the year 2000 problem are forcing institutions to focus on modifying existing technology rather than developing too many new products. “Any potential competitor’s system not in place by the middle of this year will most likely not arrive until after January 2000, which gives us some extra time to prepare,” says Gordon. “I’d say that we are in the eye of the hurricane right now.”

The FCMs are watching closely, restating how Chicago, with its liquidity, is the place of choice for exchange-traded derivatives, yet also warning what could happen: “They have the technology and we have the flow,” says Winckman at Goldman Sachs. “But they must be aware that there is very little they can provide which we can’t build through a joint venture with, say a technology firm.