On December 9 hundreds of senior managers of HypoVereinsbank, Germany’s second biggest bank, will converge on Munich to listen to their executive chairman Albrecht Schmidt.
Schmidt, known internally as “little Napoleon”, will explain to them how it was not his vanity and over-vaulting ambition that paralyzed the bank for a year. Far from it. It was a necessary, if rather slow blood-letting, to purge the bank – the result of a 1998 merger between Bayerische Vereinsbank (BV), previously run by Schmidt, and Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank (Hypobank) – of its worst Hypobank elements.
Schmidt, assisted by a couple of lieutenants from McKinsey, will unveil a strategy – Kurs 125 – to take the bank into the next century, and achieve a near-doubling of the share price to €125. At the end of November it stood at around €70.
There is more than a touch of irony here. HypoVereinsbank is in play. During November there were strong rumours that it would be merged with Dresdner Bank, a wannabe global universal bank which has lost its way. Schmidt, who for nearly a decade has insisted that his bank will be a “bank of the regions”, could hardly re-invent himself and come out on top of the merged Hypo-Dresdner, unless Dresdner is largely dismantled. But while the threat of a forced merger looms (the major shareholder of both banks is Munich-based insurance giant Allianz), Schmidt’s standalone strategy is not convincing staff or shareholders.
“Don’t underestimate Schmidt,” warns a former colleague. “He’s a supreme politician.”
The politician appeared to blow it in October 1998, when in an emotional public outburst he announced that HypoVereinsbank would have to make extra provisions of Dm3.5 billion to cover gaping holes found in the real estate portfolio that Hypobank had brought to the merger. Schmidt said he was deeply disappointed and his “belly was full of rage”.
That triggered a stand-up row with Eberhard Martini, the former chairman of Hypo then heading the supervisory board of the merged entity. Martini lashed back, saying Schmidt was consumed by vanity ( Eitelkeit) and unfit to run a bank. The battle of words ran for a week before being patched up, and was deeply damaging to the bank. Allianz begged Martini to resign, but he refused, saying his job was to protect the Hypo staff he had brought into the merger. He knew it would need a shareholders’ meeting to unseat him.
Schmidt had publicly indicted the culture and risk-management practices of the old Hypobank. But he didn’t follow through – maybe he wasn’t strong enough – and rid the managing board there and then of its Hypobank elements. What should have been a night of the long knives turned into a battle of the beancounters.
Almost every auditor in Germany and every expert in real-estate valuation has been drawn into this wrangle, and none has covered itself in glory. The attempt to put hard numbers on a portfolio of real-estate projects, many of them conceived in the euphoria of a newly-unified Germany, seems doomed from the beginning. Yet accountant after accountant has been thrown into the fray to see if yet another valuation can convince Joe Public.
During the course of this exercise, former Hypobank’s risk management practices have been laid open to ridicule; Germany’s bank supervisors have lost faith – perhaps rightly – in the effectiveness of outside auditors; and the Munich state prosecutor has embarked on a lengthy criminal investigation into former Hypobank board members and their auditors on suspicion that they recklessly destroyed value in the bank.
The irony here is that the paralysis unleashed on the bank by Schmidt from October 1998 probably cost it far more, in reputation and hard cash and its share price, than any amount of poorly-performing property loans.
Hypobank’s real-estate spree
Hypobank’s auditors before the merger were Wedit (Wollert-Elmensdorff), local partners of Deloitte & Touche. They had watched Hypobank’s property portfolio closely through the heady days of German unification, the ramp in property prices in east and west Germany, which collapsed in 1993, and the desperate work-out process which followed as developers slipped into arrears and unfinished offices and apartments stayed unlet.
Hypobank was not the only victim of the euphoria, but perhaps it had been the most gung-ho. It had even put its name to plots without secure planning permission: the legend goes that you could walk on Hypobank property from Flensburg in the north to Munich in the south. Berliner Bank, a part of Bankgesellschaft Berlin, probably has more excuse for its billions of losses, since it is based in the area most hit by the property downturn.
Hypobank set up subsidiaries Hypo-Tecta and Hypo-Real which invested in 52 property joint-ventures with local partners. It had its own investment portfolio designed to be fed into listed property funds. Guaranteeing rents for up to five years is normal practice to win critical mass for such ventures. But as the slump continued into the 1990s Hypobank staff found themselves guaranteeing rents for 25, even 30 years. Moreover, those rents were at the very top of, or even above, prevailing price bands.
Hypobank, generally a risk-happy bank, had a problem, which was largely suspected in the markets. As early as 1993 it stopped writing any new property business. The existing projects were more than enough to cope with. The entrepreneurs responsible for running such business would naturally put as optimistic a gloss on them as possible: this had been the longest property downturn in modern German history, surely the rebound would come soon. It seems that the joint ventures were beyond the scope of Hypobank’s internal audit, at least at the beginning. Nor was there, in those days, much attempt to re-rate the credit standing of these property counterparties, unless they blatantly fell into arrears. Some of their debt was recapitalized to maintain interest payments. Arguably, this might be seen as natural for a bank trying to nurse its customers through a down-cycle.
But in October 1995 the bank supervisors in Berlin, BaKred, responded to market rumours by ordering a special audit of Hypobank. This is not unusual. In fact the BaKred has no audit staff of its own and under section 44 of the 1961 Banking Act sends in private auditors to do spot checks, just to keep banks on their toes. BaKred asked KPMG in Frankfurt, which had drawn the short straw, to pay special attention to Hypobank’s property portfolio. KPMG gave Hypobank a clean bill of health, although such an audit isn’t made public at the time.
In the continued property slump the rumours persisted. Ekkehard Wenger, professor of finance at Würzburg University and a renowned champion of shareholder value, tabled a motion at the 1997 shareholders’ meeting asking for a special audit of Hypobank’s property portfolio. Wenger didn’t believe the 1996 accounts had stated its true value. The motion was rejected by a crushing 99% of shareholders.
Wenger believes responsible members of the bank’s supervisory board should nevertheless have taken note and had the portfolio examined.
But things were moving fast on other fronts. Deutsche Bank had been buying Bayerische Vereinsbank shares, prompting fears that Bavaria’s finest bank would be swallowed by the giant in Frankfurt. There were also fears that Hypobank in Munich and Dresdner Bank in Frankfurt would be forced together by their biggest shareholder Allianz. The insurer has often been termed the spider in the web of German finance: because of its vast portfolio of stakes in German companies and banks it has an important say in almost every German corporate finance manoeuvre.
Viermetz the fixer
Kurt Viermetz, an executive board member of JP Morgan and a Bavarian, was one of those who came up with the elegant Bavarian solution: Bayerische Vereinsbank would exchange its shares in Allianz for Allianz’s shares in Hypobank and the two banks merge. To sweeten the deal, it would take special dispensation from the Bavarian government to waive capital gains tax triggered when these holdings were exchanged at market value. Bavarian prime minister Edmund Stoiber and his government would be happy to oblige, to create a Bavarian giant and save Finanzplatz München from becoming a satellite of Finanzplatz Frankfurt. (Such tax waivers have since been outlawed, but not retrospectively, by the Bonn government.)
Between May and July 1997 frantic work went on to prepare for a merger announcement. JP Morgan acted for BV and Morgan Stanley for Hypobank in what was termed a merger of equals – how equal remained to be seen. Right after the July 21 merger announcement teams from BV did a rapid due-diligence on Hypobank, “looking for a potential deal-breaker,” recalls BV accounting chief Michael Kemmer. They estimated that it would cost between Dm1 billion and Dm2 billion to clean up the property portfolio, but this would not undermine the deal.
Coincidentally, a new Hypo manager took over the property brief around this time. Gisbert Dreyer came into the job on July 1, and like many incoming managers ordered a fresh assessment of the risks. By September he had concluded that the portfolio needed Dm2.1 billion of new provisions. A September 26 executive board meeting listened to what he had to say but disagreed: Dm1.5 billion would be quite sufficient, they said.
KPMG (BV’s auditors) and Wedit (Hypo’s auditors) embarked on another valuation exercise to fix the price at which Allianz shares would be exchanged for Hypo shares. BV asked KPMG to take a special look at the real estate portfolio. According to subsequent reports the KPMG people had difficulty getting some information, although the obstruction wasn’t enough to arouse suspicion. “In retrospect,” says a HypoVereinsbank source, “KPMG should probably have said ‘stop’, and insisted on stretching the deadline for the valuation.”
The pricing was due to be announced in February 1998, to conclude the deal a month later. Everyone was concerned about the property portfolio. Hypo chairman Martini generously said he would make a sweeping Dm2 billion provision to take care of the problem and bring a clean bank into the merger. His board still believed Dm1.5 billion was adequate. Martini received advice that the provisions wouldn’t be tax deductible above Dm1.5 billion. So they settled on the lower figure. “We’ve since learned that this is nonsense,” says Kemmer, who is now head of accounting and controlling at HypoVereinsbank. “If Martini had made the provisions specific he could have charged as much as he liked against tax.”
There was a problem with a specific provision, however. Such provisions risked triggering a mark-to-market of the entire portfolio (the portfolio had always been valued on a going-concern basis, not at liquidation value, for understandable reasons). The same reason had prevented a sell-off of all or bits of the portfolio at discounted prices.
In February the exchange was confirmed at six Hypobank shares for one Allianz share, approved by KPMG and Wedit on March 11, and certified on March 18 by PricewaterhouseCoopers as merger auditor.
Skeleton in the cupboard
As the banks prepared to integrate, BV board member Paul Siebertz sought more information on the property portfolio. He asked about a showpiece project in Berlin’s Alexanderplatz but was given the runaround. “Siebertz began to sense what the risks were, from March 1998,” says a source close to the old Hypobank.
In June a freelance accountant, Georg Wengert, wrote a letter to supervisory board chairman Klaus Götte protesting that the share exchange overvalued Hypobank, since “there is a skeleton in the cupboard”. BV accountants, becoming alarmed, now looked deeper into the portfolio. Hypobank’s internal auditors went through the same exercise. Siebertz was building up a picture, particularly of the portfolio of 52 joint ventures. On September 9, according to one account, he concluded there was a great black hole.
According to Schmidt it was only at this late stage that the BV team begin to realize what Hypo had brought to the party: an unsaleable hotch-potch of failed or failing projects in Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Munich and elsewhere.
Schmidt prepared his bombshell. The team fixed the price of a thorough clean-out at an extra Dm3.5 billion. They checked the figure with their auditors KPMG Munich. Only three years before KPMG Frankfurt had given the portfolio a clean bill of health, now essentially the same portfolio had been marked down by a total of Dm5 billion. It was subjected first to the new broom of Dreyer and then to the more conservative management philosophy of Bayerische Vereinsbank, but the difference was nevertheless staggering.
On the eve of announcing nine-month figures – the first for the combined bank – Schmidt invited Martini for a friendly drink. The two men are different: Schmidt driven, self-contained and ascetic, Martini, a flamboyant, cigar-puffing bon-viveur. Still, they had been good friends and sparring partners over the years. Now Schmidt had the upper hand. He warned Martini about tomorrow’s revelations. Martini tried to shrug the whole thing off: he’s never bothered about the details, only the big picture.
The “accounting error” was initially explained in terms of the old Vereinsbank’s more conservative risk assessment. The supervisory board affirmed the following month, after the fireworks were over, that the 1997 year-end accounts of Hypobank wouldn’t have to be adjusted. If Martini hadn’t reacted so violently with his personal attack on Schmidt perhaps the whole affair would have been swept neatly under the carpet. But Schmidt had either misjudged Martini, or intentionally prodded him into a declaration of war.
A dawn raid
The hard-pressed fraud team at Munich’s state prosecutor’s office could no longer ignore the challenge. Attorneys had already been making a few discreet phone calls, but now the prosecutor’s office prepared for an investigation. On January 5 1999 it swooped on the offices of the former Hypobank and seized hundreds of documents. Two months later it opened formal investigations into 12 people, including five former board members of Hypobank and two partners of its auditors Wedit. The charges are Untreue(breach of trust) – extending loans that could damage the value of the bank – and falsche Darstellung(misrepresentation) of the balance sheet at shareholder meetings. Such cases are notoriously long-winded and difficult to prove, as state prosecution team leader Johannes Nargorsen admits. The prosecutor’s office has limited resources and, perhaps sensibly, doesn’t use outside accountants. “If we aren’t sharp enough to get to the bottom of this ourselves,” says Nargorsen, “we might as well pack up and go home.”
Whatever the state prosecutor finds, however, the last year has seen the case aired liberally in the newspapers and by various special audits.
In January, HypoVereinsbank’s share price began to fall, on speculation that there were more revelations to come. It fell from €70 to below €50 in less than a month. And the speculation wasn’t without foundation. In the first quarter of 1999 the bank had to declare a further provision of Dm430 million for bad credits. Schmidt appeared to have lost his way. Since making up with Martini – a tactical mistake – his “bank of the regions” had lost momentum, despite the purchase of a small bank in Poland, BHP. Behind the scenes, sympathizers insist, the integration was proceeding apace, with the enormous task of marrying IT systems and closing 500 branches continuing without fuss.
But the outside world saw only a languid bank with a lacklustre share price, and its chief sulking like Achilles in his tent.
To scotch the rumours of yet more hidden risks the supervisory board ordered a fresh audit by Schitag. Then another was commissioned by the managing board, from Jörg Baetge, professor of auditing at Münster University. Both reports agreed with the property valuation and the Dm3.5 billion provision but they weren’t made public and failed to convince the market.
In desperation HypoVereinsbank’s four biggest shareholders – Allianz, Viag, Munich Re and the state of Bavaria – approached Kurt Viermetz of JP Morgan. Couldn’t he, with his stellar and untainted international reputation, bring new blood and fresh vision to the supervisory board?
Viermetz accepted on May 2, four days before the annual shareholders’ meeting. On May 6 this great bear of a man took charge, saying there would be a new audit and this time it would be totally independent, and public, to draw a line under the whole affair. In the meantime the shareholders left a sword of Damocles hanging over the board members’ heads: they withheld their Entlastung(approval of the board’s activities over the last financial year). The Entlastungof the managing and supervisory boards will be voted on at the shareholders’ meeting on December 17.
There was now almost no accounting firm left whose image hadn’t somehow been tainted by the affair. The supervisory board selected BDO Deutsche Warentreuhand of Munich. BDO set to work, having unprecedented access to BV and Hypo staff. It was given four questions to examine: first, were the risk provisions in Hypo’s 1997 year-end balance sheet appropriate? Second, was the special Dm3.5 billion risk provision announced by HypoVereinsbank in October 1998 justified?
Third, was the exchange ratio for the shares appropriate? Fourth, was sufficient due diligence done to fix that ratio?
BDO partners sifted through hundreds of documents and interviewed scores of Hypobank people. They realized they were being put head-to-head with the entire German accounting profession, particularly Wedit (Deloitte & Touche), which had signed off on Hypobank audits for years.
Yet more audits
To defend itself, Wedit commissioned its own special audit from two professors well-versed in the theory of property valuation: Wolfgang Ballwieser of Munich University and Peter Kupsch of the University of Bamberg. The professors’ report appeared on August 16 and was circulated to the board, the supervisory board, and the state prosecutor.
The Ballwieser report concluded that Hypobank’s own valuations were well within the bounds of the reasonable; that the property downturn had been unprecedented and could hardly have been expected to last; and that its long-term rent guarantees were acceptable for properties included in real-estate funds. If the two professors are to be believed, then Schmidt’s outburst last October could well be seen as a bid for power and an attempt to crush the non-Vereinsbank elements on his board.
HypoVereinsbank’s share price, which rose close to €70 after the intervention of Viermetz, took another plunge into the unknown. BDO partners, going quietly about their business, were suddenly under pressure to produce the antidote: the last word on that damned property portfolio. They also tried to examine the risk management procedures of the old Hypobank, and the validity of the share exchange, given the existence of a Dm3.5 billion black hole.
The BDO report was delivered on October 22. On October 26 Viermetz and Schmidt gave a press conference. Viermetz was the executioner. He said the report confirmed there was indeed a Dm3.5 billion black hole in the bank, in fact it was Dm3.629 billion at year-end 1997. The risk-controls in the bank left a lot to be desired, but some of the shortcomings could be explained in terms of the euphoria of German reunification. The bank had simply been unable to manage and reduce the risks after 1993. The 1997 year-end accounts of Hypobank would therefore be declared null and void; but the 1998 year-end figures of the new HypoVereinsbank had already taken the Dm3.5 billion into account.
Viermetz said the BDO report confirmed that the valuation that fixed the share exchange ratio had been conservative enough to take such unexpected future risks into account: accountants had given Hypobank a worse risk-weighting on its future cashflows than they did for the risk-averse BV. “This means,” Viermetz told the conference, “that the exchange ratio in the merger document has complete validity despite these provisions which became necessary.” Not everyone was convinced by this argument.
Martini shaken
Then Viermetz proceeded to the execution. “Herr Dr Martini has told me that he is deeply affected by the results of the special audit and that he didn’t expect such an outcome, although that doesn’t mean he accepts it. ‘In this new situation’ he quoted Martini as saying, ‘I can best serve the merged bank by giving up my seat on the supervisory board'”.
Four managing board members also resigned, saying they were “deeply affected, regardless of whether one feels the results and arguments of the auditor are relevant”. Although none of these men, Peter Hoch, Matin Kölsch, Martin Schütte and Josef Wertschulte, was directly responsible for the property portfolio, under company law they had joint responsibility as board members of the former Hypobank. Two other former board members, now running HypoVereinsbank subsidiaries in Hamburg and Stuttgart, also resigned.
Viermetz hailed the BDO report as the most important step to clearing up the whole matter. But the final step will be an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting on December 17 to discuss the report and vote on the postponed approval of the supervisory and managing boards. “This will then draw a final line under the matter,” Viermetz said in October.
Viermetz insisted the BDO report has nothing to do with the state prosecutor’s investigation. Yet, extraordinarily, the BDO report clearly has made use of testimony to the state prosecutor. It mentions statements made in April to substantiate that Hypobank staff found the new valuations of Dreyer “excessive”.
Paragraph 353 of German criminal law forbids quotation in whole or in substantial part from confidential legal testimony before a trial. Yet the BDO partners clearly have had access to statements. So has at least one newspaper: in November, the weekly Sternquoted liberally from a statement by Dreyer.
The BDO report also appeared to exonerate Hypobank’s supervisory board from blame. “In our opinion,” says the report, “the supervisory board could not have known that the additional provisions of Dm2.1 billion found necessary on December 1 1997 had not been set according to liquidation values.” Nor could the supervisory board be expected to have known whether the provisions could be offset against tax. “Moreover, on March 30 1998, Wedit found the 1997 risk provisions appropriate.”
The BDO report was read with fury at BaKred, the banking supervisory authority in Berlin. It suggested what Jochen Sanio, BaKred’s deputy director, had feared: in 1995 his special auditors KPMG had not got to the bottom of Hypobank’s real estate exposure. What did that say for the use of private auditors to dig deep into bank management? It suggested that auditors tend to go along with what other auditors have found: in this case KPMG perhaps didn’t question enough the basis of Wedit’s audit.
Public opinion now admires BDO for having openly found previous auditors wanting. Professionals usually close ranks in Germany (it’s almost impossible to get one medical doctor to testify against another). Yet there are those who say that the BDO report has been used to vindicate numbers plucked from the sky at the end of last year; to somehow cleverly argue that the exchange ratio was still OK and to draw a line under the whole affair.
Certainly, the valuation of real estate projects is an art more than a science. To come out with figures within Dm130 million of those Schmidt produced last year is too good to be true.Valuation experts say that marginally different assumption on interest rates or rental rates could alter the calculation by hundreds of millions.
So what does this episode tell us? It is more about politics and the credibility of bank management than raw numbers. One section of the Bavarian mafia (Schmidt) took on another (Martini) and played a numbers game to beat him. Martini and his boys were marked to market, fairly or unfairly, and stripped out of the bank. That’s what you do with risk assets you don’t want.
The accounting profession must lick its wounds and ponder how it can rehabilitate itself as the shareholder’s and supervisor’s precision tool. The supervisors must consider a revision of the 1961 banking act, which is partly happening by attrition: BaKred has its own team examining banks’ market risk models – not trusting the accountants.
HypoVereinsbank must live beneath three shadows: the threat of merger or takeover, the persistent uncertainty about how much to provision, and the state prosecutor’s investigation. Two of those shadows might never have featured if Schmidt had kept his mouth shut and used Hypo’s ample hidden reserves. “Securities law wouldn’t have allowed that,” Schmidt replies.
Behind the first and biggest shadow is Paul Achleitner, Germany’s most famous investment banker, who is about to take over as CFO of Allianz. Achleitner is widely expected to do deals with Allianz’s holdings in financial institutions. HypoVereinsbank can’t escape being in play.