If I had $50,000, just how much interest could I get? There is no simple answer. Interest rates go up and down daily and vary from bank to bank. The interest you can get on your dollar from a Turkish bank can be more than four times the figure offered by a US bank. This interest rate variation is even more evident with the Turkish lira. Indeed Mahfi Egilmez, ex-secretary general of the Turkish treasury, calculated that in 1998 the real interest on treasury bills oscillated within a range of some 1,866%.
To profit from fluctuating interest rates it is necessary to do some legwork. Turkish banks do not post their interest rates and face-to-face negotiations are advisable because there is likely to be some room for bargaining. The more money you have and the longer you are willing to deposit it, the higher the interest you are likely to be offered.
So I get out of a taxi in Uskudar (on the Asian side of Istanbul), turn up the collar of my trench coat, and try to look like a man with $50,000 in his pocket. Uskudar’s high street is a good place to carry out this type of research; within a stretch of less than a kilometre there are branches of 10 different banks nestling under the shadows of the Ottoman mosques. I step into a branch of Isbank, the biggest of Turkey’s commercial banks.
As it happens, I could not have chosen a worse day. It was the first day of the month and a Monday, when the banks are at their busiest. Isbank was so crowded that I had to queue up to join the queue. I waited my turn at a small machine, which spat out a slip of paper establishing my place in the queue. At 10.45am, I was the 700th customer to have brought my business there. A screen indicated that there were 295 clients ahead of me in the queue. I could either wait for my turn or come back later. I decided to give the other banks in the district a try.
Across the street at Yapi Kredi (YKB), another bank popular with consumers, the queue had spilled out into the street and the tellers, mostly women, seemed to be on the verge of hysteria. Turkish banks have spent millions of dollars establishing one of the most advanced electronic banking infrastructures in Europe and almost all transactions can be done through ATM machines, telephone lines or the internet. But many people are still reluctant to let their fingers do the walking.
A middle-aged woman who was obviously illiterate thrust a receipt into my face, asking me to check whether the teller had really deposited her TL15 million ($41) into her account or taken advantage of her and pocketed some of it. I assured her that the transaction was entirely above-board, but I could not relieve her of her anxiety. She marched up to another person for reaffirmation.
Fortunately YKB’s foreign-exchange department was on the first floor and was relatively quiet. Here I got my first offer for my fictitious $50,000: 12.5% a year.
At the new Iktisat branch nearby they bid 13%. At Finansbank a charming lady offered me 13.5%. At Garanti, again a top-five bank, I could not get more than 12.5%. When I showed him my other offers my interlocutor rang headquarters to negotiate a better rate but to no avail. It seemed that I had peaked at Finansbank. To summarize: the rest of the Uskudar banks made their offers in the 10.5% to 12.5% belt, while Isbank brought me down to 6.5% and Ziraat, the state-owned behemoth, offered a derisory 3%.
There are many reasons why there are large variations in the interest rates offered for the same sum. Desperation is one of them. The rumour in the market, for example, is that Interbank was offering 27% on dollar deposits, before it was nationalized by the central bank in January to prevent it from going bankrupt. Another reason is the shortage of funds. There has been a drastic drop in the inflow of foreign capital. “We have reduced the funds we make available to Turkey by 80% [since the Russian crisis],” says Aydin Ulusan, Turkey representative for WestMerchant, a member of the WestLB Group. “This ration is more or less the same for everyone else.” Many banks are finding themselves unable to roll over their debt or are obliged to roll over a part of it at a higher cost.
Shopping around
Some banks have discovered an ingenious way of paying depositors extra interest and getting the government to foot the bill. A customer wishing to open a dollar account is given the choice of making a deposit locally or in the bank’s offshore affiliate (which is often referred to as a Bahrain account because many Turkish banks have offshore bases in the Gulf state). Foreign-currency deposits are subject to an 11% reserve requirement in Turkey, which adds to the cost. The offshore account is outside the Turkish central bank’s jurisdiction and, being free of this requirement, is therefore 11% cheaper. The bank passes on some of this profit to its client. According to some estimates, between 15% and 20% of the $33 billion in the banking system’s foreign currency accounts are in Turkish offshore bank deposits. The transaction is entirely legal.
The depositor shopping for the fattest interest rate (there are rumours that some banks are offering between 16% and 17% a year net) is in a unique position: he does not have to worry whether the bank he has chosen may be about to fold. The government has taken on all the risk, first by officially guaranteeing all non-corporate deposits in the system and, second, by ordering the central bank not to allow any bank to go under.
The blanket deposit guarantee was issued in 1994 to stop a run on banks after three collapsed. It was an astute move at the time and helped to stabilize the sector. But in effect it equalized all banks by eliminating the element of risk associated with high premium. For many small banks it was a signal to start a reckless race for deposits and is part of the reason why interest rates are consistently higher than inflation. Interest rates shot up further when the top-tier banks were forced to enter the race in order to keep their depositors.
According to Melih Aras, a senior Turkish banker who was until recently chief executive of Interbank: “The 100% deposit insurance cover will undermine the system in the long run rather than protecting it.” But the deposit guarantee is now virtually impossible to lift. If it were withdrawn there would be a flight to quality banks that would probably leave weaker banks in a state of collapse.
The reason why Turkish banks can diverge from worldwide rates of interest for the dollar is simple: the most profitable legal activity in Turkey is to borrow in foreign currency and lend to the treasury in lira. The treasury is desperate for lira because there are large and widening deficits in public spending that have to be filled.
According to a Goldman Sachs report, in 1997 and 1998 the government spent more than half of total revenues on interest payments. The fiscal deficit has been “the cornerstone of Turkish macroeconomic imbalances for at least the last decade” and is the cause of the fast money growth, high inflation, rapid accumulation of public debt and ballooning interest payments on it.
Impeccable debt-service record
The treasury is a prisoner of the domestic market because it has limited access to the international markets where the funding cost is much lower. Since the 1994 devaluation, which weakened its borrowing ability, Turkey has been a net repayer of foreign debt. The international financial crisis has made things worse. The Institute of International Finance, a Washington think-tank, reports that commercial bank lending to emerging countries dropped from $121 billion in 1997 to $10 billion in 1998. The fact that Turkey has had an impeccable debt-service record since 1977 and boasts a number of world-class corporations has not prevented investors from grouping Turkey together with the rest of the emerging market.
Turkish banks, which are the treasury’s biggest creditors (they hold an estimated three-quarters of the lira-denominated state debt), are making it pay a high price. It is this price that allows the banks to give such high rates on dollar deposits.
But why dollar (or hard-currency) deposits rather than lira?
Erol Aksoy, chairman of Iktisat Bank, explains that dollar deposits are much more profitable than lira. Buying lira deposits is expensive, he says, because interest rates are high and reserve requirements and taxes push funding costs upwards to the 110% to 130% bracket.
“It is very profitable to maintain an open position because there is no devaluation risk,” says Aksoy. “Inflation is coming down. The central bank’s foreign currency reserves are at an all-time high. There is no fear that people will rush to cash in their lira for dollars.”
Statistics bear him out. Between January and June 1998 treasury bill interest rates ranged between 126% and 92% while the rate of devaluation was 30%. Confident that this gap will not disappear, banks expanded their open position until the Russian crisis when it stood at an estimated $12 billion to $13 billion for the whole sector. Banks cannot have an open position beyond a certain percentage of their assets, but this, like most other rules, is generally ignored. Since then, overseas credit lines have dwindled and open positions have contracted, probably by between $3 billion and $4 billion.
However, maintaining an open position is not entirely risk-free because a devaluation is not an impossibility. The combined open position of Turkish banks is in excess of their total equity capital. A large devaluation would eliminate most of the sector’s capital assets.
Partly in recognition of this possibility, in January Standard & Poor’s revised the outlook on Turkish banks downwards. Banks were facing “additional pressures in funding and credit risk due to curtailed access to international funding, higher domestic interest rates and the prospect for economic downturn.” S&P said that smaller banks would be squeezed the hardest. “Second and third tier banks which lack the resources, client base, diversification and industrial group connections of their bigger brethren will be harder pressed to survive a downturn in the market.”
The government is driving interest rates upwards not only through treasury borrowing but also through the state banks, which dominate the sector. “Ziraat and Halk [the biggest of the five state banks] are the politicians’ secret treasury,” says Mahfi Egilmez, a former secretary general at the treasury. Ziraat has frequently subsidized farmers and Halk small businesses. However, the subsidy policy has been inspired not by economic but political considerations. To entice voters, governments traditionally hand out loans at a fraction of market rates. Egilmez calculates that the average funding cost of Ziraat is 120% and lending rates 66%. Farmers often do not repay loans because they consider them straight political gifts.
According to Egilmez, which political parties have given the “most loans at the lowest rates while in power” has been used as a measure of political success. “This has been going on for years,” he states. He calculates that Ziraat and Halk lost nearly TL4 quadrillion in 1998. This makes a nonsense of the claim by the government that last year the budget achieved a primary surplus of TL2.5 quadrillion.
Iktisat’s Aksoy maintains that Ziraat and Halk’s intense borrowing requirement has been giving as big an upward push to interest rates as the treasury’s. He says that since the central bank has stopped subsidizing Ziraat and Halk by printing banknotes, these institutions have been forced to borrow on the interbank market.
“The treasury borrows twice a month and you know beforehand when and for what amount they will be in the market,” says Aksoy. “These guys are active on the interbank market every day. If Ziraat and Halk are paying 120% on the interbank, how can banks lend to the treasury for less?”
For the treasury and the central bank, high real interest rates are a form of subsidy to the banking sector, where there are more than 10 banks on the critical list. “Turkey was able to emerge [from the international financial] crisis because the treasury and the central bank held the sector by the hand,” says Yavuz Canevi, chairman of the Turkiye Ekonomi Bankasi (TEB). “They did this by allowing very large real interest rates to become possible.”
Canevi, a former central bank governor, blames the “deformation” of the banking sector on what he describes as the two extremes: the state banks, which he calls the “old boys”, and the small banks, which he refers to as the “new kids on the block”. He believes that the sector needs to undergo a complete upheaval before it can settle down again. “It seems we need to go through a systemic crisis,” he says.
Erol Sabanci, managing director of Akbank, believes that the high interest rates are the root cause of all of Turkey’s financial problems. “The interest level in Turkey is beyond logic and beyond economics. It is impossible to explain it and to defend it. Unless it is fixed, nothing will become level.”
Sabanci is opposed to high interest despite the fact that Akbank is benefiting from high treasury-bill yields. “I am looking at the long term,” he says. “I want economic growth to revive and people to buy goods rather than bonds. I may be making money from fixed income but on the stock exchange [where Akbank shares have declined along with all others] I am getting a beating.”
Living off interest
High interest rates and the crowding-out effect of government borrowing is making real economic activity an irrelevance. A study on the top 500 companies by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce shows that corporations are making more profit from government paper than from operational activities. Statistics show that income generated from non-industrial activities rose from 20% in 1983 to 53% in 1996.
“Banks are lending at Libor plus 20%,” says WestMerchant’s Ulusan. “You cannot do business at these rates for ever.”
The situation was recently summed up by Ali Osman Sonmez, a leading industrialist, in a newspaper interview. “No industrialist will produce anything when he can get 150% interest and I am not an exception,” he says. “Can anyone tell me why I should produce anything? I have sent my workforce on paid leave and am paying their wages with interest income [from government paper].”
It is not only through the high interest rates that Turkey diverges from western banking norms. The sector displays many characteristics of Asia’s banking system. It is not transparent or well regulated and is bereft of even basic prudential supervision. The reporting and audit standards are dubious and the Turkish legal system, abused and neglected for decades by the politicians, is often unable to act as the protector of either the state agencies or the public against misuse by owners.
Banks are often attached to family enterprises that also have a range of non-financial businesses. Many bank owners tend to treat their depositors’ money as loans for these businesses or pocket money for a luxurious lifestyle. According to the rumours making the rounds in banking circles in Istanbul, one bank manager was fired last year for not signing a $12 million loan needed to buy one shareholder’s son a yacht. His successor was more accommodating.
“Most of the smaller banks are nothing but vehicles for the aggrandizement and enrichment of their shareholders,” says one American banker. “They are piggy banks for the shareholders, their families and cronies. The irony is that they use the government’s blanket deposit guarantee to fill their pockets.”
Mark Foley, chief executive officer of Oyakbank, a small but solid bank, argues that to equate size with quality is a superficial analysis and cautions against tarring all small banks with the same brush.
“Each bank must be analyzed according to their strategies, policies, market niches and shareholder strength,” he says. He draws a parallel between Turkey and Latin America, where the reduction of inflation and the introduction of tighter supervision and accounting standards led to the failure or merger not only of small banks but medium-size and large ones too. “The vanishing of Latin American banks was not a direct function of size it was a question of management,” says Foley.
According to most observers, the blame for the banking mess must be placed squarely at the feet of a corrupt and inefficient political system, where abusing political power for financial gain is a long-established tradition and where public service is an alien concept.
“Banks are toys in the hands of politicians,” Hüsamettin Kavi, chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, told a newspaper interviewer. “The supervision of banks must be done by an independent body. For this the [new] banking law [before parliament] is crucial.”
But change will depend on the politicians, the very people who created the mess in the first place. The hope is that after this month’s general election things will move on and the long-awaited macroeconomic reform programme will be implemented.
Independent supervisor
One important component is the new banking law, which could be an important step towards reforming the system provided the politicians don’t meddle with it.
The bill calls for the establishment of an independent bank-supervision body. But already there are reports that this will be amended making the body subservient to the economy minister.
Canevi of TEB believes that the country is very close to biting the bullet. “If Turkey does not stop inflation it will be thrown out of the international financial system,” he says. “We have already become marginal players. The private sector is beginning to lose its immunity to inflation tolerance. It will put pressure on the political system to take measures to stop it. The politicians will have to respond to this.”
Meanwhile, Gazi Ercel, Turkey’s highly respected central bank governor, says that the problems of the banking sector should be put into perspective and should not be exaggerated.
“We know what the problems are. We know what the solutions are,” he says. “Ten large banks account for 65% of the banking system by assets; 14 investment banks account for 6% and 29 foreign banks for 5%. That makes 54 banks. The remaining 30 banks account for 24% of assets. Among these are many strong ones and there are ones which have problems. These are being watched by the treasury very closely.”
Ercel reminds critics that Turkish banks have no exposure in Asia, Russia and South America where US and European banks have lost a lot of money. “Many banks have lost billions there and no one is talking about their problems,” he says. “Why is everyone talking about the problems of Turkish banks?”
Headline: Turkey’s determinedly weak currency
Source: Euromoney
Date: April 1999
The strength of the Turkish lira lies in its weakness. At T-bill auctions held twice-monthly the treasury gives whatever interest the market sees fit to ask for. And the central bank continually devalues the lira just below the rate of inflation to prevent the dollar from becoming an attractive investment alternative to the lira.
Although interest from foreign-currency deposits is high, it is nowhere near as high as the yield from treasury bills. Investors (banks being amongst the biggest) are therefore more than willing to sell their dollars to convert them into Turkish lira. This has allowed the central bank to maintain a healthy foreign-reserve position. The treasury does not have to fear a foreign-currency famine, even if exports taper off and overseas foreign-currency availability declines.
But monetary and fiscal policy has become trapped within the narrow confines of this mechanism (flexibility in interest and foreign exchange rates). There are also other factors at play, such as the fact that Turkish companies are not as highly leveraged as their Asian or Latin American peers. But it is nevertheless this policy that has allowed Turkey to remain afloat in waters where Asian economies capsized.
To avoid a financial crisis, the treasury is willing to pay the highest real interest rates in the world. These rates fluctuate wildly and are impossible to predict. In July 1998, for instance, real interest on treasury bills was 3% the lowest that year. In August this rate was more than quintupled, and in September more than doubled. In five months, real interest had shot up to 56%, the highest of the year. Over the course of the year the average was 24%.
But how long can something that economists agree is unsustainable be sustained? Turkey seems to be trying to hold back the onset of a hangover by continuing to drink. So far the economy has defied the laws of economics, and continues to survive, not to say prosper. According to the World Bank, Turkey is the only country in the world that has managed to grow in a persistently high inflationary environment. Between 1995 and 1997 the growth rate was over 7% and in 1998, despite the onset of recession and international financial turmoil, it grew by over 4%.
Headline: Akbank shakes off the bonds of history
Source: Euromoney
Date: April 1999
Akbank is one of the few Turkish banks to have disentangled itself from the incestuous cross-holding relationships, which have proved the main weakness of most of the country’s financial institutions.
Over a period of four years the bank has sold all but one of its non-financial assets. Nearly $500 million dollars raised from the divestment has been used to reinforce the bank’s capital base and increase shareholder value. The only remaining non-financial asset in the portfolio is waiting to be disposed of as soon as market conditions become favourable for the sale.
Akbank has departed from a tradition, to which many top-tier banks are still strongly attached, dating back to the 1940s. An inordinate ratio of Turkish banks’ loans and investments are in companies owned by their shareholders.
This phenomenon was initially encouraged by the government at a time when the economy was backward and characterized by a severe capital and foreign-currency shortage. To fill the gap, banks were given the freedom to open unlimited credit lines to selected investments in which they held more than 25% of equity.
In the 1940s, Turkey’s economy was predominantly agricultural. In line with the import-substitution policies in vogue in those days, the country needed to build a manufacturing base. This was needed to alleviate the shortages that existed in virtually every commodity and to provide employment for a rapidly growing population. Likewise capital was needed in mining, energy, transportation and export financing. The government encouraged banks to invest in all of these sectors.
As a result, many banks became heavily involved in non-banking activities. Akbank was among them and over the years it became transformed into a holding company.
“In those days there was no money around,” says Erol Sabanci, chairman and managing director of Akbank, remembering the late 1950s when as a young graduate from the Manchester College of Commerce he started to work at a family company in Adana, in south-east Turkey. “Every day I spent two hours visiting bank managers, trying to make myself pleasant. In those days a branch manager was a very important man. If you got a bank to take up 25% of your equity, life could be much easier.”
Following the free-market reforms of the 1980s the Istanbul Stock Market was established and corporations that floated their shares were given tax breaks.
The Sabanci family, which owned both Akbank and the industrial companies affiliated with it, found itself the owner of two holding companies, Sabanci Holding and Akbank, which held shares in the same companies.
“We found that we were competing with ourselves,” says Sabanci. “Foreign investors were puzzled and did not know which was a better buy, Sabanci Holding or Akbank.” Akbank was a holding company in its own right by virtue of the size of the shares it held in Sabanci Holding companies. “We decided to separate industrial shareholdings from the mainstream banking business so that Akbank could become a more focused bank,” explains Sabanci.
The family went public in the mid-1990s, selling both Sabanci and Akbank shares, and used the proceeds to buy shares in Akbank’s industrial affiliates.
“Our advantage was that we had the financial strength to carry out this divestiture,” said Sabanci. Another advantage was that the shares in its portfolio belonged to some of Turkey’s most profitable companies.
The government now wants banks to stick to their core business and has granted capital gains tax exemption to encourage them to tidy up their balance sheets. But many banks continue to expand in non-core business. Banks often feel obliged to take over the business of a heavily indebted client who goes under. Isbank, Turkey’s biggest commercial bank, was recently obliged to go into the olive packing and hospital businesses, for example, when two of its large clients could not service their debts.
Headline: Korfez changes ahead of tough times
Source: Euromoney
Date: April 1999
For five consecutive years the small Korfezbank was Turkey’s most profitable bank. But most of its profit came from treasury operations a euphemism for buying and selling high-yield treasury bills and doing virtually nothing else. In a country where lending to the government is the biggest industry, this was not all that out of the ordinary. Many banks derived the bulk of their profits by lending to the treasury and even large corporations earned more than half of their profits by investing in government paper.
But Korfez seemed to have gone a bit too far. In 1998 nearly 90% of its profit came from treasury-bill business. Although it had 450 corporations on its client book, the bank the smallest of four owned by business tycoon Ayhan Sahenk was doing business with only 30 of them. None of its five branches had street-level offices.
“The bank had almost withdrawn from the market,” says Husnu Akhan, the bank’s new managing director. Akhan, a former central banker, came over from Garanti, the largest of the Sahenk banks (the others are Ottoman and the Amsterdam-based United Garanti), where he was in charge of operations and foreign relations.
Ignoring the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” axiom, last year Sahenk decided to transform Korfez into a bank with more divergent activities. What prompted him was the conviction not shared by many that the interest bubble is on its last legs, and that banks with excessive exposure to treasury risk may be in for a nasty shock. Inflation is declining and Turkey is steeling itself for yet another IMF standby agreement, which should reduce it to a one-digit figure in two years.
“These huge profits are not everlasting,” says Akhan. “If not today, tomorrow inflation will stop. This is no longer a prospect of small likelihood. When this happens only banks which have a large share of the corporate sector business will survive.”
Turkey has the highest rate of inflation in the world. “Some banks say that Turkey needs another 10 years before inflation comes down,” says Akhan. “They are counting on another 10 years where they can make money from treasury bills. We think that, if not in two years, in four maximum, Turkey will be a low-inflation country.”
Last year Korfez’s capital was raised from TL19 trillion ($52 million) to TL30 trillion and will be raised to TL60 trillion in 1999. It recently moved to one of the most elegant historic buildings in Istanbul, the graceful Macka Palas, which has undergone an expensive facelift. The Korfez main branch shares the street level with Gucci and Emporio Armani, two recent Sahenk family investments.
Akhan says that Korfez will not make the mistake of going from one extreme to the other by joining the ranks of the other small banks that want to do everything. “We will stay out of consumer and retail banking and concentrate on corporate banking, with emphasis on cash and risk management, investment banking, project and trade financing,” he says.
Headline: When small is beautiful
Source: Euromoney
Date: April 1999
Sibel Sanus, the executive vice-president of Bank Kapital’s international relations department, says that big Turkish banks may find it easy to sneer at smaller banks but asks: “how big are the big banks?
“The total asset size of all Turkish banks is $100 billion. Well that is 10% of Deutsche Bank’s total assets. Let’s face it, the whole of the Turkish banking sector is the size of a medium-size European bank. So who is small?”
Bank Kapital was established eight years ago by a Kurdish family of building contractors. In 1997, with 15 branches and assets of $310 million, it ranked 39th of 72 Turkish banks. In 1998 Bank Kapital, like most other small and medium-size banks, expanded its branch network in order to establish a wider customer base and reduce reliance on foreign funding.
Sanus does not think that 74 banks are too many for a population exceeding 60 million. She predicts that in the future there will be more rather than fewer banks. “In the next five years I don’t see any mergers taking place in Turkey,” she says, disapproving of the recent trend for mega-mergers among US and European banks. She believes this will prove to be an ephemeral phenomenon. “People feel alienated in such huge institutions,” she says.
The existence of a large number of banks is good for both the economy and the people, says Sanus. “It’s good for Turkey that many institutions are out there raising funds,” she says. “Turkish people like to have personal attention and for this reason don’t feel at home in big institutions. Your average Turkish businessmen likes to saunter into the branch and linger to exchange pleasantries with the tellers at the front desks. He likes to stroll into the branch manager’s office and have a tea or coffee and discuss the weather and the political situation. Business comes after all this.”
Sanus concedes that 1998 was “slack” compared with 1997 when the economy grew by nearly 8%. But business was slack for everyone, big and small, she says. She also concedes that the drop in bank lending to Turkey has affected Bank Kapital. “But it just made life difficult. Not impossible. We used to be able to find financing for letters of credit in two to three hours. Now it is taking two to three days. But we have not had to turn away one single client for not being able to find financing.” She points out that Bank Kapital was able to raise a syndicated loan in November 1998 when the global financial crisis was blowing with hurricane force.
She is relaxed about borrowing prospects for 1999 which she thinks will be better than 1998. Sanus is about to sign up a bank to lead a small club deal in the first quarter. For this she expects Bank Kapital to pay between 50 and 75 basis points higher than the all-in cost of the previous deal in October, but she is unwilling to divulge what this was. “I don’t see a problem about rolling over our loans,” she says.