Philip Crotty, head of Asian structured finance for Deutsche Bank, this year’s biggest project-finance provider, reflects on the remnants of the business in south-east Asia: “It depends on the country to an extent, but I would say that most of the major projects even ones that were under construction have either been postponed or shelved indefinitely. And there are delays and renegotiations of contracts going on all over the place. Some sponsors have abandoned projects completely, others are trying to keep them warm and then resurrect them when conditions improve.”
The market has been hit by devastating problems. Projects’ ability to pay back dollar-denominated finance has been compromised where project revenues were in local currencies. In addition, as Asian economies have contracted even local-currency revenues have slumped for most projects. Industry has reduced energy spending; fewer travellers are willing to pay to drive on toll roads; and weakness in commodity prices has hampered the revenue-raising abilities of oil, chemicals and mining projects.
In Indonesia, by far the worst-affected country in the region, the two flagship power projects, Paiton I and Paiton II with combined output of 2,500 megawatts, were suspended, both at an advanced stage of construction. Malaysia’s $35 billion multimedia super corridor was put on hold, as was a $3.7 billion elevated road and railway in Thailand.
Christopher Beale, managing director and global head of project finance at Citibank in New York, says: “There was quite a large number of projects under development in south-east Asia 200 or more. But a large proportion have now been cancelled or deferred either because of the wild currency gyrations, which rendered them uneconomic, or because liquidity dried up and funding became very scarce.”
This lack of funding contrasts sharply with the situation just a year ago. Then there was an excess of liquidity and overconfidence. Smaller banks had jumped on the bandwagon, increasing the readiness of the banking community to fund projects. “There was too much liquidity, certainly,” says Deutsche’s Crotty. “Banks that you didn’t really hear about on the international scene were coming into Asia and taking $5 million to $10 million in syndication well, they’ve all gone. As, of course, have the Japanese banks.”
Liquidity has dried up. Leading Japanese project-finance houses withdrew early on in the fray. European banks, traditional big players in global project finance, found themselves with difficult exposures and have clamped down on lending and the few US banks in the region have also retreated. Before the crisis, about 85% of project financing was provided by about 50 banks. At least 10 have now pulled out altogether, with most of the rest increasingly cautious about the deals they will do.
“There are certainly vital projects that are not going to get done for some years,” says Crotty. “But on the other hand it’s true to say that there was some excess capacity getting built as well those projects are clearly not now going to happen.”
If banks have the jitters, what about issuing more debt in the form of project bonds to support these Asian deals? Until mid-1997, an increasing number of banks and project finaciers believed that the capital markets were an ideal source of long-term funding. Yields on project bonds fell to record lows. But the appetite for emerging-market paper has weakened dramatically. Scott Ritter, head of Asian project finance at ANZ Investment Bank in Singapore, says this is a key factor in the south-east Asian project-finance slowdown. “What really hit the project-finance community was the Russian debt crisis. That completely blew out of the water any chance of capital markets involvement for the time being,” he says.
The pricing of those project bonds that have sneaked out supports that view. For example, the Cadereyta oil-refinery project in Mexico raised finance from banks for which it paid 200 basis points over Libor; it also issued the largest amount of project bonds this year at a whopping 653bp over US treasuries. Total project-bond issuance for the whole of the emerging markets peaked at just under $5 billion for 1997 but has since slumped to an estimated $1.5 billion this year. And even though the amount of cash raised in the form of project bonds was on the way up for all projects, it was still a fairly small proportion of overall project lending some $9 billion in 1996 as against US$76 billion in total lending. Existing holders of project bonds will “probably get even more burnt as some of the deals unravel or get restructured”, says a banker in Hong Kong.
A potential knock-on problem from this expensive paper debt, suggests ANZ’s Ritter, is that the bank portion of the financing will become more expensive itself as bankers notice how much the securitized part of the deal fetches. “The banks say: ‘Wait a minute, we’ve got to try to be on parity with that level of margin.’ So all of a sudden the bank debt is driven up. There are a couple of projects in India that have doubled the pricing for bank debt since the crash happened.”
“If the bond is priced at 600bp and the syndicated debt at 200bp then someone is being irrational,” says Abedayo Ogunlesi, head of project finance at Credit Suisse First Boston in New York. “It can’t be that both of these guys are right in their perception of the risk,” he says.
Too big to hedge
To get the market going again banks are turning to more sophisticated hedges and to insurance. Comprehensive hedging of raw currency risk is virtually impossible for large-scale projects. The amount needed to be hedged away is too large. CSFB’s Ogunlesi doubts the value of currency hedging, even when it is attainable. “There isn’t really a deep enough market in many of these countries to efficiently hedge off your currency risk,” he says. “Also, if you look at the hedging that has been done in other places, the effects make you wonder what the value was. A lot of banks hedged their rouble exposure with Russian banks and look what happened to the Russian banking system. Unless you can get international counterparties to take the risk, any hedging you get from local banks is affected by the fundamentals.”
Interest-rate hedging, a long-established element of project financings, has become more important. The first project financing to close in south-east Asia after the crisis was the $405 million/Bt750 million deal for the Tri Energy gas-fired power station in Thailand. Citibank acted as lead arranger and was the only institution able to commit to all components of the project’s debt structure: a 15-year term loan, a project letter of credit, a Thai baht working capital facility and the 15-year interest rate swap that underpinned the transaction. Even here, though, for the swap to be executed, Citibank had to arrange political-risk insurance (PRI) cover from US agency the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for the swap the first time this has ever been done.
PRI is making a comeback in Asia after becoming seen as irrelevant. PRI is bought by the project and provided mainly by export-credit agencies and multilaterals such as the International Finance Corporation. PRI covers several eventualities. Chief among these are expropriation of the project’s assets by an unfriendly administration and restrictions placed on currency convertibility. But in the mid-1990s the desire for PRI receded as confidence in the emerging markets increased again. “People got a lot more comfortable with the political risk in the countries they were dealing in and started to do increasing amounts of uncovered risk. It got to the stage in Indonesia where banks were prepared to look at 17 years uncovered, yet in the early 1990s banks were doing eight to 10 years and they would want 80% to 90% cover,” says Deutsche’s Crotty.
Another way to limit the risks involved in lending in dollars and collecting revenues in domestic currency is indexation. The project writes into its sales agreement an obligation on the buyer to raise additional local currency from elsewhere to equal the amount in dollars, based on the exchange rate at the beginning of the deal. Indexation usually applies to power projects where the off-taking authority the buyer of the power, usually an electricity authority raises the tariffs elsewhere in the system to offset the currency losses.
The Tri Energy deal used indexation. Tri Energy was one of a number of deals signed by Egat (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) with foreign development consortia for six independent power projects. The contracts were in Thai baht with no indexation to dollars. These were to be financed in the market and banks that were advising the sponsors initially assumed that the financing could be done on that basis. Tri Energy had the misfortune of seeking sponsors from banks at the time the Thai crisis unfolded. The deal in its initial form didn’t get done. “The original power-project agreement would pay in baht without any indexation, so people were taking exchange-rate risk,” says Ogunlesi, whose bank is a key part of the financing of the deal. “After the baht collapse there was some discussion as to what the structure should be and eventually the Thai government agreed that it was unrealistic to have it denominated in baht without indexation. So it was restructured to allow indexation to the dollar.”
Tri Energy shows that not all projects are moribund. Some foreign sponsors are still able to push ahead with projects. Large international banks, such as Citibank and Credit Suisse, have found themselves in the happy position of mopping up projects that others either cannot touch or don’t much want to. Unsurprisingly, Beale is happy with his bank’s current position. “It’s been a record year for us in Asia in project financing. We have ongoing financings in eight countries in Asia. There were a series of transactions, like Tri Energy, which we didn’t expect to be part of and others, like Shanghai General Motors in China, which have closed. We’ve found opportunities to do transactions in Asia others haven’t. Sponsors need someone like us who are still open for business,” he says.
Says ANZ’s Ritter: “For the ones that are still alive and working here, there’s no competition. If you’ve got a balance sheet that is open for business, people will find you you won’t have to go out and look.”
Another result of the south-east Asian problems has been the increase in importance of the second tier of Asian countries in bankers’ minds. China, which was ignored previously as a place too tricky to do substantial business, is the new sweetheart for project financiers. Ironically, despite China’s plans for more than $10 billion-worth of infrastructure projects, it has not raised any money from foreign banks on project-finance terms, funding the projects through a Eurobond issued earlier this year. There are private deals in the pipeline but even these show how difficult conditions have become.
A number of these private transactions are being done through club deals. In the absence of a sufficiently deep syndication market, a relatively small number of big international banks is forced to take on the whole of the debt for the project. This, says ANZ’s Ritter, may hold some promise for the near future. “For the larger projects it could be six or eight banks taking on the exposure for the entire piece of debt. You might have some secondary sell-down later on, but the intention is to hold on to the debt for the time being.” But club deals are not without drawbacks. Without a dominant lead arranger, conflicts over how the deal is to be done will arise.
“A lot of us don’t like club deals because we can’t sell the debt down,” says another. “Even with the big banks, balance-sheet considerations mean that we’re under pressure to minimize final holds on these deals. I think we’re prepared to do them if we can see the syndication market develop a year from now. And I think a lot of us will start to participate in club deals on that basis: we’ll hold these deals for now, but we’ll unload then into the secondary market in the next year to 18 months. But you’d better have called the market right.”
Until western investors regain some of their optimism, the project-finance community in south-east Asia will be left without much to do apart from mull over lessons learnt from the downturn. “I think it was a close call for the project-finance community,” concludes Citibank’s Beale. “And a sobering wake-up call that one should pay more attention to credit structures and market conditions some of the less-experienced banks were really saved from themselves by the market interruption in south-east Asia.”