Sigma triggers global meltdown

Six months into European monetary union there's a crisis, but this has little to do with the euro. It's a classic banking fiasco kicked off because too many people believed in one man's Big Idea. Sound familiar? David Shirreff reports.

Virtual battle

Dramatis personae

Tuesday July 20 1999

Perseus Marconi, executive chairman of Sigma Banking Group, a €20 billion conglomerate based in Amsterdam, rides a limo from his canal-side residence to the bank’s space-age headquarters in Foppingadreef. He is delighted with his London-based investment bank’s huge underwriting of a €5 billion equity issue for Hermes, a UK-based phone and satellite company, not to mention a sister issue of €3 billion in high-yield bonds. For Marconi, this is the future, the fusion of banking and telecommunications into a single sector – finance and information delivered instantly to any point on the globe – and beyond!

Things have been looking better by the day. A thriving Europe has slowly been pulling world markets out of recession. Stock markets have made up a lot of the ground they lost in the second half of 1998. Even bank stocks are improving.

Marconi riffles through his Financial Times hardly glancing at a news item buried at the foot of the front page: “Mobile phone scare widens”. But at Sigma’s offices the dealing room has already been in uproar for two hours. The US market last night and the Asian markets this morning took the phone scare seriously, dumping any stocks that had been buoyed by mobile phone hardware or franchises and, incidentally, satellite communications too. Why?

Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, scientists at Harvard Business School say new studies leave little or no doubt that mobile phones cause brain tumours. Moreover, a Slovak firm says it has developed a way of encoding short-wave transmissions into long-wave, allowing them to bounce off the ionosphere – making communications satellites redundant. The sharp end of the telecom industry is suddenly blunted, at least as far as short-termist stock analysts are concerned.

0900 (all times are GMT ) Marconi’s PA hands him a slip of paper; he reads: Market risk report. Telecom shares fell 10% in the US and Canada yesterday. There was less reaction in emerging markets. US and euro interest rates were steady. The US long bond yield stood at 6%, and the German 10-year euro Bund benchmark at 5%.

The €8 billion equity and debt issue for Hermes has become unplaceable and is stuck on the books of Sigma and its subsidiary MHB Investment Bank. The bid price for the shares is down to €4.50, less than half the issue price. But that isn’t the end of the problem. The market suspects MHB hasn’t placed the shares, or the debt. The Sigma group also, just yesterday, made a firm bid of $2.1 billion for a mobile phone franchise in China. In the US there are fears that Sigma’s insurance arm will face heavy claims from mobile phone users with brain tumours. Seeing the entire Sigma group as a telecom risk as much as a banking risk, banks have started to cancel interbank lines with Sigma subsidiaries Great Northern Bank in the UK and Rhein-Ruhr Bank in Germany. Great Northern faces an immediate funding shortfall of £3 billion which it has to meet by 1700 GMT.

And there’s another concern. Sigma has been under attack by a US predator, Mega Corp, and its investment bankers, Wood Stanley. Two weeks ago Mega made a private offer of €15 billion for the group. Marconi refused even to talk to Mega chairman Bob Richter – because of a long-standing personal vendetta. And there isn’t much love lost between Sigma and Wood Stanley, which last year snapped up Sigma’s star telecom analyst Max Smith after he was fired for being “too gloomy”.

The markets are playing into the hands of Mega and Wood Stanley. The raiders don’t even need to talk down Sigma’s share price – it’s happening before their eyes. Their plan is to take the group over, strip out the telecom business, and divide up the banking units for assimilation or sale.

A strangely familiar world

This is the start of what later becomes known as The Sigma Affair, a deliberate attempt to bring down one of the world’s biggest banks. It’s not exactly a conspiracy, but it turns out to be a severe test of the financial system and the people who run it: the regulators, major financial institutions, central bankers.

The banks are fictitious, but somehow strangely familiar – old favourites Chemical Bank and Continental Bank are resurrected. Midshires and Anglia, Bayerische Kreditbank, IBN Flanders Bank and Crédit Général represent the big players of the world financial system. In the eye of the storm is Sigma Bank, Dutch-regulated, although its major operations are in the UK (MHB and Great Northern Bank) and in Germany (Rhein-Ruhr Bank). Apart from its expertise in telecom finance, Sigma is one of the market leaders in credit derivatives, with 120 banks signed up to its own credit risk model, StreetCred40.

At Sigma in Amsterdam, Marconi’s faith in telecom/banking is unshaken, but in the engine room of the bank reality is dawning.

0930 Rufus Franklin, Sigma’s chief risk officer – renowned as a brilliant but erratic rocket-scientist – is faced with a write-off on the Hermes underwriting of up to €8 billion, but the cash isn’t payable for 10 days. His colleagues consider illegally stuffing some of the securities into funds managed by MHB Asset Management, Sigma’s $200 billion asset management arm. But Franklin’s more immediate problem is the falling value of Sigma’s telecom shares and bonds posted as collateral against various equity and derivative positions. The collateral must be topped up, but with what? Franklin hires US investment bank Fischer King to negotiate a block sale of Sigma’s equity portfolio, worth €5 billion yesterday but losing value fast.

Europe’s central bankers are already concerned by the funding problems at Great Northern Bank and Rhein-Ruhr. They also suspect that the Hermes issue is mostly still on Sigma’s books. They ask UK and Dutch banks to keep their credit lines open.

The international banks consider their positions. Few are heavily exposed to Sigma. They are more concerned with their equity and credit spread positions in the telecom sector. But Bayerische Kreditbank (BKB) closes out its exposure to Rhein-Ruhr Bank apart from a two-week deposit of €250 million that it can’t cancel. BKB chairman Eugen Toplitz, stung last year by the crash of newly acquired Mulhouse Brand, is predicting a stock market crash.

1030 The vultures are circling. Midshires Bank of the UK is interested in acquiring Rhein-Ruhr Bank. The maverick Sir Miles Lewis, head of Anglia Bank and once described as “the most dangerous man in the world”, loses no time turning others’ distress to his advantage. He consults Wood Stanley on how Sigma will be carved up, and expresses interest in some of its investment banking activities.

Tony La Salle, head of corporate finance at Wood Stanley, advises the international banks to “foreclose on Sigma, split up the business and auction it off”. The US money-centre banks are slower to see opportunities in the break-up of Sigma.

In fact, Sigma is far from dead and buried. Marconi won’t go down without a fight. Looking suave in his white linen jacket, the man who was once the darling of the UK stock market tells the press Sigma is still wholly committed to the telecommunications industry and is unshaken by the market turmoil. Chief risk officer Franklin – sinister and unshaven in a black roll-neck shirt – admits that Sigma holds “pretty much the whole” of the Hermes issue. “But we’ve always said we would be happy to own the business,” he adds unconvincingly, his eyes darting everywhere to avoid meeting others.

1230 European regulators are slow to coordinate their efforts as the crisis builds. During a hastily organized conference call, Jürgen Stark of the German finance ministry takes the initiative: “As government officials we have no formalized system of collaboration.” He proposes that they should collaborate, but without making the fact public.

1300 Market risk report. Western telecom stocks have fallen another 20%, and a similar fall is expected in New York when it opens. Credit spreads widen on telecom bonds and loans. The US long bond yield goes to 6.25%, the German Bund stays at 5%. In Asian and European trading the US dollar has fallen 3% against the euro. The Bank of England cuts its repo rate by 0.25%.

Bank of England governor Eddie George is reported as saying that Sigma is “solvent and a going concern” (in a subsequent inquiry George denies he said any such thing). Central banks and treasuries are pooling information and ready to do damage limitation – but they are adamant this wouldn’t include bailing out Sigma. US officials read the situation differently. Treasury secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan are angry the Europeans haven’t consulted them, but they see a way to turn that to their advantage. “Eddie’s done two things here,” Rubin tells Greenspan. “One, he’s going to do a bail-out. Two, this gets us off the hook. We were told by the UK authorities that Sigma was fine. That allows us to completely isolate this. I’d really hammer Eddie on this one. You tell him ‘I’m not supporting that statement unless you’re taking full responsibility’.”

But Greenspan has one eye on the US economy and possible overheating. Wrong-footing the punters he raises Fed fund rates by 0.25%.

1520 Dutch central banker Tom de Swaan is elected chairman of the consolidated board of European central banks and Eddie George, not on the governing council of the European Central Bank, is invited to join. They decide to force Sigma to offload some of its positions. “The long-term plan,” says De Swaan, “if Sigma is insolvent, is that we regulators go in and force the break-up.”

Toplitz of Bayerische Kreditbank continues to give dire warnings of a crash in bonds as well as equities. “The UK banks are in a dangerous position,” he says. He also worries about how the German banking sector will cope when, as he predicts, “Rhein-Ruhr Bank goes down”.

1600 In the Netherlands, Dutch banks are anticipating the collapse of their biggest rival. It’s a bitter-sweet experience. They don’t want to be tarred with the same brush, but “if Sigma goes down,” says Jan Chambers, chief risk officer of IBN Flanders Bank, “there will be pickings for us”. His chairman, Gerritt Aesop, explains: “We’re not interested in buying Sigma, but we’re interested in buying assets.” He’s flabbergasted, however, at the apparent incompetence of his counterpart at Sigma: “Everybody seems to say that the senior management of Sigma is foolish. How come someone who seems to have a reputation for excess is head of a very large bank?” (It’s happened before and it can happen again.)

Let the market decide

Chambers predicts that the Sigma crisis “could result in taking 1% off the GDP of Europe”. But, he cautions, “the regulators should only intervene if they think there’s a serious systemic risk. At this moment it’s still concentrated in Sigma Bank. If it stays that way then the market can solve the problem.”

Rescuing Sigma would be a mistake, says Aesop. “It would be the Japanese/French type of initiative.”

1620 The crisis isn’t big enough to goad central bankers into a rescue. But they are concerned about the liquidity of Sigma’s two commercial and retail banking subsidiaries, Great Northern and Rhein-Ruhr. European officials worry that “informal arrangements between central banks and their banks” may not be enough to avoid a liquidity crisis. Says ECB president Duisenberg: “We want some form of agreement that short-term lines can’t be withdrawn.”

Eddie George is reluctant to pump £3 billion of liquidity into Great Northern Bank – more than its own capital. He tells Howard Davies, chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority: “I’m not a regulator any more. But I refuse to provide liquidity so you must shut Marconi down or bail him out.”

In theory, none of these regulators or central banks is allowed to bail out a bank any more. European monetary union relies on the principle that no single country, or bank, will be bailed out. The European Central Bank is not a lender of last resort. Although the UK is not an Emu member the ECB has a legitimate interest in the liquidity of banks in London, as an important financial centre. But there is no obvious deus ex machina to support Sigma unless the European banks club together to prop it up. And there’s no sign of that – they want to tear Sigma apart.

1640 At Sigma, chief risk officer Franklin – a man of slippery, weasel-like cunning – is coming to terms with Sigma’s pressing obligations. Although the Hermes proceeds aren’t payable for 10 days, if the shares can’t be sold, Sigma has to raise the cash, perhaps with a fire-sale of assets or subsidiaries. Franklin tells his adviser, Brad Cohen of Fischer King, that the best candidates to buy Great Northern are the UK banks Midshires and Anglia, since they have loan exposure to Sigma of $2.5 billion and $3.4 billion respectively which they might convert to equity. Franklin is also toying with the possibility of temporarily parking some of Sigma’s credit portfolio, perhaps by means of a three-month credit default option, to bring down its regulatory capital requirement.

1800 But European regulators aren’t impressed by Sigma’s attempts to dress up its balance sheet. Stark and other European regulators interrogate Marconi, who on his own admission isn’t “a numbers man”. Stark tells him: “We’re very close to losing all confidence in you as the manager of the Sigma group. We may replace you.”

Marconi: “Clearly we have an overnight liquidity problem. Great Northern’s requirement is £3 billion and Rhein-Ruhr’s is $1.5 billion. But we’ve just signed up Fischer King to act as our advisers to liquidate $5 billion worth of our equity holdings with minimum disturbance to the market and to pursue contacts with potential buyers of part of our group.”

Stark: I don’t believe Sigma is a going concern.

Davies: All the figures we’ve been presented with are utterly meaningless.

Duisenberg: It’s not going to get better. Remember the insurance market is going down, Sigma is exposed. We need an independent administrator we can put into Sigma.

But it’s some time before an administrator is found. In the meantime Sigma’s value is slipping away, with interbank lines cancelled, retail deposits withdrawn, a falling share price, and margin calls and payouts on its credit derivatives.

2030 Greenspan in the US, mistrusting any figures conveyed to him about the Sigma crisis, attempts to ring-fence his own banking system. In an unprecedented move he forbids US banks to buy any Sigma assets. The US banks are flabbergasted.

Hand of Greenspan

“Can Greenspan request that?” asks Cohen of Fischer King. Fischer King is not regulated by the Fed but this seriously undermines its efforts to sell off assets on behalf of Sigma. Mega Corp, the media giant owned by the aggressive Bob Richter, isn’t Fed-regulated either, so feels free to pursue its campaign to destroy and then devour Sigma. Wood Stanley’s La Salle, acting for Mega Corp, asks Chemical Bank to provide bridging finance. But Chemical chairman Rick Strange, primed by Greenspan, is cautiously negative: “Why overpay for something [Sigma] that’s fundamentally flawed? What we’re getting here are businesses that are completely bad. Investment banking business that is underwriting stuff but not placing any of it. Credit derivatives which are completely bad. Technology businesses that have completely gone wrong. I mean I’m tempted to just say forget it.”

2045 Duisenberg and the European regulators tell the press that they have put in place “arrangements to ensure adequate liquidity is available to members of the Sigma group, to avoid discontinuity in their business activities”. He explains they will be reviewing appropriate longer-term action. Meanwhile, Marconi and his management team are still in place. But the markets continue to dive.

2100 Market risk report at New York close. Telecom stocks fell another 20% then recovered slightly. Utilities and broadcasting were also down. Credit spreads widened in all these sectors, triggering payouts on some credit derivatives. Rating agencies prepare to downgrade. The long bond yield is 7%, the Bund is 5.5%, and the US dollar has lost another 3%.

At the end of the first day of crisis, the financial markets continue to function more-or-less normally although billions of dollars have been wiped off stock values. Banks can still generate meaningful value-at-risk figures and assess their credit-risk and market-risk exposures, although correlations between markets are slipping.

Marconi, who says he won’t “let the buggers get him down”, is seen at the new production of The Damnation of Faust at Covent Garden, with Hermes chairman Jack Faraday.

Wednesday July 21 1999

0900 Market risk report. The dollar has continued to fall in the Far East, losing 5% against the yen and euro. Asian telecom stocks have been heavily sold and are down 30%.

0905 Rating agencies warn they will be downgrading Sigma after a severe blow to the banking and insurance group. Other banks with close banking relationships with Sigma are also on creditwatch until the impact of those exposures can be assessed, the agencies say.

0915 At Sigma the coffee cups and detritus of all-night dealing litter the workstations. It’s been a tough few hours for Franklin and his senior traders, working East Asia for pockets of liquidity. Marconi, well-rested after his evening’s entertainment in London, touches town at Schiphol airport and tells the local press: “We managed to get overnight support from central banks and we’re still in one piece.”

When he gets to the office he discovers his chief risk officer Franklin has a different view: “We’re going to die fairly shortly,” Franklin says. Sigma is technically insolvent: “Stocks have fallen 30% overnight so our collateral won’t be enough. The central banks accepted the $4 billion portfolio at 50% as collateral. However, my view is that we’re bust actually but not publicly. So we should merge with Wood Stanley and Mega Corp immediately.”

Marconi won’t see the destruction of his core company: “I’d like to consider selling off subsidiaries before merging.”

Lewis of Anglia Bank has a secret meeting with Franklin who he judges is more amenable to a sale. He’s offering to buy 51% of Sigma’s UK subsidiary Great Northern Bank, for £1.5 billion, plus assumption of £3 billion of its short-term debt.

Franklin ponders the deal: “It was worth £5 billion and we’re selling it for £1.5 billion which isn’t a catastrophe.” But the bigger picture is alarming: “We still have an €8 billion hole in the balance sheet. We’ve just sold our biggest asset, 25% of the group, for £1.5 billion. That values the group at much less than €8 billion. So this rolling programme of asset disposal is not going to work. And we still have a $2.1 billion mobile telecom franchise we’re committed to in China.” The one remaining jewel is MHB Asset Management which handles clients’ funds totalling $200 billion. That should fetch a good price, but not in a distress sale.

Asian thunderbolt

0930 Memo to Sigma Banking Corp from Bank Austerlitz, its subsidiary in Singapore: “We have been instructed that Ravi Asian Bank, Jakarta, is refusing to pay the $300 million leg of a spot foreign exchange transaction with Sigma in New York and is keeping the Indonesian rupiahs in part payment for outstandings owed by Sigma. Sigma’s insolvency is suspected following its credit downgrade.”

The $1.5 trillion a day foreign exchange market relies on absolute integrity of trades. Once a deal has been agreed and funds released for one leg of a foreign exchange transaction, the other party to the contract is bound to release the counterpart funds. There may be delays because of time-zone differences, but there should never be a delay because one side refuses to pay. Ravi Asian Bank’s hot-headed action could cause a dislocation of the entire market as banks lose confidence and seize all the cash they can to cover receivables.

Sigma in Amsterdam immediately reports the problem to the Dutch central bank. Eddie George and Dutch regulator Tom de Swaan discuss a contingency plan.

George: What we should be doing is creating a function for the FX and let the trades wash through.

De Swaan: We can say that if it appears there’s a problem we will put in place clearing arrangements for FX contracts with Sigma.

0931 The London Stock Exchange suspends trading in Sigma shares.

1030 The European regulators decide to put an administrator into Sigma. Eddie George has other worries besides the FX hiccup: “The thing that concerns me increasingly is the systemic risk that would come through if Sigma went down and took their credit derivatives book with them.”

Sigma is a market leader in credit derivatives. It has its own credit risk evaluation model, StreetCred40, which is subscribed to by 120 banks. It uses StreetCred40 to price its own portfolio and to make bid-offer prices to its clients, and to some extent to the market at large. That’s fine in normal markets. But Sigma’s own credit rating has deteriorated and its clients are not prepared to take a risk on its performance, especially on large credit derivatives positions. Sigma’s credit derivatives book, with over $100 billion in notional principal, is becoming a millstone round its neck.

Eddie George talks to De Swaan, Sigma’s home supervisor: “Sigma has a matched book of $100 billion of credit derivatives, I presume that’s notional. On top of that they lost $4 billion yesterday. I would like you to get Perseus Marconi to construct some form of special purpose vehicle where the matched book would go in, or that we would get the banks who are involved in that matched book to novate, sign new agreements where they would cut out Sigma as intermediary. That way we would reduce systemic risk dramatically.”

De Swaan volunteers IBN Flanders Bank: “I’m going to suggest they do it, for a short-term facility fee.”

1130 IBN Flanders Bank is happy to consider taking over Sigma’s matched credit derivatives book. It would act as intermediary on each deal, providing a better credit to the counterparty than Sigma could, and charging a fee that would come out of any proceeds from unwinding the derivatives book. IBN Flanders is also eyeing Sigma’s subsidiary in Germany, Rhein-Ruhr Bank, as a means of expanding its operations there.

Chemical Bank is considering converting Sigma debt obligations into equity as a way of getting “some upside potential”. Chemical chairman Rick Strange asks his regulator Greenspan, in view of his recent embargo on US banks buying bits of Sigma, if there are now “any restrictions on us buying any parts of Sigma, because we’re potentially interested in the investment banking operations – MHB Capital, MHB Investment Bank, MHB Securities”. Greenspan raises no objection at this stage.

1145 In a private meeting with Sigma chief risk officer Franklin, Strange agrees a deal – conversion of $2 billion of debt into 30% of Sigma. But it isn’t clear whether this 30% includes title to assets such as Great Northern Bank and Rhein-Ruhr which are at the point of being sold. Franklin, it’s clear to Strange, is plotting the removal of Marconi, presumably to become chairman of Sigma, or what’s left of it, himself.

At midday on the second day of the crisis international banks are seeing the implications of the global telecom sell-off, its impact on credit spreads and equity prices, deepened by the fear that central banks are far from orchestrating a bail-out. Nor will the US regulators involve themselves in what they see as a European affair. This is a time of recrimination not constructive effort.

1150 The German banks are distancing themselves. They are angry at being drawn into a non-German crisis. Says Toplitz, head of Bayerische Kreditbank: “This has begun in the Netherlands. Perhaps it’s a European crisis but not especially a German one. So we as German banks don’t see why we have to pay the bills.”

1230 Greenspan continues to keep his distance. He says the US expects European regulators to rescue the situation. Sigma’s problems arose as a consequence of a new European regulatory regime that is still at an early stage of development, he argues.

Greenspan explains why he blocked a merger between Mega Corp and Sigma: “We’re not impressed that our friends in Europe have a complete handle on the situation. We think that this whole euro adventure has taken off with a number of teething problems and that some of the regulatory aspects were not fully anticipated.”

US treasury secretary Robert Rubin adds his own analysis: “Were it not for the Europeans and their sloppy thinking this mess wouldn’t have arisen in the first place.”

1230 In a move calculated to irritate the Europeans further, the US Federal Reserve once again raises rates by 0.25% to “head off possible inflationary tendencies in the US economy”.

1300 Market risk report. Industrial and emerging telecom stocks are down, and western bank stocks are following in a highly correlated decline. Other stocks are beginning to fall.

In Washington, chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission Arthur Levitt can’t ignore a report that Wood Stanley has been talking down and possibly manipulating Sigma stock. He confers with Rubin and Greenspan:

Levitt: I have to decide on an investigation into Wood Stanley. I haven’t gone so far as to suspend trading.

Rubin: You’d better get cracking on the suspension of Sigma shares. We’ll nail Wood Stanley down some other time. You as the SEC are more concerned with propriety in the marketplace. Are shareholders being hurt? That’s the question. We’ve got a bunch of vultures here, at Fischer King, Continental etc. It sounds to me like Joe Ordinary Investor’s getting screwed.

Greenspan: Bill McDonough [chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York] is concerned at the very large volumes of securities and deposits traded at Sigma’s branch in New York. He wants to close down that branch.

Rubin agrees.

1311 Marconi gives a riotous press conference with Lewis of Anglia, confirming its purchase of 51% of Great Northern Bank for £1.5 billion plus the assumption of the bank’s £3 billion funding shortfall. Other creditors are angered by this side-deal – some are jealous that they didn’t think of it first. Lewis confirms that Anglia has completed a $3 billion bond issue led by Wood Stanley, but there is considerable doubt whether, in these turbulent markets, the issue has been securely placed. Marconi also announces the sale of Sigma’s matched book of credit derivatives to IBN Flanders Bank. IBN Flanders will stand in the middle between Sigma and its counterparties, to overcome the impaired nature of Sigma’s credit. But Marconi denies that any debt/equity agreement was reached with Chemical Bank. Either he doesn’t know about the deal between Strange and Franklin, or he’s keeping it secret.

1315 The ECB cuts short-term euro interest rates by 0.25% and may cut them again within the next hour, market sources say. But it seems the US and European regulators are still at odds, with the US raising rates and Europe cutting them. Duisenberg gets Greenspan and Rubin on video link to discuss interest rates, and the coordination of insurance regulators. Sigma insurance operations in the US could draw the US into the crisis.

Rubin notes that insurance regulation on both sides of the Atlantic is somewhat fragmented: “Increasing dependence between banking and insurance raises the question who would actually jump in at the same time on the insurance side?” But he’s more preoccupied with the dollar: “We’re going up, to try to defend the dollar a little bit. We’re up half a point. I don’t think we want to go very much further, we’re in danger of overcorrecting. But we’re not averse to further rises if necessary.”

Duisenberg: We haven’t heard what’s going on inside Sigma’s New York operation.

Greenspan: We’re aiming very shortly to suspend their activities. We want to make sure that the integrity of the US banking system is not affected.

Duisenberg: The US federal insurance commission will presumably close down Sigma’s insurance business. I want to make sure that anything we do in Europe takes account of the fact that residual value will come out of the US insurance group. At the moment the US federal commission has to do it state by state; it’s a nightmare.

1412 The US SEC says it has suspended trading in Sigma shares, at $3 a share, pending investigation of their volatility. The US treasury, on behalf of the federal and state insurance commissions, suspends Sigma’s insurance subsidiaries from writing further business or paying out commercial claims, for a period of five days. Greenspan also suspends the operating licence of Sigma’s New York branch.

1456 Press reports in London put Sigma’s marked-to-market derivatives losses, apart from its matched book, at “at least $5 billion and perhaps as much as $7 billion”. There is some confusion about who is ultimately responsible for this paper loss, now that IBN Flanders is standing in as counterparty for some of Sigma’s credit derivatives deals. But IBN and the Dutch central bank understand that IBN is responsible only for the matched book, not positions that are unhedged. However, it’s possible that the “matched” book was only matched according to Sigma’s own risk management software, StreetCred40, which may have come unstuck in highly volatile conditions.

1500 The US banks have now fully woken up to the opportunities, rather than the dangers, in Europe. They seek to stymie Wood Stanley’s aggressive tactics and unleash a press campaign against the investment bank’s “alleged talking-down and manipulation of the Sigma stock price”.

Tony Ringo, chief financial officer at Continental Bank, confides to US regulators: “The way we read it, we are the big pockets in town. We’ve got $50 billion in capital. Chemical has $2 billion exposure to Sigma, we have $800 million. We think there’s an opportunity to convert it into equity in Sigma. It’s an opportunity to take a position in Europe in the telecom sector. It’s good for US business, and good for us if we can do it. The downside is that instead of the stock rebounding it may continue to slide. We’re not going to give them an open-ended guarantee.”

Rubin: My biggest concern is that we get stuck with you and Chemical between you taking over 50% – effectively we’ve bought the problem off the Dutch.

Ringo: If the worst came to the worst, Chemical and Continental could merge.

Rubin: “Be careful because then Duisenberg will happily stuff you with all this.” Just like the US before Pearl Harbour, US regulators are determined not to be drawn into what they see as a European crisis.

But the foreign-exchange problem may soon engulf them all:

1520 Memo from Sigma New York to Sigma Amsterdam: “We’re still waiting for the $300 million from Ravi Asian Bank through the CHIPS system. If it doesn’t appear we may indeed have liquidity problems.” There are reports from the far east that Ravi Asian “may not open for business tomorrow”.

European officials now fear a systemic crisis. They consider putting in clearing functions for foreign exchange, acting as a provider of liquidity for held-up trades. They also consider a worst case if Sigma goes bust. The ideas fly around. They have obviously done no collective contingency planning as European central banks – the principle of no-bail-out being so firmly part of the Maastricht Treaty.

De Swaan: Do we enter into a risk-sharing arrangement between various central banks?

Duisenberg: We could announce that, on the assumption that the overall exposure is, say, E10 billion for the sake of argument, the Europeans will collaborate.

Duisenberg: They’re telling us there is systemic risk, what’s the reason for that?

De Swaan: The systemic risk is actually more about uncertainty.

Stark: Would the European central banks be so sanguine about seeing banks go under? Surely they wouldn’t.

De Swaan: No-one is going to go under.

Duisenberg: We need to get the Americans in. I think we’re getting out of control. [enter Marconi and Franklin]

Marconi: The good news is we’ve just struck a deal with IBN Flanders Bank to sell off Rhein-Ruhr Bank for E2.5 billion. But …

Franklin: …we have a credit derivatives portfolio which is under water to the tune of $13 billion. This is in addition to the matched book.

George: We’ve got the classic problem, do we just close down the book? We don’t really know the true position.

De Swaan: We wouldn’t provide liquidity to them unless the government are willing to stump up the taxpayers’ funds, that’s it.

Duisenberg: Then we concentrate on the banks that might be affected. We provide them with support. We feel more confident in stopping the line there than we do about stopping the line with Sigma.

Marconi protests that he has £1.5 billion cash from the sale to Anglia. But that cuts no ice with the regulators. It’s clear to everyone but himself that this is the end of the line for him.

1648 The Dutch central bank moves to quash rumours that it is providing support to IBN Flanders Bank to take over Sigma’s matched credit derivatives book: “We’re just taking something that’s not a problem and ring-fencing it,” says a spokesman. “Sigma has other credit derivatives positions where it maintains principal exposure.”

Meanwhile IBN Flanders has placed a bid for Rhein-Ruhr, offering $2.5 billion, which they estimate at 1.1 times net book value. Tony Ringo, CFO of Continental, calls Aesop. He’s heard IBN wants to do a financing, in highly volatile conditions.

Aesop: We wouldn’t mind consolidating some of the cash position and want to consider raising say $500 million. I think that’s as much as the market would tolerate now.

Ringo: What’s your exposure to Sigma?

Aesop: $1.5 billion. We’ve written down to zero all our telecom.

Ringo: It could be helpful to you perhaps if you were able to sell something. We’d pay you $1.5 billion for a package of the telecoms equity and the Sigma loan.

Aesop: We’ll come back to you.

1837 Showing he’s right on the ball, Sir John Furniss, chairman of Midshires Bank, tells a reporter he’s about to make a bid for Rhein-Ruhr Bank, despite reports that IBN Bank has already bought it.

Bayerische Kreditbank is anxious to spoil these foreign bids. BKB’s chief risk officer Chuck Rivers plots with his chairman Toplitz: “We have to create a crisis that decreases the value of Rhein-Ruhr and anybody who’s not there in the German system will run a mile. We are then the only buyers.” Toplitz spreads a rumour of “possible fraud in Rhein-Ruhr’s mortgage portfolio”.

1700 Firm complaints about the aggressive tactics of Wood Stanley, as it tries to soften up Sigma for a potential takeover by Mega Corp, have reached the ear of SEC chairman Arthur Levitt. He announces an investigation. But the damage has already been done. The dive in Sigma’s reputation is now costing it liquidity everywhere, especially in the FX market:

1800 Memo from Sigma to the Dutch central bank: “Ravi Asian claims that Sigma is in default and that it’s seizing rupiah funds from a foreign exchanges transaction to cover other exposures. Banks worldwide are reacting by cancelling payments to Sigma and reviewing their exposure. Correspondent banks have seized nostro accounts. Sigma appeals for liquidity to the Dutch central bank, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bundesbank to tide it over.” Sigma is haemorrhaging.

1830 There is a severe risk of dislocation in the foreign exchange markets unless regulators and central banks worldwide cooperate on a standstill and rescue. Hasty calls by central banks establish that the major banks have forex receivables from Ravi Asian Bank totalling $16.2 billion, with IBN Flanders and Crédit Général the most heavily exposed ($3.3 billion and $3 billion respectively).

1920 At a Sigma press conference the media are howling for blood, probably Marconi’s. He’s jeered and hissed as he takes the rostrum to make what must be his resignation speech. Marconi admits: “I have been destroyed by numbers. I shall go off and start other business … you will hear from me again.” An administrator is appointed.

Chief risk officer Franklin, determined to stay on the technical high ground, defends the credit derivatives model StreetCred40 which has produced a paper loss on the Sigma portfolio of at least $4 billion: “The model you are referring to has been bought by 120 institutions, and there have been no prior complaints about its operations or its ability to model credit risks. There have been suggestions that the numbers it throws up are consistently different from all the other models on the street. We are not in a position to comment on that because we have only run our model on our own portfolio. As you know most banks have option pricing models, value-at-risk models and so on. Many use the same underlying assumptions but apply them differently and they get different results. [laughter and catcalls from the auditorium] StreetCred40 does apparently give results different from CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+. But on the other hand [says Franklin in desperation] no one can say that our model is wrong!” The conference ends in uproar.

2100 Market risk report. Stock markets are in free fall, with telecom and banking stocks leading in western as well as emerging markets. There’s no safe haven except the Swiss franc and gold.

At the end of day two, Sigma is no longer a going concern, although an administrator has been appointed. The foreign exchange markets are in turmoil, but central banks appear to be stepping into the breach with liquidity where it is needed. The hyenas are tearing up Sigma. A fierce debate rages over credit derivatives and the models used to price them.

Thursday July 22 1999

0900 Market risk report. The Singapore and Hong Kong stock markets suspend trading. Tokyo is hovering on the brink. In London and elsewhere in Europe traders expect a 60% drop.

0915 The Bank of England announces “unequivocal support to ensure Asian defaults on FX payments do not spiral into a systemic market crisis”.

0917 European officials are baffled by the markets. They are wondering how to intervene, and where. They conclude that stabilizing the equity markets is the key to pre-empting a meltdown.

Duisenberg: These equity markets are behaving a bit like FX markets now. They’re going down because people are shorting. The minute they realize there’s some money going in the other side to call their bluff.

1030 The European officials decide to set up discount facilities with banks to encourage investment and pension funds to buy equities, and for companies to buy back their own shares.

This is the situation in the middle of day three. Sigma is contained, central banks have intervened heavily, and are prepared to intervene some more; foreign exchange markets are functioning in slow motion; equity markets are being supported by new credit lines from banks, pre-empting the need for over-extended investors to raise cash from parts of the market that are still liquid. But the situation is precarious. The banking system has been tempted to extend credit to the equity markets way beyond normal banking prudence. If equity markets don’t bounce back, who will pick up the pieces?

1400 Press release. Dr Mervyn Schmidt, dean of Harvard Medical School, announces to Bloomberg that Dr Wong Lok Suk and Dr Okie Moon have been arrested and charged with fraud. They were the authors of the article published in last week’s New England Journal of Medicine alleging that intracranial tumours were associated with even modest use of mobile phones. Wong and Moon are found to have built up substantial short positions in mobile phone stocks, using a $150 million line of credit from Ravi Asian Bank. “There is no evidence for tumour incidence,” says professor Schmidt.

Bitter conclusion

Can you put the toothpaste back in the tube? After the market mayhem, and the collapse of Sigma, the losses of the last 48 hours can’t be reversed. A bubble has burst, and the management of a major bank was removed. Perseus Marconi, visionary though he is, won’t get his old job back, and Sigma is dead or dying.

But, for bankers and regulators, The Sigma Affair is a reminder that markets tend to grab information and trade on it before examining whether it’s good or bad.

In this case governments and financial regulators were quick – perhaps too quick – to intervene to limit the consequences of imprudent banking. Sigma had hardly experienced its first funding problems and been hit by adverse market rumours before the regulators and central bankers were all over it, pumping in liquidity and encouraging its dismemberment and sale.

That is probably symptomatic of today’s banking landscape, in which every institution and its components are a target for acquisition or merger: good for pre-empting systemic crises, bad for building businesses and corporate identity.

Sigma went down, but its retail subsidiaries didn’t. Nor did the financial system, despite a foreign exchange crisis, a stock market crash, and a surprising spat between US and European regulators, as the European System of Central Banks learnt to flex its muscles. With extraordinary generosity, European central banks subsidized banks to buy shares and stabilize the stock markets.

Would governments in real life have pumped in so much cash? Probably. Does that encourage banks – and investors – to take foolish risks? Draw your own conclusions.

The events and dialogue above were compiled from tape-recordings, press releases and notes made by the players. This material is entirely fictitious and in no way represents the behaviour of real-world bankers or government officials, despite the use of some real names.

Many thanks to PA Consulting Group, the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, JP Morgan [for the risk room], Cityforum and Crisisplay International.