YOU CAN’T HEDGE AGAINST THE MAIN RISK
In the last 10 years the Deutschemark-dollar exchange rate has gone from 2.60 to 1.72, then to 3.45 and now to about 2.30. The sterling rate rose from 1.64 to 2.42 and then fell to near parity before rising to 1.50. Such gyrations make it almost impossible for businesses to form sensible investment plans. The uncertainty itself limits investment and the currency swings produce distortions in the real economy, such as the squeeze recently imposed on US manufacturing and farming by the high dollar.
Could a monetary system for the whole world run like the European system, and reduce the volatility of the foreign exchange markets?
The arguments against it are familiar. Exchange rates are prices, which must be allowed to change so that markets can clear and produce efficient results. Companies worried about exchange risk can always hedge in the futures markets.
Hedging is not cheap, and one cannot hedge against the main risk – that the currency of the country in which one has decided to produce will appreciate and make all costs too high. The only response is to be large enough to spread production around the world.
Exchange rate movements such as those recently, clearly markets but do so only as a safety valve in response to disequilibria in goods and labour markets. World capital markets are easily the most closely linked of the three – only a tiny percentage of what is produced in North America, Europe or Japan ends up in one of the other super-economies – and so exchange rates overshoot, while other prices and quantities adjust slowly.
The exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System works because goods and labour markets within Europe are much more integrated relative to capital markets, and because government policies are at least partly harmonized in order to achieve stability. The most conspicuous example of the latter was the change in the policy of the Mitterrand government in 1982. The exchange rate mechanism within the United States – one dollar equals one dollar everywhere – works for the same reasons.
Applying the system to the whole world is much more difficult. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates succeeded in the 1950s and 1960s because capital markets were not closely linked and the dollar formed the base of world liquidity, as long as US economic policy stayed in line. Central banks could intervene, using sums of money which were large in relation to the flows of private money. This is no longer the case. Intervention can still be used – but it can have only a limited impact.
Exchange rates can be kept in line only through monetary and fiscal policy. The move to floating rates gave greater freedom for governments to vary their policies — but only at a cost of rapidly moving exchange rates and varying inflation. This came to be considered unacceptable. European countries decided to manage their exchange rates and many others pegged their currencies to the dollar, or to other major currencies.
This regional pegging can increase, and probably will. Sterling might join EMS with a wide base band and a provision for realignment if the oil price changed. The difficulty lies in ensuring sufficient policy consistency to stabilize the exchange rates between North America, Japan and Europe, where the separation of the goods markets means that a small policy change generates a large exchange rate movement. It is not likely that agreement could be reached on harmonization of fiscal policy and so all the strain would have to be borne by monetary policy.
A suggestion associated with the US economist McKinnon is that the world money supply, rather than the money supply of any one country, should be controlled. If German citizens wish to hold more of their welath in dollars, the Fed should supply more dollars and the Bundesbank fewer Deutschemarks. This would in effect be unsterilized intervention, but conducted within an internationally agreed target for world monetary growth. The coordination would not be easy, and the situation is complicated by the existence of the Euromarkets, but the technical problems could be overcome if the will to do it existed. The aim would not be to stop all exchange rate movements but to reduce the size of the fluctuations.
Unfortunately each country is hypnotized by its own monetary aggregate, and seems unaware of the importance of changes in the international demand for its currency. A change would need a shift in views of what monetary policy is for. A new system might not work, but the prize is so great that it must be worth a try.