Geopolitical risk is back on investors’ minds, and so it should be. The most geo-strategically sensitive region of the world is entering a period of intense political and economic flux. And the wave of political change and instability could spread out of the Middle East.
The main question for global markets is what it means for the oil price, and consequently the dollar’s strength. What it means for the Middle East’s local financial markets is largely irrelevant to the rest of the world. External debt and foreign holdings in local equity markets are generally small.
Nevertheless, the events in the Middle East have added impetus to recent outflows of portfolio investment from emerging markets. There has been an element in recent weeks of what London brokerage Exotix calls an autocracy premium in bond pricing.
The Arab Spring is a reminder that emerging markets tend to have less-developed institutions; historically, that is what has primarily justified their higher yields.
The smaller and less-sophisticated nature of capital markets and profit-oriented banks in some emerging markets generally is linked to the democracy deficit. In other words, the idea is that liberal democracy in whatever form usually gives – and, perhaps as in Egypt and Libya recently, might result from – a more open, transparent and commerce-oriented financial and economic system.
Predictably, much of the western media coverage of the events has emphasized how the protests are not anti-western or anti-capitalist and have been led by an educated and culturally globalized generation of satellite TV, mobile phone and internet users. This is only partly true, as internet access in Libya, for example extends to only about 5% of the population.
If the movement does result in the coming to power of a more entrepreneurial generation, this could be good news for investors. But in Egypt and elsewhere the fall of Hosni Mubarak will not in itself bring the democracy and jobs the protesters are looking for. On the contrary, lending by foreign banks, as well as foreign direct investment and tourism, will likely evaporate in the short term, with disastrous consequences for the macro-economy.
Post-revolution survival of banks and corporates will depend on their distance from the old regime.
If the central bank’s reserves become inadequate to further prop up the Egyptian pound, dependence on food imports will bring even higher consumer price inflation – a spark for the original protests – entailing even greater discontent.
Economic problems will make it more important for the government to prop up the economy and placate the population more by loosening the fiscal balance sheet even more, which could put off international investors still further. Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have all announced impromptu gifts to their population in exchange for quiescence.
In the long term, energy subsidies could present a risk even to Saudi Arabia’s fiscal situation. Even before a recent $39 billion additional spending announcement, the Institute of International Finance projected that the Saudi government’s break-even price of oil could rise to $108 per barrel by 2020.
Violence in Saudi Arabia seems more likely after the unrest in Bahrain and the cataclysm in Libya. With the marginalized Shia population concentrated in the oil-rich eastern provinces, disruption to Saudi oil production is not inconceivable.
Commodity investors know these dangers only too well, and the flipside is that higher prices for oil as a result of political risk will bring more money to oil exporters whose production has not been disrupted. This includes those exporters in Africa with similarly large economic potential, but also similarly volatile political situations. Oil-rich Nigeria, for example, might experience communal violence around elections in April – just as the extra oil wealth flowing into state coffers raises the stakes of winning.
Chaos in Nigeria would be another reminder that oil and democracy rarely mix easily.