It looks as though local markets are slowly making the transition from flavour of the month to full-fledged asset class. In mid-June, JPMorgan launched a suite of new products, called the GBI-EM (Government Bond Index – Emerging Markets) that will provide a benchmark for local-currency debt.
JPMorgan has long had the EMBI (Emerging Market Bond Index) and its cognates – indices that follow emerging-market debt denominated in dollars or euros. It’s also had a GBI for developed market government bonds. There was an obvious gap, and one that has increasingly needed to be filled as large real-money bond investors move more of their funds into local markets.
The move into local bond markets has been accelerated by dollar weakness and low interest rates on dollar-denominated spread product. But even if dollar bond yields start backing up again, local markets are likely to remain an important source of diversification – as well as providing an opportunity for capital gains.
“The investor community has taken an interest in a global local market index since last year,” says Gloria Kim, manager of JPMorgan’s index products. Her new product shows such interest is justified: local instruments have outperformed dollar bonds on a risk-adjusted basis since 2001, when JPMorgan’s data begins.
The GBI-EM comes in many flavours: there are versions denominated in dollars and in local currency, and clients can also choose to restrict the list of countries to those that are more welcoming to foreign investors. JPMorgan is also agnostic on whether Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore count as emerging markets: there are indices that include them, others don’t.
Strong evidence of the increased importance of local markets came in June, when a Mexico euro-denominated issue proved too expensive for many investors, who instead preferred to get exposure in the local market.
The €750 million 10-year bond, co-lead managed by Barclays and UBS, was priced aggressively at one of the tightest points on the Mexican curve, and swapped into dollars just three basis points over the 10-year dollar bond.
That meant that hedge funds weren’t interested in the deal: there was no profit in it for them buying the euro bond, swapping it into dollars, and shorting the dollar curve. In the end, the bond was sold to 149 real-money investors, some of which had never bought Mexico before. The coupon is just 4.25%: Mexico’s lowest ever.
The problem for Mexico and its lead managers was that once the bond was sold, it immediately fell in price. Over the past few years, Mexican issues have generally done very well, as a result of their scarcity value: the sovereign has been paying down its stock of foreign debt, replacing it with domestically issued local bonds.
With this issue, however, that strategy started to show its limitations. Foreign investors have stopped falling all over each other to snap up new dollar and euro bond issues; instead, they’re simply going to the Mexican local market, where they can get as much Mexican credit as they like. Mexico’s domestic 10-year bond pays twice as much interest as its euro bond does, and comes with a possible currency-appreciation play on top. Given the ease with which foreign investors can enter Mexico’s domestic market, it’s hardly surprising that they’re beginning to shun instruments denominated in their home currencies.