The discussion begins with the added public scrutiny of individuals – “unfortunate, but inevitable,” the chief concedes.
Conversation turns to the business mix of the different divisions within his group. Most of his peers talk in terms of percentage of earnings between the retail and wholesale parts. This chief executive instead discusses it in terms of the amount of capital he allocates to each business line. Get used to it – it’s the language of 2010 and beyond in a world of high capital requirements and scarce provision of it.
But his main concern is different. He thinks it is increasingly inevitable that the political backlash against banks will lead national regulators within the eurozone to require that banks keep capital for each operation within national boundaries. This, he complains, runs completely against the concept of the free market within the common European currency.
Worse still, more than 18 months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, he still has no idea what set of rules his bank will have to comply to.
Jacques de Larosière, former managing director of the IMF and former governor of the Banque de France, warned once again last month that prospects for economic recovery are threatened by uncertainties about reform, which have been heightened by the recent proliferation of national proposals.
No doubt he was thinking in particular of how any variant of the Volcker rule ban on proprietary trading might break up universal banks.
Bankers from countries worst affected by the crisis – the US and Europe – talk a lot about how misjudged new regulations might impede lending. What they truly worry about is something else: loss of competitive advantage. The Europeans think that the US banks and regulators were most at fault and hope to derive some benefit from this. US bankers, goodness knows why, cling to a notion of their own superiority and leadership in financial services.
The bottom line is that neither the US nor any European country will accept any new banking regulations that do not help their own banking systems regain a position from which they can support national economies.
What this just-under-the-surface hostility between the US and Europe ignores, however, is a third bloc of countries not much considered up to now as a source of significant competition in global financial services or as participants in the debate over new bank rules.
Taxpayer-funded bailouts of failed banks have not featured prominently in the emerging markets. The fast-growing countries of Asia, notably, did not suffer a second banking crisis after the one that struck in 1998. These countries’ banks seemed to get through rather well.
It seems strange then that the voices of their regulators and policymakers should be so little heard in the debate over a new international scheme of arrangement for banks. They have no reason to accept some regulatory hodge-podge cooked up in Washington, London and Brussels to apply to their own banks, which did not make the same mistakes. They have good reason to be sceptical of anything delivered by the western regulators, who gave us a constipated 10-year debate over a Basle II system that totally failed to head off the biggest disaster in banking since the 1930s.
Those decrying the absence of international coordination are insulting our intelligence. This was only ever a dream.
If they really want to bring it to life, western politicians, bankers and regulators might ask their emerging market peers for advice.
They probably wouldn’t like all they would hear and neither would consumers in those mature economies. Asian banks faced many more restrictions on lending, including on loan-to-value ratios on residential mortgages. This is anathema to free-marketeers who dislike credit rationing and it’s a worrying thought for politicians in countries where consumers used cheap credit and housing equity to compensate for the low wages imposed by globalization.
In a more restricted and closely regulated bank market, Asian banks tended to make money charging customers for core services of bank accounts and maturity transformation. Reintroducing that would be a very tough sell for politicians and bankers in the west. But it’s better than leaving banks to make their money from shadowy side activities, piling up leverage and trading synthetic products with synthetic customers (really themselves), and calling the proceeds profit.