“In Japan, I feel the fashion is to bash bankers. This is not a sound move in a modern society. It is a little bit hysterical,” ponders Shin Nakahara, the corporate planning boss of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.
Contemplating the sheer scale of the bank rescue ahead of them – estimated needs $500 billion – Japanese bankers might feel like turning round and bashing the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.
In Basle 10 years ago the British and Americans capitulated to the Japanese ministry of finance (MoF) on the issue of tier-two capital. The concession allowed banks to count, as tier-two capital reserves, up to 45% of their hidden assets – that is to say, unrealized gains on their equity portfolios.
This defeated the whole effort of the Basle Committee to harmonize banks’ capital adequacy ratios (BIS ratios) in the Group of 10 industrial countries. The British and American regulators had gone to Basle intent on forcing Japanese banks to boost their equity capital from 4% of all assets to 8%. The concession won by the MoF meant a tier-one ratio of 4% could be balanced by unrealized stock market gains of 4%. Japanese banks could say their capital adequacy matched that of their western counterparts even though their outstanding shareholders equity had not changed at all.
This arguably is the root of Japan’s instability today. When times are good – the currency strong and equity markets bullish – the value of unrealized gains increases, the BIS ratio increases and the banks have scope to lend more. In an asset price bubble, lending increases even faster. When times are hard the process quickly reverses, forcing banks to cut lending at a time when companies most need working capital.
In 1992 the hidden equity gains of the top 19 Japanese banks stood at ¥17 trillion. Today the weak stock market has wiped out the gains. At the banks’ year end in March 1998, with the Nikkei stock index hovering around 16,500, hidden equity reserves were reduced to ¥1.8 trillion. Moodys’ Investors Service reckons that all aggregate reserves of the banks are wiped out if the Nikkei goes below 16,000. On September 9 it was 14,756.
It gets worse. Japan’s banks have enormous dollar-denominated loan books. So when the yen weakens against the dollar, their risk assets increase in yen terms. Unless more capital is found to offset this rise, their BIS ratio falls. James Fiorillo, a bank analyst at ING Barings estimates that for every ¥10 drop against the dollar, the BIS ratio is cut by 50 basis points.
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi calculated its BIS ratio at year end in March 1998 using a rate of ¥134 to the dollar. Its BIS ratio was 8.53%. With the yen at ¥144, Fiorillo’s rule of thumb suggests it’s now fallen to 8.03%.
The banks are caught in a downward spiral. As confidence wanes, so too does the stock market and the currency. As the economy worsens, so too do bankruptcies (up 238% in June) and so too do the banks’ profit-and-loss as they absorb credit losses. Their tier-one capital takes a hit when the bank moves from profit into loss. While they can play any number of accounting tricks with tier two – such as revaluing land holdings, which is the MoF’s latest favourite – the tier one ratio is hard to fudge. Shareholders’ equity is shareholders’ equity. And tier two capital cannot be bigger than tier one. So, in the absence of fresh equity, the only way to keep the BIS ratio above 8% is to reduce assets. This is the cause of a deflationary credit crunch every bit as severe as the earlier asset-price bubble.
“I feel some responsibility for the banks’ current difficulties,” says one of the Japanese bureaucrats who negotiated the deal in Basle in 1988. “I don’t think the tier two concession was such a healthy thing for the banks after all.”
However, the banks can’t simply blame these officials. Basle capital standards only set a regulatory minimum. Banks are responsible for holding enough capital in the right form to ensure their survival. And Japanese banks have applied different standards to their subsidiaries elsewhere in the world. Japan’s biggest bank, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, has a tier-one ratio of 4.27%, but its wholly-owned subsidiary Union Bank of California – US regulated – has a tier-one ratio of 8.96%, and an overall BIS ratio of 11.05%. Tokyo-Mitsubishi, or rather its two components, might have looked more like their subsidiary if they had been faced with a stark choice in 1988 – increase tier-one capital or reduce loans.
Now, deeper structural problems in Japan are combining with the effects of inadequate bank capitalization to threaten the entire system. As Heizo Takanaka, professor of Keio University says, Japan has a two-tier economy. “The dual nature of the economy pits industries with high productivity – which can compete in international markets even with the yen as high as 100 to the dollar – against low productivity industries that are operating on a 200-yen level [they could only compete internationally if the yen fell to that level], surrounded by protective regulations. The 200-yen industries survive by clinging to the 100-yen industries.”
Who needs return on equity?
This has implications for the country’s banking system. For the 200-yen industries to survive, the banks must lend to them at roughly the same rate as they lend to the 100-yen industries. This goes a long way towards explaining the banks’ dire performance.
Around 85% of Japanese banks’ earnings derive from lending; 50% of their risk-weighted assets are lent to big corporates at about a 50bp spread; the net interest margin on the overall loan book is 1.3%; the average return on equity (ROE) is 2.1%. Compare this with US banks which earn less than 40% from the credit spread business, have a margin of 4.3% and an ROE of 20.7%.
Since 1992 Japan’s banks have incurred ¥40 trillion of bad debts. Nor is it over yet. Yukiko Ohara, bank analyst with Morgan Stanley, reckons the top 19 need to provide a further ¥20 trillion against bad debt. If her estimate is correct, the net asset value of the top 19 is close to zero. That excludes the impact of the present recession and bad debts it is creating. Japanese banks spend too much of their resources lending to borrowers who should be using bond markets. Nor have they won much higher-margin business on the back of these loans.
| Japanese banks and the Nikkei | |||||
| Unrealized gains on securities – impact on the banks’ BIS ratios (%) for various values of the Nikkei stock index | |||||
| Nikkei index level | |||||
| 16,000 | 15,000 | 14,000 | 13,000 | 12,000 | |
| IBJ | 10.3 | 9 | 6.8 | 4.6 | 2.5 |
| LTCB | 10.8 | 9.4 | 7.9 | 6.5 | 5.1 |
| NCB | 7.1 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 5.1 | 3.3 |
| DKB | 9.5 | 8.4 | 7.3 | 6.2 | 5.1 |
| Sakura | 9.1 | 8 | 6.8 | 5.7 | 4.6 |
| Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi | 8.5 | 8.1 | 7.8 | 6.5 | 5.2 |
| Fuji | 8.9 | 7.9 | 6.8 | 5.8 | 4.7 |
| Sumitomo | 9.9 | 8.7 | 7.5 | 6.3 | 5 |
| Daiwa | 8.2 | 6.6 | 5 | 3.3 | 1.7 |
| Sanwa | 9.6 | 9.2 | 7.9 | 6.6 | 5.3 |
| Tokai | 10.3 | 9.9 | 8.5 | 7.1 | 5.6 |
| Asahi | 9.6 | 8.4 | 7.1 | 5.8 | 4.5 |
| Mitsui Trust | 10.3 | 7.5 | 4.6 | 1.7 | -1.1 |
| Mitsubishi Trust | 10.3 | 7.7 | 5 | 2.4 | -0.3 |
| Sumitomo Trust | 10.3 | 8.3 | 6.3 | 4.3 | 2.3 |
| Yasuda Trust | 10.4 | 8.4 | 6.5 | 4.6 | 2.6 |
| Nippon Trust | 5.2 | 4 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 0.4 |
| Toyo Trust | 11.1 | 9.6 | 8.2 | 6.7 | 5.2 |
| Chuo Trust | 10.4 | 8.1 | 5.9 | 3.6 | 1.4 |
| Major banks (average) | 10.2 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 5.8 | 4.4 |
|
Source: ING Barings |
|||||
If Japanese banks wanted to achieve a 20% ROE they would have to increase their revenues by more than Germany’s annual GNP, according to Deutsche Bank economist Kenneth Courtis. Or they would have to reduce their loan book by 47.6% to 65%, according to calculations by Goldman Sachs. Given that 60% of corporate funding comes from banks, these numbers explain why corporate treasurers are having sleepless nights. The corporates have high debt and little equity. Take recently bankrupted trader Okura & Co whose major shareholders included Fuji Bank (4.9%) and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (2.8%). Its equity ratio – defined as shareholders’ equity as a percentage of debt – was 1.2%. This is by no means unusual.
According to Tokyo-Mitsubishi’s 1998 annual report, 74% of its domestic lending to corporate customers is for “working capital purposes”. Nor is this unusual. If banks pull their loans, the company is effectively bankrupted.
That explains why the banks cannot voluntarily change their lending practices. Japan’s consensus society won’t let them. The two-tier corporate economy – 100-yen and 200-yen companies – is the result of government’s policy to provide lifetime employment for everyone. Japan is an orderly society, and the conventional wisdom in Tokyo is that it can only be orderly if everyone is working. Even today bureaucrats shudder at any mention of the Era of Civil Strife, a period of bloody conflict in the 16th century, just before the orderly Tokugawa shogunate. Horror of that time is the underlying reason for today’s social contract which provides lifetime employment.
Japan recoils from emulating Norway and squeezing jobs. “When the Nordic banking system was bailed out from 1992 to 1996,” notes Jim Walker, economist at Crédit Lyonnais Securities Asia, “bank credit fell from 73% to 52% of GDP and unemployment rose from 4% to 11.6%. In Japan, bank credit is a mere 6% off its peak of 118% of GDP in 1994.”
Socialist economy
As soon as the banks reduce their lending, unemployment will follow – and the correlation is likely to be even sharper than in Scandinavia. To do so, banks will have to fundamentally change their role. Japan has avoided unemployment by keeping unproductive people in unproductive jobs at unproductive firms. The unproductive firms were kept alive with unlimited bank loans at artificially low interest rates – from unproductive banks. All the 200-yen industries were cross guaranteed by 100-yen industries that were affiliated to the same keiretsugroup.
Any change in the banking sector would immediately throw the whole system out of balance. Japan is the most carefully controlled system on the planet. It’s a socialist economy in all but name. “A market economy is like Newton’s law,” says Akio Mikuni, who runs Mikuni & Co, a rating agency based in Tokyo. “The apple has to fall. In Japan, the apple can go up, it can even go sideways.”
The more thoughtful Japanese bankers understand completely what happens if the apple starts to obey the laws of gravity. “Japanese banks have been regarded as a public utility,” says Nakahara of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. “But whether we like it or not, we have to adopt global standards and compete with foreign institutions. I have no problem with that.
“Global standards means American standards. We have to change to adapt to the new competitive environment and we are ready to do so. When we say we’ll do so based on global standards, that means the unemployment rate will also be global standard. Are we really prepared for that? I don’t know. It will bring about social turbulence: a higher crime rate, the delinquency of youth. If we go global we have to accept these negative impacts,” he says.
Fine words. But there’s no sign of the banks taking even one step in the right direction. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubsishi has made commitments to extend credit to corporates in 1998 to the tune of ¥10.2 trillion – an increase on the 1997 when the amount was ¥7.5 trillion. There is a plausible view that Japanese banks – eight years after starting the strategy – are still committed to the idea of Japan’s economy growing them out of trouble.
But others argue, like Goldman’s David Atkinson, that far from solving the economy’s problems, the banks are making them worse. “You could solve this problem overnight,” says Atkinson. “Tell the bankers: those reserves you’ve taken, go out and use them. Result: loan workout, debt-equity swaps, real estate supply. Real estate gets developed. Value gets added.”
But that isn’t going to happen. Even if society would vote for banking reform – that is, for mass unemployment – it is not in the banks’ short-term interest to oblige. Loan workouts are against their short term interests says Atkinson and gives an example: a bank has lent a real estate company ¥100 billion at the peak of the bubble, which it has used to buy a property for ¥100 billion. The property is currently valued at ¥20 billion. The bank makes a provision of ¥80 billion, mostly on a tax-free basis. This represents an interest-free cost of funds. The bank’s exposure to the real estate company is now ¥20 billion, which costs about 0.6% a year to finance because of low interest rates. The real estate company still owes the bank ¥100 billion, so if it sells the property it gives the bank ¥20 billion and still owes it ¥80 billion. So it doesn’t sell. But neither does it develop the property because it can’t afford to fund it – it’s not paying interest after all – and if it could, all the added value would accrue to the bank until it paid off the full ¥100 billion.
Why forgive?
The only way the property will move is if the bank forgives part of the real estate company’s debt. The company can’t take an ¥80 billion loss, so in return for handing over the property, it gets ¥80 billion of debt forgiveness from the bank. The real estate company has no bubble effect left, nor a property. “The real estate company is most likely to agree to this type of deal,” says Atkinson, “but why would the bank? It’s not a charity?” Under present circumstances the bank still has an effective call option on recovery, represented by the ¥100 billion debt, which costs it only ¥20 billion at 0.6% a year to fund. There is no time value on money, and there are no attractive alternative investments. So says Atkinson, “why not wait, especially where better properties are concerned, for an economic recovery?” Then the bank can get back ¥100 billion, most of which was reserved anyway.
Atkinson calls this “rational behaviour, albeit short-sighted” and points to the fact that the top six banks control 50%-or-so of all non-performing loans, while the top 19 banks have already taken ¥40 trillion of reserves. Nothing will change, he argues, until one of the top six start loan workouts. And once one does, all will.
Based on Goldman Sachs’s experience he is almost certain that banks have no real interest in securitization, of which he says there has been almost none. “They do one every once in a while,” he says. “Securitization is very good for the PR image. They’re not designed to do anything other than look good.”
He gives another example, of a loan against a ¥1 billion property. It has five liens on it from five banks, each worth ¥200 million, but obviously the number one lien holder gets paid first. The property is today worth only ¥200 million, so the other liens are worth zero. He says that what’s going into the portfolios of loans being sold to investors is mostly the fifth, sixth or seventh lien loans.
“You’re selling thin air,” he says, adding that most are executed as private placements. “One or two loans have some value and are fairly priced, the other 38 have none. You get them for nothing. The bank can say it sold off “x” number of non-performing loans and, if you value these sixth liens at book value, it’s true. The end-buyer knows he is buying a couple of loans. But the other stuff is meaningless – it’s like someone giving you a cup of coffee when you go and get a haircut.” Has Goldman accumulated enough loans to do a public transaction? “We’re quite a long way from that,” says Atkinson.
Because the banks do not want to start the loan workout process, the real estate market will remain paralyzed, says Atkinson, paralyzing credit creation elsewhere in the economy: “The experience of the rest of the world is that until the loan workout process is completed, inefficiency in the real estate market has a tendency to suck everything down with it.”
Blip on the growth path
But the prevailing view among the elite and influential in Japan is, even today, that nothing too radical should be done: the Japanese system has its own way of working things out. And the consensus, in a country based on consensus, seems to be with them. The problem is viewed by many of the elite as a blip on Japan’s long growth path – the result of the occasional mistake in fiscal policy.
Akira Nambara, former executive director of the Bank of Japan, now senior adviser to Japan’s Export Import Bank – with his fluent English and Fulbright scholarship – is one of those Japanese officials who is regularly sent out into the world by the cabinet to explain Japan and its policy. His view is that Japan, far from doing nothing to solve its problems in the last eight years, has in fact followed a “beautiful policy”.
This, he says, was working – evidenced by almost 4% growth in 1996 – until the Fiscal Consolidation Act was introduced, hiking taxes, and causing fiscal drag in 1997. US president Herbert Hoover made a similar fiscal mistake just after the 1929 Wall Street crash, when America was the world’s largest creditor nation, as Japan is today. He points out that the IMF liked the Fiscal Consolidation policy, aimed at balancing the budget – the IMF’s first deputy managing director Stanley Fisher spoke to him about it.
So Nambara was shocked last November by the decision to allow city bank Hokkaido Takushoku to go bankrupt: he believes it was a profound mistake. “Very unfortunately, American economists gave us the wrong impression,” he says. “The Bank of Japan’s people were brainwashed by American economists who told them that too-big-to-fail is not so good because of moral hazard. Unbelievable. Since then the Hokkaido economy has faced a big problem and Japan has a credit crunch.” That hasn’t shaken his confidence in Japan’s ability to self-correct, with the help of some tax cuts and some public works spending: “I’m pretty sure the worst times are behind the Japanese government. Already our economy is coming back to sea level – that’s my sixth sense.”
He is cynical about the Anglo-Saxon pre-occupation with return on equity: “It’s easy to increase return on equity,” says Nambara. “If you stop equipment investment, or fire employees, return on equity increases. Sales will not increase. Adam Smith said those companies which see too high a return on equity are too short term. ROE should be 6%. Double digit is no good.”
What of UK bank Lloyds-TSB, widely admired, and with an ROE of over 30%? Does he think that’s the wrong model for a bank? “Yes, that’s the wrong model. Now the fashion and advice is Thatcherism,” he continues. “Fortunately the Japanese manufacturing sector is wise enough not to listen, so they’re still strong.”
Nambara’s views probably strike a chord with a high proportion Japan’s elite. It is a refusal to admit that the system isn’t working.
Public apology
Stephen Church of Analytica in Tokyo says the Japanese system is characterized by a lot of noise but not much change. Part of the noise is the practice of public apology and humiliation. In August the former president of Nippon Housing Loan Corp was fined three years salary plus his bonus in a Tokyo court for his “irresponsible management of the firm that led to its failure.” A few days later, Long Term Credit Bank’s chief, Katsunobu Onogi resigned. “I would like to apologize for my poor management,” said the LTCB President humbly. “I will step down to take responsibility.”
But public-apology-of-the-month came from finance minister and former prime minister, Kiichi Miyazawa. The 78-year-old looked wobblier than usual as he approached the podium to tell parliament that he took responsibility for the bubble economy of the late 1980s. “I regret that I failed to respond appropriately to economic conditions.” An article in the Nikkeinewspaper the next day revealed that this act of contrition was a trade-off with the opposition to get financial bills passed in the upper house where the LDP (which rules in the lower house) no longer has a majority.
Bank analysts grow more frustrated with politicians by the day. James Fiorillo of ING Barings in Tokyo wrote a poem for his clients which begins:
“T’was the night before crisis,
And behind the Diet border,
Not a creature was stirring,
To restore financial order.”
LDP politician Makiko Tanaka, the daughter of former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, is one of the more outspoken critics of political inertia. Speaking at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo in August, she compared the three candidates to succeed former prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to “the three stooges” and called prime minister Keizo Obuchi a “mediocrity”. She warned that the domestic banking system could collapse while legislators “pass around time-bombs to each other and refuse to take responsibility”.
Graveyard keeper
But surely the politicians have shown their vigour by coming up with the bridge bank concept? (Although the legislation hasn’t been passed yet.) The markets surged briefly in July when the plan was announced. At last it seemed the Japanese government was going to spend money on solving its banking crisis.
The bridge banks are a US invention, but in the US the concept was simpler and their life span was designed to be short. In Japan they could feasibly keep lending new money to existing borrowers for five years after they have taken over the assets of the failed bank.
Keiji Matsuda describes himself as “half graveyard keeper and half doctor”. As deputy governor of the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) he is responsible for the bridge banks as well as the ¥30 trillion the government has committed to the financial clean-up.
The complexity of the Japanese bridge bank structure is – even for him – not easy to explain even though his English is good. The top holding company will be called the Heisei Financial Revitalization Corporation and in Matsuda’s words “it must lend money to the bridge bank”. This body will be located in the same building as the DIC. Then there is the Examination Board of Financial Crisis Management. “That board must monitor how the bridge bank can manage a fit and proper lending policy to clients,” Matsuda explains. “Heisei is in charge of day-to-day, and Financial Crisis Management of whether they can make loans.”
Matsuda seems a little confused himself about the role of the Loan Examination Committee, which reports to the Heisei board according to the document submitted to the Diet. In an interview with Euromoney he found it difficult to explain how the Loan Examination Committee’s role would be distinct from the Examination Board of Financial Crisis Management. Then he recalled: “We have eliminated this Loan Examination Committee.”
According to the Diet document the bridge banks are expected to “continue providing loans for a certain period to sound borrowers in good faith”. But it’s not clear who decides on “sound borrowers” and determines “good faith”. Matsuda explains: “The criteria for judging healthy and sound should be made by another board. Yes, it’s quite complicated. In the process of parliamentary discussion that structure should be altered.”
Goldman’s Atkinson entitles his report on the bridge banks “Great propaganda”. After eight years in Tokyo he has been there before.
“Revolutions,” says Mikuni “are usually resisted by vested interests until the bitter end when it becomes clear to all that no alternative exists. Unfortunately, things have not yet gotten to this state in Tokyo.”
There is still a debate about what constitutes bank failure. At the end of August, hopes of a less vague approach on banking resolution were dashed. “It is not realistic to expect that we can come up with a very detailed, unequivocal definition of what is a [bank] failure and what is not,” said Toyoo Gyohten, a special adviser to the prime minister for financial affairs. “Realistically speaking, it is impossible to come up with a foolproof definition.”
The politicians are particularly sensitive about meddling with the banks for one simple reason: votes. The construction industry is a major source of votes for the ruling LDP (it can muster around six million voters) and of funds. While the 100-yen industries can operate successfully at ¥100 to the dollar, and 200-yen industries at ¥200 to the dollar, the construction industry contains companies that would struggle at ¥300 to the dollar.
If the banks started behaving more like western banks, the construction industry would be one of the hardest hit. So too would the LDP vote-machine. This was thought to be the threat behind a remark of Satoru Kishi, in his capacity as head of the Bankers Federation, in a rare public argument with the Bank of Japan over the lack of transparency of problem loans on banks’ balance sheets.
Kishi responded that if bankers were forced into breaking down problem loans into more detailed categories they would inevitably be squeezed into calling loans, so as not to look bad compared with their peers. The inference was that the loans called would be construction related. The LDP got the message. It announced that the Financial Supervisory Agency would not, as was previously hoped, announce the extent of category-two problem loans for individual banks after it finished its inspections in August.
The bridge banks – say the cynics – are a good vehicle for protecting the LDP’s more troubled friends in construction. They will be allowed to go on lending for five years after the banks they take over go into liquidation.
Japan may not want to face the social consequences of reform now, but it will soon have to face the social consequences of inaction. It has an ageing population. Its needs for adequate pension returns cannot be met by a system designed to provide cheap capital to inefficient businesses in exchange for full employment. This conflict of interest between the working and non-working populations will cause its own social problems. Long-term it will force banks and corporations to change.
The problem is serious, and it isn’t far off. The average age of a Sony employee in 1970 was 25. Today it is 38. At Toyota it is 37. Nor are corporate pension funds in a good state. “If you talk to any Japanese corporate managers,” says Masaru Kakutani, boss at Moodys’ Japan, “none of them will tell you, ‘look, I’m not worried about the pension fund’, except those who know nothing.”
Masaharu Usuki, senior economist in the pensions research division of LTCB Research Institute has calculated that the combined impact of under-reserving and a switch to accrual accounting from fiscal 2000 will slash Japanese corporate profits in half and keep them at that level for years.
The state pension system is almost certainly in a worse state. The welfare ministry estimates that in 2025 contributions to the system will peak at 34% of the average person’s income. This is exclusive of income tax and state medical insurance and is probably an underestimate .Nor does anyone know how much of the ¥130 trillion of existing reserves is bad debt. But it is known that the reserves have not been put to the most productive use. At best they have been used to buy JGBs (Japanese government bonds), and at worst the money has been lent to state entities such as the Japan Development Bank. “In my opinion the pension problem is going to kill the Japanese economy,” says one Japanese pension specialist who used to work at the MoF.
State and corporate pensions will be cut, because they cannot be maintained. People will be forced to take out private pensions and they will then start to look more closely at the returns they get. They will be shocked.
Return to zero
The average return on equity of the Japanese manufacturing sector is around 3.5%. This compares unfavourably with the US where the average annual return on equity was 16.8% in the first quarter of 1998. HSBC Securities says that the real rate of return on capital in Japan has fallen from around 20% in the 1960s.
“The real rate of return on capital has been falling steadily over the past 30 years,” says HSBC Securities Tokyo economist, Peter Morgan, “and has now reached abysmally low levels. An extrapolation of this trend suggests that it would hit zero in the next decade, ie investment would have a zero return.”
The quest for decent returns has already started. Individual investors have already begun to act. Take mutual funds. By June there were ¥2.6 trillion of non-yen denominated fixed-income funds. Only two Japanese firms were ranked among the top 10 managers, with Merrill Lynch and Putnam leading. If you look at all funds under management, the Japanese still dominate, but the top 10 includes Goldman Sachs Asset Management and Putnam. “Three years ago the foreign fund managers were nowhere,” says Courtis of Deutsche Bank. “Foreigners are now taking market share at will.”
In August a 74-year-old customer, in a letter to Osaka Shimbun newspaper, described his first experience of walking into one of the old Yamaichi branches taken over by Merrill Lynch. The letter ends: “I learned that Merrill Lynch was indeed very different from Japanese securities firms. Indeed, Japanese firms operate under the principle that corporate profits take priority over customers, an approach that has been protected by the ministry of finance’s convoy policy. I am getting old now, but from now on, I’m going to compare Japanese and foreign options when thinking about a good securities investment.”
These trends will combine with Japanese banks’ chronic undercapitalization and force them to change. Some will even be acquired. “I detect substantial interest on the part of foreign firms,” says Hiroshi Nakaso, who runs the financial system division at the Bank of Japan. “Generally speaking, a foreign acquisition is no problem at all. It’s fundamentally welcome.”
But such an acquisition would bring rapid change. A foreign bank wouldn’t lend in the old fashioned way. It wouldn’t provide cheap capital for 200-yen industries. It would be selective, make returns, reduce assets. It would start loan workouts and put companies into bankruptcy.
While the system prevails, the banks get weaker. Japanese banks today have an average Moodys’ financial strength indicator that ranks them below the banking sectors of Estonia, Jordan and Argentina. Even if the government recapitalized the banks tomorrow – and did a good job of it – the banks would only continue to prop up the 200-yen industries and get themselves into trouble again. As one analyst puts it, it would be like reconstructing the Titanic, and plopping it back in the Atlantic in front of an iceberg. It would still hit the iceberg and it would still sink.
There is a lot of vigorous talk now about bank restructuring. But don’t take it too seriously. Sumitomo Trust’s chairman, Hitoshi Murakami told Euromoney that if the government-engineered merger of his bank with LTCB goes ahead there will be no redundancies – even though overlapping branches would be closed. Puzzle over that one.