Investment banker Ariel Sigal, who covers the Republic of Argentina for Deutsche Bank, was about to board a plane to take him from Buenos Aires to São Paulo when his mobile phone rang. Making the call was Federico Molina, head of public credit for the Argentine government and the most senior civil servant in the country’s famously astute debt raising team.
“Where are you going?” demands Molina, whose tough, no-nonsense style is the stuff of legend in emerging-market underwriting. Bankers recount hour-long conference calls with Molina when his only words were: “Yes, no… uhuh”. Face-to-face presentations of their latest structures often end with Molina declaring, “OK, we’ll see”, then leaving the room with his staff following behind.
But on this occasion Sigal found Molina a bit more effusive. Something was clearly up. “São Paulo,” replied Sigal, feeling like a naughty schoolboy caught skiving off early by the head teacher.
“No you’re not,” says Molina. “You’re either staying here [in Buenos Aires] or going to New York.” That was Molina’s way of informing Sigal that Deutsche’s latest pitch had been accepted. The deal was on.
The next half an hour was spent on the phone discussing tactics while over the tannoy Sigal was being summoned for a flight he no longer intended to catch yet was preventing from leaving. The other passengers and crew were fuming. So too were airport officials as Sigal fought his way back out through passport control to return to the office. It was going to be a long night.
When this incident is related to Molina during an interview in his sparse, pictureless room in the ministry of economy and public works and services in Buenos Aires, he raises a rare smile, like a grizzled war veteran remembering an occasion when he was the one with the loaded pistol and his quarry had dropped a weapon while backing into a wall.
To look at Argentina’s glittering record in the capital markets one might mistakenly conclude that Molina had always had the upper hand against unarmed folk. It isn’t so. Argentina has lately been lauded as the best borrower from the emerging markets (the sovereign again wins this title in Euromoney‘s annual borrower awards), and has gained a reputation for frequently being the first credit to reopen markets following a crisis. It is also widely commended for being innovative with structures, maturities and currencies.
Back from the dead
However it is important to remember where Argentina came from. It was shut off from international finance for a decade following the 1980s’ debt crisis. Its reputation was that of a country incapable of producing good economic management – as evidenced by some of the worst hyperinflation the world has ever seen – where generals governed badly and citizens disappeared in the middle of the night.
That is the backdrop against which Molina and his colleagues have established Argentina’s name as a worthy credit over the past eight years. What’s more when Molina, along with other pioneers such as Carlos Weitz, Luis Briones and Alejandro Vanoli transferred from the central bank to the ministry in 1992, they had to bring their own furniture and computers with them. The ministry provided nothing except office space. There were no systems and no database. Argentina’s traditional approach to debt management was to keep the creditors at bay and avoid paying for as long as possible. No-one knew exactly how much the republic owed, who it was to, or when the next payment was due.
No concessions
It follows that if Molina hadn’t been tough, he wouldn’t even have lasted the course, let alone go on to win accolades for his work. Circumstances dictated that he gave away nothing in negotiations – neither words nor basis points. His team are of the same mettle, except that one or two are slightly more suave. This has allowed them to perfect a game of “good cop, bad cop” that they now use on the legions of investment bankers sending them as many as 15 proposals a week when markets are open. Their aim, which few doubt they have achieved, is to be as informed and aggressive as any banker on the other side of the table.
Since Argentina is one of the world’s biggest and most important borrowers, banks have dedicated staff covering only the republic. Some talk five or more times a day to the Argentines even when no specific deal is under way. One bank has an executive whose sole job is to cover Argentina in euros. Others have professionals on hand to talk to Argentina about documentation, legal issues, marketing and anything else that might arise.
Small wonder that Molina and his team at the national bureau of public credit sometimes feel they are being oversold to and fear being taken for a ride. They have responded with the following strategy: Molina and Weitz are the bad cops, closely guarding their positions, pushing the bankers to deliver their best and castigating them when they fail. Weitz, who now works out of the office of the financial representative of Argentina in Washington and who is the first point of contact for many investment bankers, is more up-tempo than Molina. He likes to wind up the bankers. “You don’t seem to have done much in dollars lately,” he will say. Or, “that’s far too expensive”. Or, “you may think that’s original but I have five similar proposals sitting here”. Weitz enjoys this kind of banter, but the effect is the same as Molina’s deadpan: to push the banks to deliver what the republic wants, at the lowest cost.
Of a lighter touch are Norberto Lopez Isnardi, Molina’s deputy in Buenos Aires, Noemí La Greca, who heads the Washington office and is noted for her wealth of investor contacts, and Hugo Secondini, who also served as Molina’s number two (together with Weitz) but now works elsewhere in the ministry as an adviser. They are the good cops whose job it is to turn on the charm and smooth things over after the bankers have been roughed up by the bad guys.
For many years Molina, Weitz and Secondini, working together in Buenos Aires, had this routine worked out to perfection. The three men, all economics graduates of the University of Buenos Aires who met and became friends while working together at the central bank, have offsetting personalities that enable the game to succeed.
“Carlos is the most aggressive, Federico is a man of few words and, maybe, I was the most polite who would smooth things over afterwards,” says Secondini. Building on their personalities, he says, they worked out a strategy to get the best deals from the banks.
Says Weitz: “I fight with the bankers. In some cases they can make easy money dealing with countries that are not prepared. We see deals on the screen that don’t make any sense.” Weitz says that in the early days bankers tried to justify high prices with sophisticated but false arguments about lack of demand and liquidity but now they have learnt not to try this in Argentina.
“Every negotiation is very difficult because we fight for every cent and we don’t like to lose even one cent in the market,” says Weitz. He adds: “I am very direct and if I think a bank is working poorly I tell them. I am trying to encourage them to deliver a better product and get them to respect us and not to take advantage of the republic. I think now they understand we are a very professional team.”
With Secondini’s departure from the team at the end of 1997 the good-cop role has been taken over by others, such as Isnardi and his deputy Viviana Weissmann. But some bankers say there are no good cops in Molina’s team and that everyone adheres to the same military-style philosophy, giving away little and much less than would be helpful to those designing the proposals. Others say they get what they need from Argentina, that Weitz and Isnardi point them in the right direction – “try something in euros, about seven years” is the kind of comment they might get from Weitz – without ever revealing details of another bank’s ideas. They say Argentina treats them firmly but fairly, rewarding those who bring it good proposals and coming down hard when promises are not delivered.
So united is the front the team presents to the markets that many outsiders are mystified by how the decision-making is really done, believing, wrongly, that all 20 team members vote on the deals.
“They never tell you who voted for what,” complains one banker. In fact, although great effort is spent trying to reach a consensus, the final decision is taken in the hierarchical way one would expect in a civil service operation. Molina and his seniors – Miguel Kiguel, undersecretary of finance, and deputy minister Pablo Guidotti, are where the buck stops.
All bankers respect the Argentine team for bringing a level of professionalism to emerging-market debt-raising that was previously missing. As a result, heads of public credit from all over Latin America have descended on the 1930s ministry building in Buenos Aires, with its wide corridors, sturdy doors and regulation paint that is the unlikely setting for a borrowing revolution. The visitors want to learn the techniques that enabled Argentina to pull off a string of firsts. It was the first emerging-market sovereign to do a global bond and the first emerging-market issuer to explore structures such as the FRAN issue in March 1998 – a spread-adjusting floating-rate bond designed by Morgan Stanley. Argentina was also the first to do a 30-year strippable zero coupon in euros, led by ABN Amro in May of last year; and a $1 billion seven-year issue with warrants (exchangeable into the republic’s 2027 global), led by JP Morgan and Deutsche in November 1998. Argentina has led the way in showing what can be achieved with reopenings and other methods of accessing the market at great speed to exploit niche opportunities.
On the liability-management side it has achieved cost savings through buy-backs during market crises, then gone on to be the first issuer back into the market when things picked up. After the Russian crisis, for example, Goldman Sachs led a $250 million addition to an earlier 2017 issue that set the ball rolling for everyone.
Ignacio Sosa, former head of emerging markets at BankBoston, who has now set up asset manager OneWorld Investment, says: “The current Argentine [debt management] team is probably the best we have seen out of Latin America. They understand the markets and have a real sense of striking a balance between funding at the lowest possible cost and making sure investors are happy and willing to buy the next issue that comes along. Many Latin American countries have a sub-text of going for the lowest price now and not worrying about the future. This approach always comes back to haunt them.
“The Argentine team understand how the global system works and that it’s all interrelated. They know how to work the crowd, they know what is on investors’ minds and they address it. They don’t fudge or beat around the bush. They get to the point and deal with it.”
But it hasn’t always been so. Argentina has also had its times of pricing issues too tightly, with investors waiting to pick up paper in the secondary market when it had widened out. As little as four years ago, following the tequila crisis, then economy minister Domingo Cavallo had to twist the arms of chief executives of international banks to get them to buy $1 billion-worth of Argentina’s so-called patriotic bond that kept the finance flowing when markets were shut. Only after 1996 with the new political appointments made when Roque Fernández became economy minister – when Guidotti and Kiguel arrived – was a longer-term approach taken. Issues were priced l