Sale of Seoul Bank poses a quandary

The Korean government wants to sell Seoul Bank to a blue-chip foreign strategic investor. But the likes of HSBC aren’t interested. So how far should the government compromise and maybe encourage a private-equity fund? The problem is that in the run-up to an election, the government is hemmed in by the favourable deal it struck with Newbridge, which was widely ridiculed by the local media.

After seven months, Seoul Bank stands forlornly with a for sale sign still hanging heavily around its neck. And despite the odd investor having a sniff around its books, none has come close to signing on the bottom line.

The government wants foreign investors to come in but has become wary and choosy. It would prefer a large strategic investor such as HSBC to put in an offer, but so far only seems able to attract the private-equity funds. It’s an alternative disliked not only by the government but also by the incendiary media. Elections are around the corner and the government doesn’t want to face the charge of selling out to the vultures yet again. The terms of the deal negotiated by Newbridge Capital when buying Korea First Bank still leave a bitter taste. The problem is that any foreign investor considering Seoul Bank, be it a bank or a private-equity fund, will demand the same kind of deal.

It is now only the twelfth largest bank in Korea, down from ninth position last year. Its assets shrank over 20%. Time is running out for the bank. And many say it is teetering on the edge, about to be tipped into Woorie Financial Holdings, known locally as the toxic waste dump, an asset management company already struggling to cope with patients such as Hanvit Bank. Alternatively, it might be forced into a merger, another course of action that leaves the bank’s management grimacing. A tie-up with Cho Hung Bank is one idea being considered.

Deadline passed

The Seoul Bank saga isn’t a saga at all, reckons Chungwon Kang, Seoul Bank’s president and CEO. “Daewoo is a saga,” he says. “That’s been dragging on for 18 months. The sale process for our bank only started in February, so it hasn’t been that long at all. It normally takes a reasonable amount of time to sell a bank.” But the original June deadline set by the government to dispose of the bank has passed. And selling Seoul Bank has been on the agenda a lot longer than four months.

       
Roy McKelvie

In 1998 the government announced that it was in discussions with two investors about offloading Seoul Bank and Korea First Bank. The investors, HSBC and Newbridge Capital, had independently expressed an interest in acquiring the wrecked banks. The deal that was eventually agreed has come back to haunt the government and Seoul Bank. Inexplicably, a bargain was struck with Newbridge Capital, but HSBC’s $900 million offer for Seoul Bank fell through.

A foreign banker, whose US institution watched events closely, says: “The deal that HSBC was willing to do was more favourable from the government perspective than the one it struck with Newbridge. In addition, HSBC would rather have done the KFB transaction. The Korean government grossly mishandled it. The deal they did with Newbridge was attractive for Newbridge – nobody else. Doing that deal with a private-equity player as opposed to HSBC was nonsense.”

Weijian Shan, a managing director of Newbridge Capital, spearheaded the negotiations for Korea First Bank. It took him 15 months to close the deal and maybe several years off his life. Other bankers shower Shan with compliments. “Boy, does that man have stamina,” says one. “He seemed to live at the airport, always waiting to fly back to Seoul because somebody over there was screwing around.”

“We spent 15 months on that deal,” says Shan. “Eventually they realized that no-one else was going to come in.” All credit to Shan. Newbridge walked away with what can only be described as a sweet deal. The key words in the contract centred on credit protection – or, phrased another way, the put option. “We inherited a clean bank and warranty on loans on the book for two years,” explains Wilfred Horie, KFB’s first foreign president and CEO. In effect it meant any bad loans not already taken off the book that might later turn sour would be taken over by the government.

HSBC turned on its heel and left the arena in August 1999. The government, which had by now laid off 4,000 Seoul Bank workers and pumped in W5.63 trillion ($4.4 million), started looking around for other potential buyers. “But,” says another observer, “they were so burnt by the process of dealing with Newbridge Capital that they were very cautious as to how they went forward. The government wasn’t willing to do deals that others were willing to do at points in time. But then when it was ready to, the market wasn’t there and it was too late. It was astonishing that this could happen at this level.”

A call for help

So it was back to the drawing board and time to call in some help. In April 2000, Deutsche Bank was dragged into the process. It won the mandate to help restructure Seoul Bank. “It wasn’t a strategic assignment where we just went in and told them what their future would be,” says Frank Nash, Deutsche’s managing director, head of global corporate finance, Asia Pacific. “It was much more nitty-gritty,”

       
Chungwon Kang

Deutsche devoted 35 people to the task, beginning with a restructuring of the operational side of the business. First, the books were flung open and due diligence kicked off. It’s safe to say that what Deutsche saw was not in line with international best practice. Lending based on relationships and bribes, and an over-emphasis on corporate banking, had blown a huge hole in the balance sheet. In 2000 alone, Seoul Bank reported losses of over W700 billion.

With the strong backing of the government and the new management team headed by Chungwon Kang, an ex-Deutsche banker himself, Deutsche’s team set about introducing desperately needed enhanced risk management policies, overhauling the balance sheet, and refocusing Seoul Bank’s strategy. Kang is particularly proud about drumming in a new front- and back-office culture. The treasuries-trading desk, for example, is now separate from the settlements department. That’s an important improvement in Korean banking practices.

“They have trained every employee, changed the culture and dealt with the unions. They’ve basically cut away the deadwood, which wasn’t easy to do,” says Harrison Kim, associate director of equity research at UBS in Seoul.

Seoul Bank’s balance sheet is, on the surface, looking better too. It has shifted away from its reliance on corporate business, which was four-fifths of the total. Today retail has doubled to two-fifths, with a proportionate drop in corporate. Bad debts have been sold and, according to Kang, non-performing loans stand at 7%. The bank’s loan book has slowly started to grow. Normal lending increased by W2 trillion in the first six months of this year, with the largest increase on the retail side. Over W1 trillion in mortgages were approved.

By February 2001 the crucial first wave was complete and Deutsche pulled out most of its staff. Only three of its credit specialists remained to prevent any return of old habits. They were flown out in June.

“Our role in the operational restructuring is pretty much over,” says Nash. “But the operational restructuring is by no means over. What is important is the sustainability of what has been implemented and maintaining the momentum.”

Government provisos

Surely with the adjustments that had taken place over the year, Seoul Bank would find a buyer. Deutsche Bank must have thought so, otherwise it wouldn’t have negotiated a separate agreement with the government to effect a sale by June.

       
Seoul: can Seoul Bank get the market
interested in it?

But the government put in a major condition. It was getting choosy. “It has stated publicly that a foreign bank would be the preferred buyer for Seoul Bank over private-equity investors or Korean entities,” explains Nash. The Korean government didn’t want chaebols [Korean conglomerates] or private-equity investors. They wanted Deutsche to land a foreign bank. As far as the government was concerned, only a strategic investment by a foreign bank would create the change it was looking for in Korean banking. It was a nice idea but it stymied Deutsche in its mission of getting the bank sold.

The June deadline came and went with no sale. And whatever the spin, it is obvious that Seoul Bank won’t be sold for a long time yet.

The government’s wish for a foreign bank to make a quick strategic investment is quite unrealistic. No foreign bank has so far made an investment that can truly be called strategic. Goldman Sachs, on a fully diluted basis with its convertible, has a 16% stake in Kookmin Bank. And after Kookmin’s merger with H&CB this will fall to below 10%. JPMorgan, through its bank fund, Corsair, holds a minority position with the Carlyle Group in Koram Bank. ING has a 10% foothold in H&CB and BNP holds 4% of Shinhan Bank. “But,” says Nash, “you cannot call any of them strategic investments.” Jan Op de Beeck, director and executive vice-president, risk management, at H&CB, agrees. “We [ING] do not control the bank and have no ambition to control the bank. The intention is just to help in a way that will be beneficial for our investment.”

So the private-equity players are leading the way. And the government is not exactly ecstatic about it as they are not seen as long-term players. “The government believes that they will sweep into town, clean up and shift on out very quickly. The government is worried that they will be left carrying the baby,” says a banker.

Newbridge Capital has a 51% stake in KFB and total management control. And though the Carlyle Group only has a 40% share in Koram Bank, it’s got total control of the bank because of a fractured shareholding structure. Unlike the high-profile Newbridge transaction, the government attempted to downplay Koram Bank as a purely private-equity deal.

According to one senior banker in discussions with the government at the time, Carlyle was only allowed to do the deal if it had a fig leaf. Its fig leaf was Corsair, the 100%-owned JPMorgan bank fund. By pulling JPMorgan into the arena the government was then able to face up to its regular grilling by the local media and announce that it was a foreign bank that had entered the system, not just another private-equity fund.

One reason for the slow take-up by the foreign banking community is clear: the Korean banking sector still has some way to go in moving from basic recovery to sustainable viability. In terms of balance sheets, the government has to some extent dealt with the NPL problem and done what is necessary to keep viable the banks that it has a hand in. Unfortunately it can’t do any more as it is spending taxpayers’ money.

Because of this, foreign banks are not showing more interest. Nash explains: “If you are a strategic investor you like things up and running with strong links to your retail strategy. But in Korea for now that’s not the play. The play is buying a distressed asset and taking a bet on the portfolio or at least on the part of it the government hasn’t acquired or protected.” That adds up to a proposition that is much more attractive for private equity than it is for the strategic investor.

The retail dilemma

There’s another problem. All major Korean banks are pushing strongly into retail, since the corporate sector remains a minefield. But there are only two foreign banks that are looking to expand their mass retail banking presence on a global basis into emerging markets: HSBC and Standard Chartered. Citibank, with its emphasis on top-slicing high-net-worth individuals, is seen as being too much of a niche player in the Korean market. Up until now, neither HSBC nor SCB has chosen to hit the bid in Korea. It’s a larger, more developed market. And entering bigger markets means placing bigger bets. It automatically makes Standard Chartered reluctant. And who says they have to take the bet now anyway, as there will always be Korean banks to buy? On top of this, foreign banks have yet to get to know and trust Korean management. As one Korean banker says: “It’s difficult to find indigenous management talent well known to foreign investors, but you need them because it’s a struggle to understand the Korean market. Korea also just feels further away and more isolated.” He continues: “And you have a government that is difficult to negotiate with, drives a tough deal and is sometimes irrational.”

Irrational seems a bit strong, though. The government doesn’t want to do any more sales at giveaway prices. It is determined to make investors look beyond the distressed valuations floating around the market and get them to focus on the long term. But it’s left with a tough choice. If it wants to privatize now and wants normal valuations, it’s not going to get them. And if it wants double-digit price-to-book valuations it will have to wait. The questions are: how desperate is the Korean government to sell its assets and where does this leave Seoul Bank?

Seoul Bank is not only fighting against a trend that suggests no foreign bank will come in and buy any Korean bank, it’s also having to deal with negative perceptions about itself and with bankers’ views of what the government is prepared to accept.

One managing director, whose bank has a minority stake in another Korean bank, brutally sums up Seoul Bank’s plight. “This is the most embarrassing, crappy situation. Nobody can quite work out what Seoul Bank is about. Are the assets for real or are they going to blow up? If the government doesn’t give the put option, nobody is going to buy it.”

Most observers who spoke to Euromoney are under the impression that only 30% of the bank is for sale. Harrison Kim, UBS Warburg’s associate director of equity research, is a case in point. He says: “If you look at the Seoul Bank deal, all the key elements of the KFB transaction are not present. There is only 30% up for sale and no credit protection. Nobody’s going to take it.”

Another analyst takes a similar line: “HSBC walked away, Newbridge was in again, and DBS was looking. They want it all or nothing. Also, they don’t know what the loan book is worth. There are a lot of workout companies in there. The government will have to provide credit for certain ones. It’s very hard for investors to actually see past the potential downside with the present overall structure.”

Chungwon Kang is quick to stamp on this idea. “The government is selling a controlling stake. That’s 51%. And as far as I understand it, the negotiations for the structure for the terms of the deal have not been discussed yet. I don’t think it is fair for this 30% rumour to go around. And no, I can’t comment on why HSBC is not interested.”

After boxing itself in by publicly stating that it was not prepared to do a solely private-equity deal, the government desperately started looking for an alternative. The next best thing was to try to interest the private-equity arm of a big foreign bank. Luckily, it would seem, Deutsche has such an operation. Causing some raised eyebrows, Deutsche Bank Capital Partners ventured into Seoul Bank for a peek at the books. “Well I have to say it is unusual,” says a banker. “We would struggle to do a deal where we were the sell-side adviser and our private-equity arm was the only one showing an interest in buying.”

Integrity intact

Nash doesn’t understand why the integrity of such a move should be questioned. “We immediately put up our hands and said we would not continue our sell-side mandate as long as DBCP was a potential buyer. We negotiated a document with the government and said we would step aside so our partners could look at the bank. I would also add that DB Capital Partners are not saying: ‘Oh boy thanks for delivering this to us on a plate.’ We certainly did not queer the sale process with others in order to divert this to DBCP. It could be an attractive investment, but it will be more difficult for a private-equity investor with no retail strategy.”

Apparently Nash had to lean quite heavily on DB Capital Partners to persuade it to take a look at the bank. Until his persuasive phone call, Deutsche’s private-equity arm had shown no interest. According to one source, Deutsche had exhausted all options. All that was left open to it and all it could bring in was Deutsche Bank Capital Partners.

“That’s not strictly true,” explains Roy McKelvie, managing director, head of private equity, Asia. “Frank didn’t just wander into my office with a big pile of books and say: ‘Here Roy, you’ve got to take a look at these.’ We had already been speaking to every government agency you can imagine to get them comfortable with the process.” But one Deutsche insider says: “The guys in DBCP didn’t want to go near this bank and are more cynical than anybody else who has ever looked at the bank previously.”

“It’s not appropriate for us to comment on any ongoing deals,” says McKelvie. “I can say, however, there’s still a long way to go until both sides feel comfortable. Yes, the bank has made progress but I don’t think it is all the way there yet. But we haven’t entered detailed negotiations yet, or made an offer for the bank. We are still evaluating it and discussing certain issues.” The government is going to have to offer DBCP a lot.

“If I were in Deutsche now I would be cringing,” says another banker. “Forget about the Chinese-walls nonsense. If these guys, DBCP, are showing an interest and those who used to be the sell-side advisers are sitting in the next room I would make damn sure they told me the whole story and the rest. They can’t pull a fast one on their own guys.”

Dead already

But perhaps it won’t ever get that far – DBCP may already have seen enough. “The deal is dead in the water,” says the Deutsche banker. “And a merger with Cho Hung Bank is already being discussed.”

       
Frank Nash

“I’ve got better things to do than pretend to look at a bank and burn time and money in order to drum up interest in someone else’s bank,” McKelvie says laughing, but clearly irritated. If it gets as far as a deal structure being discussed, the past will undoubtedly be mentioned at some point. The Newbridge deal is a seriously large fly in the ointment.

“For whatever reason the government gave Newbridge the terms that it did, the guy who is going to take Seoul Bank is going to demand as much as that. Because if I am a guy who wants to buy Seoul Bank and I go back to my boss with a worse offer, I’ll get my head chopped off,” says a foreign banker from his US investment bank’s Seoul headquarters.

Kang completely disagrees. He says that potential buyers are fairly well in tune with the situation and understand the pressures on the government. “DBCP understands it cannot do its own Newbridge deal at the moment. And in my mind there is no need to do such a deal,” he says.

The argument put forward is that two years ago, when Newbridge moved in, there was much uncertainty about the portfolios of most of the banks with heavy corporate exposure. With Daewoo unresolved and other corporates barely alive, valuations were almost impossible. Kang continues: “I am not saying that there won’t be some items of dispute when they sit down and value the portfolio, but it will be much easier to address because there aren’t that many uncertain issues left.” He stresses again: “We don’t have to do a Newbridge deal and the buyer understands this.”

Newbridge’s Shan defends his deal and says it hasn’t made it harder for Seoul Bank to be sold. But he believes it can only happen if a similar deal is struck. “Nowhere has anyone made an investment in a bank with significant NPLs without government protection,” he says. “You have to assure the investor that the bad bank has been cleaned up or if it hasn’t, that they won’t be held responsible for losses incurred by the previous management.”

He’s right. No investor is simply going to fill the hole. If the government doesn’t provide protection for investors on NPLs, no-one will come in.

In the meantime everyone just waits. Seoul Bank sits with fingers crossed. The rest of the banking sector waits to see what deal, if any, will emerge. And the government is hoping that no assets on Seoul’s books head south.

There are long odds on correctly identifying who, if anyone, will be tempted.

One investor is quick to answer when questioned about whether his outfit would be interested in Seoul Bank.

“If we were not held responsible for the huge mistakes made by the management in the past, I suppose we are always open minded,” he says smiling.