In a cramped square off central Milan’s Piazza della Scala a security guard skulks by the entrance to a 17th-century palazzo. There’s no nameplate on the door. None is needed. Number 10 Via Filodrammatici has long been known as the home of Mediobanca, Italy’s premier investment bank.
But shortly after the death of Enrico Cuccia – from 1946 until last year the CEO of the bank – his successor and devotee, Vincenzo Maranghi, decided to set the fact in stone. He persuaded the city authorities to grant permission to name the spot. Three marble plaques bearing the dates of Cuccia’s birth and death and the single word “Banker” now pronounce the square “Piazzetta Enrico Cuccia”.
It’s a grand gesture to a small, stooped man that many Milan residents remember glimpsing walking to work, as he did until his dying day. Cuccia’s diminutive stature belied his standing. It’s 15 months since his death at the age of 92, but his name is still on the lips of M&A bankers in Milan. He built an intricate network of holding companies and cross-ownership structures resulting in myriad convoluted lines of responsibility. And as chief architect of his own pet project, Cuccia knew exactly which strings to pull to achieve the results he wanted.
A conservative tradition
“If Mediobanca hadn’t been there, some of the most important companies in Italy would have collapsed,” says a banker at a US investment bank. “On the other hand, by being there, it has ensured that the progressive forces of capitalism have not been able to take hold.”
The 64-year-old Maranghi is, like Cuccia, a conservative. Yet though he still refuses to replace the old-fashioned telephone on his desk with a push-button model, even he now recognizes the inevitability of change. For the first time, big deals are getting done in Italy without Mediobanca. And this is due to one man. To Maranghi’s dismay, his former second-in-command, Gerardo Braggiotti, is fast becoming the most talked about banker in Milan. “Braggiotti is the only true investment banker, the rest of us are amateurs,” says the abashed head of corporate finance at a rival house.
| Mediobanca key data | |
| Total assets: | e28.4 billion |
| Net profits: | e297 million |
| ROE (normalized): | 4% |
| Market capitalization: | e8.4 billion |
| Number of branches: | 1 |
| Number of employees: | 1,155 |
| Headquarters: | Milan |
| Largest shareholders: | Unicredito, Banco di Roma, 19.9%, other syndicate members 30.3%, free float 49.8% |
| Major shareholdings:* | Assicurazioni Generali 14% (post Euralux merger) Banca di Roma 2%, Fiat 3.1%, La Fondiaria 13.8%, Gemina 12.5%, Gim 3.1%, HdP 13.1%, Italmobiliare 8.1%, Olivetti 1.5%, Pirelli 6%, SAI 2.2% |
| Source: Company report and Schroder Salomon Smith Barney estimates October 2001 | |
| *Morgan Stanley September 2001 | |
Until 1998, Braggiotti, who is 49, was part of Maranghi’s inner circle. Young, talented and full of ambition, Braggiotti’s future at Mediobanca seemed to be assured. He forcefully persuaded Maranghi to appoint him general secretary, a senior role that had previously not existed in the bank’s tightly hierarchical management structure. It was doubtless presumed that the promotion would keep him quiet.
But it wasn’t enough. Braggiotti believed that Mediobanca needed to reinvent itself in order to stand a chance of surviving into the 21st century. He pushed for a series of measures designed to achieve this – among them a link with an international boutique such as Lazard.
Maranghi was not prepared to cede any more ground to this dangerous revolutionary, whose goals for Mediobanca were so different from his own.
The elder man, in short, got scared. He felt that Braggiotti posed a threat to his own power, particularly as some important groups of shareholders seemed to be taking his side, including Marzotto, Credito Italiano (now part of Unicredito) and, significantly, Pirelli. In the end, Maranghi called on Cuccia, who always backed his deputy – for better or worse, to adjudicate. Voices were raised, doors slammed and Braggiotti walked.
He moved straight over to Lazard, which was only too happy to welcome him and his ambitions. Braggiotti was given a free rein to put his plans to create a global investment banking operation into practice, merging Lazard’s team in Milan with that of Vitale&Borghesi, an Italian advisory firm, in 1998. A year later he played a pivotal role in an overhaul of Lazard’s worldwide operations.
It is in origination that Braggiotti has had the greatest impact. Single-handedly, he has altered Lazard’s fortunes in Italy, transforming it from a middle-ranking, small-scale house into the country’s most successful M&A investment bank. He is now responsible for originating virtually all of Lazard’s advisory business and is involved in every major deal in Italy. Though undeniably talented, he’s been able to do this largely because of the unique position he holds at the centre of Milan’s financial community.
The son of a former chairman of Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI), the institution that established Mediobanca in 1946, Braggiotti has a contact book that positively bulges. As a child he was bounced on the knees of the most important men in corporate Italy – the Agnellis, the Tronchetti Proveras, the Benettons. To these people, he is practically family.
As Maranghi must now realize, the decision to force Braggiotti out was an appalling mistake. Braggiotti has been able to divert business from his former firm because of his connections. Consider the compelling evidence of the two most significant takeover battles in the country this year – Electricité de France and Fiat’s successful bid for Montedison then, soon after, the Pirelli Benetton capture of Telecom Italia for e7.9 billion ($7.1 billion).
The takeover of Montedison was largely expected. It boasts a highly valuable asset in the shape of Edison, the largest independent energy producer in Italy. But it was rudderless and needed guidance from an industrial partner. It also has a cluster of other non-core activities in the engineering, chemical and medical sectors and a pile of debt. The ideal solution to its troubles was for a larger player to take control, break it up to release value and focus on its key activity.
What was surprising, though, was the fact that, when Fiat and EdF moved on Montedison, the deal sidelined Mediobanca. Mediobanca owned 15% of Montedison and as such was one of its largest shareholders. Its defeat looked to be the beginning of the end for the august institution. “For the first time we saw two groups of [Mediobanca] shareholders fighting against each other,” says one banker. And Maranghi seemed powerless to prevent one of the most important assets he controlled slipping from his grasp.
Significantly, the bid for Montedison came initially from abroad. At the beginning of June it emerged that Electricité de France had been slowly accumulating a 20% stake in the Italian company. Silvio Berlusconi’s newly elected centre-right government reacted swiftly by capping EdF’s voting rights in Montedison at 2%. It was able to do this because the French company is still state owned. That foiled EdF president François Roussely’s ambitious plans, putting it in a sticky situation. EdF now owned 20% of a company in which it was not entitled to have any real control.
| Bookrunners of Italian IPOs (Jan-Sep 28 2001) | |||||
|
Rank 2001 |
Rank 2000 |
Manager or group | Amount ($mn) | Issuances | % share |
| 1 | 4 | Mediobanca – Banca di Credito Finanziario | 189.63 | 3 | 15.53 |
| 2 | – | Deutsche Bank | 179.88 | 3 | 14.73 |
| 3 | – | UBS Warburg | 136.05 | 1 | 11.14 |
| 4 | 8 | Salomon Smith Barney International | 121.76 | 2 | 9.97 |
| 5 | – | Banca Antonveneta | 97.42 | 1 | 7.98 |
| 6 | 9 | IntesaBci | 93.18 | 3 | 7.63 |
| 7 | 2 | UniCredito Italiano | 83.9 | 2 | 6.87 |
| 8 | – | BNP Paribas | 81.07 | 1 | 6.64 |
| 9 | 3 | Banca IMI | 60.64 | 2 | 4.96 |
| 10 | – | Banca Nazionale del Lavoro | 51.29 | 2 | 4.2 |
| Total of issues used in the table | 1,221.29 | 14 | 100 | ||
| Source: Capital DATA | |||||
That could have been the end of the story. “People are normally a bit cowardly in Italy, they wait around for something to happen,” remarks a Milan-based banker. “But Braggiotti knew how to do that deal.” He went to visit Gianni Agnelli, head of the Fiat empire, whom he knew had been looking for a new core business for some time. Fiat has already disposed of 25% of its car-manufacturing capacity to General Motors and reportedly has a put option with the US firm for the rest.
Since entrepreneur Roberto Colaninno’s assault on Telecom Italia in 1999, the Agnelli family had largely stayed on the sidelines of any corporate intrigue. It didn’t take Braggiotti long to persuade his old friend that it was time for him to make a comeback. Montedison was a perfect fit with Fiat’s other energy interests and, what’s more, a perfect opportunity to kick-start Fiat’s role in the developing utilities sector.
Under Braggiotti’s guidance, Fiat created an investment vehicle called Italenergia in conjunction with EdF. Lazard bankers approached Montedison’s major shareholders, among them Banca di Roma, SanPaoloIMI and IntesaBci, which all agreed to sell their stakes to Italenergia. The Fiat-led consortium also bought an additional 7% of shares on the open market and then made a tender offer for the rest. “The market reaction was extremely positive, which can be seen from the fact that we were able to reach 97% of the stock,” says a banker involved in the deal.
Maranghi was a bad loser. He claimed that Fiat and EdF had launched a hostile bid for Montedison – a difficult claim to substantiate as the two already had a combined 52% stake when they launched the tender. “Maranghi saw this as an attack on his personal position,” says the banker. “In reality, though, Mediobanca made a fantastic capital gain. They bought a stake in Montedison for L700 billion [$328 million] and sold it for twice that, at e3.16 a share which, in pure investment banking terms, is amazing.”
The cash did little to relieve Maranghi’s humiliation, however. Montedison is viewed as a turning point in Mediobanca’s history because the Agnelli family showed it was ready to risk the Italian bank’s wrath by rebuffing the CEO. “The Agnellis were probably willing to tolerate Mediobanca’s dominance when Cuccia was in charge but not now it’s Maranghi,” says another banker at an M&A boutique in Milan. “For years, Mediobanca has bullied people into doing what it wanted. If you do that with intelligence, style and competence it is much more palatable.”
What’s more, the feelings of disillusionment were widespread.
Confirmation of this came sooner than anyone expected. In July, Marco Tronchetti Provera rocked corporate Italy with a dramatic swoop on Telecom Italia, arguably the country’s most highly prized asset. Mediobanca had supported Colaninno’s bid for Telecom Italia – the largest-ever hostile takeover. This time, it didn’t get near the negotiating table.
According to bankers who were close to the deal, when Pirelli chairman and CEO Tronchetti Provera began to look for a place to invest his company’s e4 billion pile of cash – the result of selling assets to Cisco and Corning of the US at the beginning of this year – he had rather more modest aims. But the opportunity to acquire control of Telecom Italia was impossible to resist.
Colaninno wooed investors with promises of great things when he took control of the telecom company two years ago. But he has delivered only disappointments. Telecom Italia was paralyzed by the weight of Olivetti’s debt. All of its free cash went towards interest payments, leaving nothing behind for developing the business.
Working closely with Braggiotti, as well as Merrill Lynch’s Italian-based team led by Maurizio Tamagnini, Tronchetti Provera struck an agreement with the Benetton family to buy a 30% stake in Olivetti, the holding company for Telecom Italia. They did this by buying out investors in Bell. The disenchanted investors, who had gambled on Colaninno’s project by taking stakes in Bell, were only too happy to accept the offer of e4.17 a share, almost twice the market price.
The deal was a bitter blow for Mediobanca. And because it wasn’t involved in the financing for the deal, it will also hit its investment banking fees. Italian banks Unicredito and Intesa are expected to reap the benefits because, along with Pirelli and the Benettons, they also paid highly for their stake in Telecom Italia. “The only way they can get any return on their investment is through deal flow,” says one banker “From now on, every time Telecom Italia, or TIM or Seat does anything, the participation of one of these banks is guaranteed.”
Mediobanca’s investment banking business has always been fed by a steady supply of mandates from the companies in which it has holdings. That is why the loss of control of key assets, such as Telecom Italia and Montedison, is so worrying.
Braggiotti, of course, knows just where to find the weakest links. The question is to what extent he intends to use his intimate knowledge of his old firm. Rumours are flying in the corridors of Milan’s investment banks. It is beyond dispute that Mediobanca’s influence is waning. Not so long ago it was the power broker of the Italian financial markets. No shares changed hands, no capital markets transactions took place without its explicit approval. Now corporate Italy is waking up to the fact that there is an alternative route.
In mid October, Italian daily newspaper La Repubblica reported that Lazard was to launch a hostile bid for Mediobanca. This was the scheme that Braggiotti had dreamt of back in 1998 while he grappled with Maranghi for control of the firm.
The speculation was quickly quashed by Lazard. Still, it must be a perennial temptation for Braggiotti. If the grand old bank were gobbled up, Lazard would probably split Mediobanca into two halves, merge its investment banking operations with its own and sell off the various participations to the highest bidders. The resulting capital gains would be significant. At current market prices, Mediobanca’s holdings are worth around e6.8 billion. Among its most important shareholdings are a 13% stake in HdP, owner of Italy’s largest publishing group RCS, which produces daily newspaper Il Corriere della Sera, 12.5% in Gemina, an aviation activities group, and 14% of insurer Generali. A stake in Italy’s largest insurance firm is the real prize for any potential bidder, particularly as the potential of bancassurance starts to become clearer.
Before Lazard, or anyone else, can take control of Mediobanca, though, several obstacles have to be overcome. Not least is the resistance of the Italian central bank.
Any bidder would have to gain the approval of the Bank of Italy, and governor Antonio Fazio has reiterated his opposition to cross-border mergers.
Fazio’s protectionist stance reflects the fact that Italy is behind the rest of Europe in banking consolidation. Its small financial institutions are still too weedy to compete on an equal footing. The largest Italian bank by market capitalization – IntesaBCI at e15 billion – ranks only 35th globally. So if the floodgates were opened to allow competition from outside the country, the domestic banks would quickly be swallowed up by relative giants in Europe.
But even before Fazio’s proclamation, it was far from clear that Mediobanca was ripe for takeover. “Strategically, you can make a case for Mediobanca being finished,” says an analyst at a Milan-based broker. “But don’t forget, this is Italy.”
Cuccia’s legacy means that Mediobanca is extremely well protected against any attempt on its independence. Despite the occasional dalliance with the enemy, its core shareholders, which are divided into two groups, banks and corporates, are still largely loyal and just over 50% of the company is protected under a shareholder pact.
Even if support for a takeover emerged, there would be no obvious matches for Mediobanca at home or abroad. Notwithstanding regulatory barriers and Braggiotti’s ambitions, it could be argued that a link with Lazard makes little sense. On the one hand, Lazard is already well established in Italy and, like Mediobanca, its strength is in investment banking. On the other, the resulting company would have a lot of areas of overlap and few synergies. It would not give Lazard entry to any new geographical areas, for example.
It is just possible that one of the banks with the largest share in Mediobanca – Unicredito or Banca di Roma, which both hold around 10% each – might be interested in snapping up their rival. But Unicredito has already tried, and failed, and Banca di Roma is more of a target than a bidder, mired in its own financial difficulties largely as a result of making ill-considered loans.
More important, Mediobanca doesn’t need anyone to prop it up. It may be missing out on the biggest M&A mandates, but it tops the league table for primary issuance for the first nine months of 2001 with a 16% market share. Among the deals it co-led was Lottomatica’s e200 million IPO in May, which was one of only two offerings this year to trade up on the first day. The other was Initdex of Spain, the holding company for the Zara clothes retailer. In the area of equity-linked issues, Mediobanca has been even more prolific, acting as bookrunner on all but three of the 15 deals done this year.
It’s clear that Mediobanca’s securities business is highly regarded among its domestic and international rivals in Milan. “Their investment bankers are as good if not better than the people you find anywhere else,” says a banker at a US bulge-bracket firm. “Most of the old people are gone and the team they have now really do understand how the markets work.”
“It’s true that their M&A franchise is supported by the companies in which they have cross-shareholdings,” says Marco Tacconis, equity analyst as SSSB. “But over the past three years, their capacity to generate revenues and their ability to defend their investment banking business has been particularly good and they’ve done surprisingly well.”
Partly that’s because the firm no longer relies completely on its circle of allies for all its business. At the head of the investment banking arm of the firm are Renato Pagliaro and Alberto Nagel. While Pagliaro manages Mediobanca’s captive audience, Nagel spends most of his time on the road, pitching for new business. Fellow bankers say they frequently see him out lunching with prospective clients in Milan’s most exclusive restaurants. “That didn’t happen in Cuccia’s lifetime,” says one. “You never used to be able to get a lunch out of Mediobanca.”
Nor a research note. But, in another clear attempt at modernization, the bank is building an equity research unit and hiring analysts, including the former head of research at SanPaolo IMI. Although Mediobanca has always had a research department, it has not customarily published its views because it only worked for companies in which it held a stake, or which had stakes in it. Airing an opinion on a particular company could have damaged its own interests. That looks set to change.
In another departure from tradition, Mediobanca is also reported to be building an equity sales team. On the one hand, this is a clear acknowledgement that it no longer enjoys cosy relationships with its shareholder banks as it once did. Mediobanca was known to direct Unicredito and Banca di Roma to distribute its securities as if it controlled them and not vice-versa. On the other, it shows Mediobanca’s determination to adapt to change.
Its continued dominance is a particular achievement as Italy is not an easy market to do well in and the international banks are clearly winning over the locals. However, the slowdown is hitting harder than elsewhere in Europe because of the relative dearth of big, capital-market-savvy companies. There are only 10 or 15 large-cap corporates to sustain every institution in Milan. Small to mid-sized and family-owned interests still comprise the bulk of firms and these are not typical fodder for investment banks.
As a result of the size of the market and the fierce competition for every mandate – most of which revolve around Telecom Italia, Fiat and Generali – a number of banks are in dire straits. Most international banks are scaling back their Milan-based operations, laying off or transferring bankers elsewhere and running most of the business out of London.
That’s a risky strategy in a market where relationship banking is paramount. Italians expect loyalty and seamless service from bankers whose offices are just across the city, not a plane journey away.
Another trend that goes against the grain with Italian CEOs and CFOs is the decision by many firms to reorganize their business along sector rather than geographical lines. Merrill Lynch has recently disbanded its country teams and while some key relationship bankers are still based in Milan, many have been moved to London to work with clients across Europe.
CSFB is said by sources in Milan to be closing down its Italian office after a disastrous year’s business. The only equity market deal it has been involved in in 2001 has been a e2.7 billion block deal for EMI, along with Banca IMI, in February. But Carlo Calabria, head of M&A at CSFB, says that being involved in this deal alone justifies the firm’s presence in Italy and denies that CSFB is pulling back.
It is certain that firms that do reduce capacity in Milan will suffer.
The more forward-looking among them are now working at building relationships not just with new clients – many admit they are looking further down the scale in terms of size than ever before just in order to survive – but with local banks. In an environment where personal connections precede business relationships, this is a smart move. “We work very closely with Mediobanca, I see them as one of my best clients really,” says a US investment banker.
It’s not surprising. Those institutions that are most friendly with Mediobanca – Lehman, Goldman Sachs, SSSB, BNP Paribas, possibly JPMorgan – will come through the downturn in the best shape. That’s because Mediobanca not only has access to an extremely comprehensive distribution network but can also get its favoured banks to the table on the key deals.
There’s nothing altruistic in Mediobanca’s motives though. In today’s economic climate and sheltered from predatory foreign institutions it continues to flourish. It boasts a thriving investment bank for the mid-market, a sound credit business and the best asset quality and coverage ratio of any of the Italian banks.
Once the next phase of consolidation is complete, however, and the Italian champions have emerged, there will inevitably be a cross-border merger between one of these superbanks and a foreign institution. By forging links now – with both US and European securities houses and universal banks – Mediobanca is trying to buy insurance against its demise.
Traditionalist Maranghi is likely to balk at attempts to take modernization any further, but unless this happens, the bank’s days are numbered. Mediobanca’s future lies in the willingness of its shareholders to dispense with the old order once and for all by ousting its CEO. A faction has developed, led by Banca di Roma and Fiat, that opposes him, but Unicredito is still on Maranghi’s side. Until a candidate who is able to gain support across the board emerges, this stalemate will persist. Could Braggiotti be the man?