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It is becoming increasingly difficult to be surprised by some of the illogical fallout from the credit crisis. But when wrapped triple-A bonds (with a double-A underlying) start to trade outside unwrapped double-A bonds for the same name, it really does seem that all reason has departed. This is what happened in November, when the Ambac-wrapped triple-A bonds issued by BT’s Telereal vehicle were trading wider than its unwrapped double-A bonds. In other words, the market saw the fact that the bonds were wrapped by a triple-A rated insurer as increasing, rather than reducing, the risk involved. Whether or not this is as ludicrous as it sounds depends on just how precarious a position the monolines are really in. This industry is certainly used to questions being raised about its viability; activist fund managers such as Pershing Square Capital’s William Ackman have been persistent bears on monoline insurers for years. As this magazine has pointed out before (see The End for Monolines Euromoney March 2007), these firms have increasingly moved away from their traditional municipal markets to higher-yielding structured and project finance, and that structured exposure has recently focused on CDOs. This is something they are probably now living to regret. But is it enough to render their guarantees worse than worthless?
The monoline industry as a whole has $78 billion-worth of exposure to US mezzanine and high-grade ABS CDOs. Critics such as Ackman have long pointed to the perceived inadequacy of these firms’ capital bases: in a May 2007 presentation he compared the leverage ratio of MBIA (94:1) with that of Citi (12:1) and claimed that while Citi’s reserves against potential credit losses were 96bp, MBIA’s were just 3bp. So these firms are indeed particularly vulnerable to the downgrades sweeping the ABS CDO sector. And perhaps the market is as right to be as worried about the monolines as it seems to be.
But look at the vested interests aligned against any potential downgrade of a leading monoline insurance firm. Any change to the ratings of the triple-A rated firms would have an adverse impact on $2.4 trillion of bonds and hit the politically sensitive business of municipal finance. And the last thing that the investment banks themselves want is for the triple-A guarantee to come under question – that would mean them having to recognize yet more ABS CDO exposure (the exposure they have wrapped) on their own balance sheets. Every possible avenue will be explored in order to shore up these businesses – as the $1.5 billion capital injection for CIFG and rumoured $200 million funds for FGIC attest. Reports that Warren Buffett is also poised to step in and recapitalize the monolines if necessary should give further comfort to the market. But while they will probably survive, they will likely be shadows of their former selves – retreating back to the municipal business that they were founded to write. As Sean McCarthy, president and chief operating officer at FSA and chairman of the association of financial guarantee insurers, told Euromoney in February: “Writing a wrap on structured finance can be like writing aggressive hurricane insurance – you can be sure that every hurricane will find you.”