English football fans have a reputation for hurling foul-mouthed abuse at opposing teams and supporters. But their most fearful chant contains no profanities and is aimed at the team’s manager when things are going badly wrong. It is a slow, mournful, sometimes contemptuous refrain. It often precedes a coach’s sacking.
“You don’t know what you’re doing. You don’t know what you’re doing.”
Has soon-to-depart US Treasury secretary Hank Paulson been hearing this reproach in his dreams? He seems to be making an effort to rewrite his part in the failure of the US financial system, perhaps in an effort to influence the verdict of history.
In his testimony to the house committee on financial services in November, he seemed to admonish the politicians for delaying his Tarp plan. Paulson asserts that market conditions worsened so much in the two weeks it took Congress to pass the legislation – while the stock market lost more than $2 trillion – and the global market crisis became so broad and severe that he was forced to change tack and resort to direct injections of capital.
One can only sympathize with Paulson when he points out that there is no playbook for responding to this turmoil, being of a kind not seen before, and that this requires policymakers to adjust their responses as the damage to the economy and financial system reveals itself.
But it would be quite wrong to accept his implication that, if only the politicians had fallen into line when he asked them to, things might have turned out better.
There never was anything resembling a properly formulated plan to buy in distressed assets, as the testimony of acting assistant secretary Karthik Ramanathan has revealed.
Worse, because market participants came to believe that the Treasury was working up such a plan – which secretary Paulson had told everyone was so vital to stabilize the financial system – news of its abandonment had painful consequences. Yields on triple-A-rated commercial mortgage backed securities had fallen and the price of the ABX index had risen following announcement of the Tarp plan. Investors had taken some comfort that there would be a bid for problem real-estate-related assets. So the sudden abandonment caused those markets to fall again sharply. Coming at the same time as a couple of commercial property defaults, news of the Treasury’s flip-flop pushed spreads on triple-A CMBS to 1,500 basis points over Libor.
The rise in triple-A CMBS yields did not occur in a vacuum. It made other assets, such as corporate credits, which had rallied on injections of capital into the banking system and the prospects of restoration of stability to the markets, look expensive by comparison.
The Treasury, Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp have announced a dizzying array of programmes. Some overlap, and sorting this out has damaging consequences of its own. The solutions risk becoming part of the problem. So, in the month and a half it took the FDIC to resolve its proposed government guarantee of three-year bank debts – which banks rejected for being forced to pay a 75bp insurance fee on overnight funds that were freely available at low cost – not a single bank issued in the debt capital markets: this at a time when the entire aim of the policy was to restore funding to the banks so they could on-lend to businesses and consumers.
It’s a scattergun approach, which might one day be seen to have stabilized the system. But that happy outcome has not been secured yet.
On November 18, Paulson told Congress that his legacy to the next president and the next Treasury secretary would be a more stable banking system, where the failure of a systemically relevant financial institution is no longer a pressing concern to rattle the markets.
Just five days later, with Citi’s share price having fallen below $4, the Treasury was once again called into emergency action and required to inject another $20 billion in capital and provide guarantees against potential losses on $306 billion of troubled assets, just to ensure that the iconic bank could open for business again on the Monday morning.
The markets welcomed his plan to leverage $20 billion of Tarp funds into a $200 billion Fed programme to give investors cash for their illiquid consumer asset-backed securities. But the system is far from stable yet. It’s a good bet that Paulson will not be remembered as the hero of the hour, but rather as the Treasury secretary who didn’t know what he was doing.