The law of unintended consequences has particularly powerful effects in the field of monetary policy. In the 1970s, after lavish government spending on the war in Vietnam and social programmes in the 1960s, the US was experiencing its first trade deficit of the 20th century, rising inflation and the loss of its once massive gold reserves to the Europeans.
The distinguished economist Arthur Burns, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, convinced the US president to impose wage and price controls and a 10% import surcharge while ending the convertibility of the dollar to gold, all on August 15 1971. This would, it was hoped, allow the Fed to pursue non-inflationary monetary expansion, a very pleasant idea.
Of course, it did not work and inflation soon accelerated; over the next 10 years the dollar lost well over half its purchasing power, the stock market dropped 50% in inflation-adjusted terms, and gold rose from about $60 an ounce to $400, briefly peaking at more than $800. Eventually Burns’s successor, Paul Volcker, had to raise interest rates to 20% to break the inflation surge. Savers were burnt by Burns.
In the 1830s, US president Andrew Jackson decided to help the common people by doing away with the central bank, the Bank of the United States, which he despised as a tool of the greedy northeastern elites and European money interests. Soon banks all over the country were merrily printing their own money, with or without gold and silver reserves, even though these notes were theoretically convertible into precious metal. For a while the good times rolled. Speculators in real estate made a killing. But eventually inflation became rampant and the various dollars were worth less and less.
This led Jackson to issue the cruelly ironic Specie Circular in 1836. This required that, unlike the people, the federal government must be paid in gold or silver for land purchases. Since there wasn’t enough gold, the Panic of 1837 ensued in which just under half of the banks in the US shut their doors and many states defaulted on their debt issues in the London market. The depression that followed was like that of the 1930s.
The experience of the US in the 1830s might be of particular interest to present-day holders of euro-denominated bonds and banknotes. The yields of euro area sovereign bonds have diverged, in line with the varying credit quality of the sovereigns. Even more interestingly, people are discriminating among euro banknotes – some prefer euros printed in Germany (serial number begins with X) to those of Italy (S) or Spain (V), for example.
This is not irrational. After the demise of the Bank of the United States in the 1830s, a regional clearing system developed in New England in which member banks kept interest-free deposits at the Suffolk Bank of Boston where their dollars (‘country money’ as it was called then) were redeemed at par while dollars of other regions’ banks (‘foreign money’) were redeemed at discounts even though these other dollars were theoretically the same.* One could imagine a European currency devolution occurring on a regional basis in a similar way with currency discounts should (God forbid!) the European Central Bank cease to represent any part of Europe.
Bananas
When the Japanese occupied Singapore in 1942, the British-backed Malayan dollar disappeared from circulation and was replaced by the Japanese-backed ‘banana dollar’, so named because of the banana trees portrayed on the 10-dollar note. It had the look and feel of real money, but soon no number of them was enough to buy a banana, no matter how many fleets and divisions the Japanese put behind them.
The Yapese could have provided the Japanese with valuable advice. In Micronesia, the island of Yap, which was occupied by the Japanese during the war, for many centuries used title to stone disks up to 12 feet in diameter as money. These disks were quarried on the distant island of Palau and towed by canoe on rafts to Yap, a perilous journey.
The stones remained good value until the 1874 arrival of one David O’Keefe who brought ships filled with new stones (helicopters did not exist then) to buy sea cucumbers, copra and other commodities. These new disks soon depreciated in value, however, as the Yapese reflected on what was going on, but today they still value the old stones, using them for dowries and such, while eschewing O’Keefe’s stones because of their doubtful provenance.
In theory, helicopters can be used to scatter money in an emergency as Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke is now doing, but the reality is that in a democracy the Fed will not be able to recover the money once the crisis has passed. People won’t want to give it up. So a brief episode of deflation will likely be followed by a lengthy period of stagflation.
For investors, this presents an opportunity. In the long run, high inflation benefits capitalists and hurts wage earners and those living on fixed incomes. Owners of sufficient capital can buy appreciating real assets and borrow at fixed interest in depreciating paper money to do so. When the price of securities is eventually fully depressed by high real interest rates, as in the early 1980s, they can sell the real assets and reinvest in securities. In this way the rich can get much, much richer. For a simpler strategy if you can’t get title to one of the stones in Yap, dress up your portfolio in gold: it’s the new black.
*Rolnick, Smith, Weber: Lessons from a laissez-faire payments system: The Suffolk banking system (1825–58), Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp 11-21
Lincoln Rathnam, PhD, CFA, is an investment professional based in Singapore and Boston. In a career spanning almost 30 years he has managed equity, debt and venture capital portfolios and was a pioneer investor in emerging markets in the late 1980s