Solvency is still the issue for Spanish banks

Lenient treatment of property assets acquired in debt-for-equity swaps shows regulators are still worried by systemic vulnerabilities.

The chief executive of one of the biggest Spanish banks tries to convince Euromoney that his country’s economy is not in quite the mess often presented outside.

The economy is more innovative and diversified than it is given credit for and is now benefiting from big improvements in infrastructure and human capital that allowed it to hold its share of world export markets even as its labour costs caught up with core Europe over the past nine years. And the economy is more flexible than it is given credit for, the chief executive says – just look at how quickly Spanish companies have been firing people.

Indeed. Spanish unemployment was recorded at an official rate of 25% in 1994. It declined to a low of 8% in the first half of 2007, where the Spanish bank chief executive suggests it amounted to full employment. In the seven quarters to April 2009 it had risen to 17.5%, and with the construction and property development sector in huge retreat economists outside Spain expect unemployment to reach 25% again quite soon.

It is a boom and bust that could only have happened on the periphery of the euro area. Spain’s boom, since the creation of the single currency, was driven by negative real rates as investment in the country to take advantage of low labour costs and build second homes for Spaniards and other Europeans drove up local inflation while the European Central Bank kept rates low. Now Spain can’t devalue its way out of the bust and the suggestion of withdrawal from the euro hovers in the air.

Through all this the large private Spanish banks have fared well. Praise for this is often given to the Banco de España and its policy of dynamic provisioning, requiring banks to build capital buffers of unallocated generic provisions in the good times.

The country went through banking crises in the 1980s and early 1990s, leaving a generation of bankers and supervisors acutely conscious of the very credit and liquidity risks that took other countries’ regulators by surprise in the summer of 2007. In the run-up to the crisis a large Spanish bank might have had 60 or 70 supervisors stationed permanently in its offices. Other regulators on both sides of the Atlantic must hang their heads in shame.

Last month in Euromoney’s 40th anniversary edition, no less a figure than Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive of Goldman Sachs, argued that regulators, rather than establishing static new minimum capital levels, should now look to calibrate various capital, liquidity and credit ratios to constrain market excesses, for example during sustained periods of economic growth. It’s an endorsement of the Spanish model.

The large private Spanish banks will claim that their risk management processes led them to concentrate mortgage lending on primary residences in the cities at reasonable loan-to-value ratios, leaving speculative lending to developers and buyers of second homes to the local savings banks, the troubled Cajas. In 2007 some big Spanish banks were even selling whole portfolios of mortgage loans to foreign investment banks and other leveraged buyers.

But is the Banco de España now indulging in a little regulator’s forbearance? Analysts at Credit Suisse wonder about the accounting applied to some €9.5 billion of real estate assets seized from failing developers since the start of 2008 in debt-for-equity swaps.

Such voluntary arrangements often forestall what otherwise would have been a bankruptcy but require less capital to be put up against the property assets coming on to bank balance sheets than banks would have to hold against any acquired through a formal bankruptcy process.

Credit Suisse also wonders about the valuations assigned to such properties being calculated by banks themselves, often on the basis of the offer price at which similar properties have been listed. In a thin and falling property market, offer prices aren’t much of a guide to real value.

Spanish banks have been rushing to re-staff their recoveries departments, which worked through problem loans at the start of the 1990s. They are bullishly suggesting that they might even make big profits on these property acquisitions and say that they have found buyers at modest 20% or so discounts, even in some of the worst-hit holiday destinations. But sales so far are being measured in the few hundred million euros range and the banks typically fund the new buyers, so risk transfer is minimal.

It is interesting to hear the chief executive of another large Spanish bank talk about the opportunities to acquire weaker banks as this crisis plays out. He has no interest in deploying capital in any such adventures. He is more likely to sell assets to boost capital than to acquire them. Maintaining solvency remains the priority, not chasing future earnings. Let’s not get carried away.

Spanish banks were busy last month with issues of capital securities to burnish their ratios while trying not to worry common shareholders about impending dilution.

Santander was poised to complete an €2 billion placement of preference shares. The attraction of preference shares, for bank creditors and regulators, is that coupons tend to have mandatory deferral triggered by loss or regulatory capital shortfall and are non-cumulative.

Banco Sabadell announced a €500 million offering of mandatory subordinated convertible bonds to retail investors.