Bail-out plans: France’s free market gamble

Whisper it quietly, but Sarkozy’s bail-out plan looks the most market-savvy.

The French government has been explicit in directing the country’s six leading banks to use the €10.5 billion of tier 1 capital it injected into them last month to increase lending at a 3-4% rate to individuals and companies, especially small and medium-size enterprises.

It looks like the heavy hand of the state channelling credit to voters and employers with little regard to borrowers’ capacity to service those debts. But look again. The French plans so far enacted differ from those of the UK, the US, Switzerland and the Netherlands where governments have taken direct equity stakes in various classes of bank preference and ordinary shares and, in some cases, quickly declared an intent to appoint directors.

By contrast the French state is not, so far at least, either taking any form of equity stakes or appointing directors but merely lending subordinated debt to the banks at a spread of 400bp above the risk-free rate with a five-year call. These loans boost tier-1 capital – but not core tier-1 – by roughly 50bp but they do not dilute existing shareholders nor prevent dividend payments on shares. That leaves open the hope that if and when conventional private subordinated debt and equity capital markets revive, French banks may be more favourably received.

Yes, there is the requirement to maintain lending growth, but at the time the deal was inked, loan growth had been running, up until the end of August 2008, at an 8% rate. French bankers suggest the requirement to grow loans at 3-4% is not an injudicious opening of the spigots and talk about leveraging this subordinated debt capital by around eight times, making €80 billion of loans available to the French economy. They say that they will not loosen their credit standards to achieve this.

Two intriguing bets, one short-term and one long-term, are being taken here. The short-term bet is on the relative quality of the French banks’ existing loan books and on the quality of their credit underwriting. Though French banks have shown a worrying propensity to take hits from rogue traders, raising questions about their operational risk controls, and have endured some losses from structured credit, attention now turns, as economies weaken and conventional loans losses must rise, to how prudent banks have been in basic lending to domestic households and companies.

The French state is betting that its banks have made a better job than, to take the extreme example, many of their UK peers, of the loans they have extended over the past five years, by holding the line on mortgages at a maximum 80% loan-to-value and debt service at 30% of monthly income, on largely fixed-rate loans of 15 years duration which do not require home buyers to refinance at punitive levels of interest once initial teaser rates expire. So, yes French banks may not, in future, look quite so well capitalized on a relative basis as others whose governments continue to inject equity. But, so the French government hopes, investors will regard the country’s banks as well capitalized given the good quality of their assets.

It’s a noble thought. Whether investors will actually prove so discerning or share this faith in the quality of French loan books amid a gathering global recession, is quite a gamble.

The longer-term bet is this. When, eventually, some semblance of stability returns to the financial system and the economy, the banking industry will be profoundly consolidated. Rules on state aid will prevent banks that have been propped up by government ownership from leading this consolidation in Europe, leaving the market open to the French and, let’s not forget, the Spanish.

Is this a reasonable bet? Perhaps, but no one knows where the financial and banking system turmoil is heading next. Another severe downdraft may yet force France to line up alongside those governments partially nationalizing their country’s banks.

BNP Paribas’s acquisition, announced early in October, of the operations of Fortis in Belgium and Luxembourg, clouds the picture. It gives an 11.6% stake in the bank with a two-year lock up and two board seats to a European government: but Belgium rather than France itself. Luxembourg takes 1.1% with a one-year lock up.

Perhaps more pertinently, the deal makes BNP Paribas the largest deposit taking bank in the eurozone.