The devaluation of the Brazilian real has kept emerging markets at the top of bankers' and regulators' priority lists. As the crisis struck, the Malaysian second finance minister was on a tour of Europe designed to gather support for the country's controversial approach - an approach the minister insisted was working and would be continued indefinitely. More than a year on from the start of the crisis, there is still no consensus on what policies are appropriate for these troubled countries.
However, as Brian Caplen's story reveals, many of the assumptions on which policy ideas have been based are wrong. But revealing - with the benefit of hindsight - what actually went wrong, means apportioning blame. And that has caused an unseemly row between bankers, academics and politicians.
This much seems clear: emerging-market corporates, but particularly Asian corporates, undertook heavy borrowing in foreign currencies without any consideration of the risks. No account was taken of the likely impact of devaluation nor did companies know or care that their rapid investment growth was producing returns below the cost of capital. Domestically this credit growth was driven by crony capitalism and poor banking supervision.