Inside Asia’s whirlwind

Who's to blame for Asia's crisis? And what happens now? Nine of the region's movers and shakers give their views on the pace of change across the region, the part played by the Japanese banks, the future of Hong Kong's currency peg and the role of China.

* Norman Chan, deputy chief executive of the HKMA
* Michael Dee, managing director, Morgan Stanley
* Stuart Gulliver, treasurer of HongkongBank
* Donald Hanna, regional economist, Goldman Sachs
* Edmond Ip, executive director and general manager of finance, Cheung Kong
* Clement Kwok, finance director, MTR
* Brian Lippey, chief executive, Tokai Asia
* Alan Smith, vice-chairman, Credit Suisse First Boston Asia
* Richard Tsiang, director, Allard Capital
* HY Wong, treasurer of Airport Authority of Hong Kong
* Interviewer: Padraic Fallon, chairman and editor-in-chief, Euromoney Publications

What’s different about Asia’s crisis?

Brian Lippey: Asia is the last vestige of command economy, and what we’re seeing is the breakdown of the command economy. In Asia’s case banks were the agents for governments that wanted to guide capital. The banks were encouraged – either directly or indirectly – to lend to strategic industries. One of the reasons Korea was so deeply affected was because lending decisions were taken because of government policy and not profitability.

Do you blame crony capitalism?

Michael Dee: I define crony capitalism as the allocation of capital to non-efficient mechanisms. But one of the great strengths of Asia is the extremely high domestic savings rate. The problem is that the capital doesn’t get allocated efficiently to the right projects.

Alan Smith: On this issue of crony capitalism I don’t think we should get it out of proportion. There is a tendency now to hang all the ills on that, but as a percentage of these economies’ GDP it was not dramatic. I don’t know what number you’ll put on it – maybe 3% to 4% – but it’s not 50% of the economy. It’s now become a slogan. In other parts of the world you might call it pork-barrel politics or in France, the rule of the enarques. No country is totally immune to this sort of relationship. In Asia, it was taken to extremes and I’m certainly not justifying it. But we’ve got to get it in context.

Is Asia moving to the Anglo-Saxon model?

Norman Chan: I don’t think we should gloss so much about Asian versus Anglo-Saxon because a good system is a good system whether it’s Anglo-Saxon or German or whatever.

Not if it doesn’t last.

Chan: A good corporate could have nothing to do with the government, but be making profits and have a good business. Then it gets carried away and expands too fast, and goes bust. This is a familiar story. Look at the savings and loans in the US. How much money did the US taxpayer have to pay out?

Dee: Over a $100 billion.

Chan: Why did the US economy overcome this? Because there was a lender of last resort in the form of the New York Fed, providing liquidity and then presenting the taxpayer with the bill. This S&L crisis had nothing to

do with the government directing credit, but with these institutions making bad loans and disregarding the risk. Depositors earned a 200 basis point spread knowing there was an implicit guarantee. All too often it’s too tempting to blame everything on this crony capitalism.

Do these economies lack a sound regulatory framework?

Chan: There’s a lot more to be done in these economies.

Let’s take Korea. Will the chaebols be broken up?

Edmond Ip: Not in my view.

Clement Kwok: I would like to think that Asian companies will be more discerning in their investments, however. In the past they’ve thought they were invincible and have invested outside their core competence. The access to scarce capital will act as a monitoring mechanism to make companies more conscious of the types of investment decisions they are making.

Are Asia’s governments prepared for change, or do they want to get this crisis out of the way and go on the same way?

HY Wong: Korea and Thailand are more likely to change. I put Malaysia at the other end of the scale. In between I’d put Indonesia.

Richard Tsiang: In Thailand they’re introducing foreclosure laws and protection for creditors: that’s a tremendous step in the right direction. It’s a question of whether the rest of the region takes up that mantle.

Wong: The Korean president is democratically elected and is not involved with any of the dirty things from the past. So he has a clean hand to start afresh. That’s very important. Same in Thailand. The prime minister is an ex-banker and is very clean.

Donald Hanna: There are always different factions in any government with different objectives. Those who want more openness now have a stronger hand than they did six months ago. It’s certainly the case in Malaysia. The people at Bank Negara have known for the last three years that credit growth should come down. It never happened. Why? Because politically it wasn’t possible.

Do they have that power now?

Hanna: They’re doing it now.

Will there be a move towards independent central banks throughout Asia?

Hanna: If you look at the IMF structures that’s one of the big focuses.

Will Malaysia go that way?

Hanna: The technocratic view will have a stronger hand in Malaysia relative to politics.

What does that mean?

Hanna: It means people who are willing to be more open and transparent are going to have a bigger say in policy-making in Malaysia than they did in the last 10 years. Malaysia’s still going to be an obscure place, but not as obscure as it has been in the last 10 years.

Wong: But they are very wary about opening up to foreign capital.

Smith: In Malaysia you should watch what they do not what they say. What they’re doing is often a lot more sensible than what they say.

Clement Kwok: There’s been a lot of talk about people in the region learning from this experience. But we shouldn’t forget that the international investor community must go through a learning process too. Issues such as financial management, lack of transparency and the mismatch of liabilities are all problems it is true. But let us not forget that two years ago the international financial community was approaching such companies to do deals. Investment banks were encouraging them to issue bonds in the US. The transparency issue existed back then too but investors still came pouring in. Part of the cause of the problem was investment bankers’ enthusiasm to promote their deals.

So it’s the fault of greedy investment bankers?

Kwok: Well I don’t think it’s fair to say all the learning has to come from the region. Some of the learning has to come from the other side as well.

There should be a health warning on every investment banker. What do you say to that, Michael Dee?

Dee: Definitely. I couldn’t agree more.

Hanna: One way of looking at this crisis is to say the bond vigilantes got it very wrong in Asia.

What’s a bond vigilante?

Hanna: It’s based on the idea that the market is going to influence policy-making by central banks and keep things on an even keel. You could argue that if what we had here was a credit boom, then the bond vigilantes who were supposed to look ahead and keep things on an even keel didn’t do a very good job.

Dee: I would counter that the bond vigilantes are a domestic policy control. In Asia you have very few developed domestic bond markets. How many bond markets in Asia have a 30-year bond? Very few. The bond vigilantes you’re talking about are the US treasury traders who are putting pressure on treasuries.

Will this crisis speed up the development of domestic capital markets in Asia?

Chan: We have taken a lot of initiatives to promote the domestic debt market in Hong Kong. Others in Asia should do the same. It’s not enough just to reform the banking system, because the banks can only give corporates short-term funding. If corporates want to make long-term investments it’s better for them to get longer-term funds – and that means issuing bonds. Then there is no maturity mismatch.

So the lesson is: follow the example of Hong Kong?

Kwok: I fully support Norman’s views but the problem we have in Hong Kong is there isn’t an institutional bond-buying investor base of any depth at all. The problem is that equity markets have been too lucrative in this part of the world.

Stuart Gulliver: The Asian crisis will be a catalyst for local bond markets. There is a change in government attitudes to them for a start.

We used to go and see various central banks and say quite unashamedly you should copy what Hong Kong has done and create a bond market. We were told, well, actually we have a surplus, so we don’t need to borrow. Well, now a lot of them don’t have surpluses and they need to finance themselves. This will create a yield curve for corporates to price off. Secondly, issuers want the comfort of local investors. A Thai company will prefer the comfort of being financed in baht by Thai insurance companies.

What about Asia’s bond investors – or rather the lack of them?

Gulliver: Asian investors have tended to focus on equity because you had negative real interest rates. Now you have positive real interest rates. This tends to favour fixed income. So its much easier to sell bond funds than it used to be.

How have the Japanese banks reacted?

Kwok: Speaking personally, I’ve found that the strongest development on our business is the Japanese banks retrenching in the loan market.

You’re saying Japanese banks have packed up and gone home?

Kwok: They have not withdrawn facilities that are committed, but there is no more space in their balance sheets and this has made financing much tighter.

Smith: Because of the Japan premium they’re lending to fine Hong Kong credits at 50bp and borrowing at 150bp. Obviously there’s something wrong there.

How big an impact has this had?

Wong: In Hong Kong we are feeling the pain. The Japanese banks are repatriating the money to rescue their home office and dress up their balance sheets.

Did the Japanese credit crunch start off the whole crisis throughout Asia?

Gulliver: It wasn’t just the Japanese banks. It’s a combination of things. The Japanese banks have specific BIS ratio problems, and they lost money in Thailand and Indonesia. They probably exited Hong Kong because it was one of the few markets where their credits were still substantially intact. The Japanese banks exited here because they still had solvent loans to sell.

Lippey: What we saw at year end was the Japanese selling assets that were still in the money.

But how can the region stabilize if a major source of liquidity, the Japanese banks, have effectively withdrawn?

Hanna: In Indonesia, Thailand and perhaps Malaysia, the Japanese banks will provide liquidity but through restructuring of loans rather than new flows.

Is the crisis over?

Smith: If you look at Asia’s stock market indices, they’ve all had good recoveries this year, but it may well be that markets have not discounted further bad news. For example, when Malaysian banks reported very bad losses, that seemed to be a shock to the market and it fell.

Tsiang: The markets have reacted far too positively. It’s wholly sentiment. But until we move to the point where countries have the guts to open up their borders to M&A rather than make out they’re becoming slaves to the west, the capital flows are going to be speculative and we’re going to see enormous volatility. Until real direct investment arrives, we’re not going to move to fundamental valuations.

Is the crisis over in Hong Kong?

Gulliver: Hong Kong has undergone a very quick process of correction, because it is a very transparent market and there are very few controls. The cathartic process of asset-price deflation has happened quite quickly. In our view property prices are down 45% from their peak in August 1997. Hong Kong’s a well-regulated market with a very strong, transparent banking system. The financial results you get from the banks are what the banks actually make.

What’s your biggest concern as treasurer of HongkongBank?

Gulliver: I have a number of concerns, one of the key ones being a significantly weaker yen. If it moves to ¥150 or ¥160 to the dollar, it starts to put pressure on Asia again. Indonesia is also a potential flashpoint.

Will the [Hong Kong dollar] peg stay?

Tsiang: I’m going to throw down the gauntlet and say that there’s still significant doubt whether the Hong Kong dollar peg will hold. We’ve seen with the sentiment swings across the region that 30% to 50% could easily come off the peg if it goes.

You’re saying that Hong Kong is the only place in the region that has clung to an overvalued currency, and it’s going to have to devalue?

Tsiang: Fixed exchange rates in the past have proven they don’t last. Hong Kong has lasted extremely well for a long time, but from a longer-term perspective there are real question marks.

Smith: I do not accept that a lot of people believe the peg will go. I know there are always people around who will say the earth is flat, so obviously some people will say it will go. But I don’t think it’s a widely held view.

Tsiang: I’m not arguing on a 12-month view. But on a longer-term view if we keep running current-account deficits how is that sustainable over a 20-year period?

Chan: Why do you think that Hong Kong will continue running a current-account deficit? You assume this.

Tsiang: We’re running a deficit at the moment. Projections are we will in the next two years too.

Chan: Hong Kong must maintain its ability to adjust. There are many ways to keep your competitiveness high. One way is to devalue. But the other way is price adjustment. Property prices are coming down; so are wages. The cost of doing business is going down in line with asset prices. The speed with which Hong Kong is adjusting is a good story to tell. As long as we allow market forces to work it will take care of itself.

Why not have a free float?

Chan: Nobody can actually have a truly free float. Very few governments want to see exchange rates moving to the tune of 25%.

Gulliver: If I may just add, that [a peg] is what the euro is. It’s the European continental countries not wanting to deal with exchange-rate risk between France, Italy and Germany. They’re saying we want to make things and sell them. The floating-rate regime is the ultimate achievement of Anglo-Saxon economies.

Smith: And that’s why the Anglo-Saxons are not joining the euro.

Let’s talk about China. What’s been it’s principal concern throughout this crisis?

Wong: China is very focused on reforming its state-owned enterprises. [Prime minister] Zhu Rongji recently said that foreigners were prone to overstate the problems of the state-owned enterprises. He said 500 big enterprises account for 85% of revenue collection. About 10% of them may have serious problems. He believes that he can solve the problems in three years.

So China is far more worried about internal problems than what is happening in the region?

Ip: Don’t forget China has always been on its own. They were dealing with their inflation problems while the rest of Asia was going crazy. But I think it’s wrong to say they don’t look at the rest of Asia, especially now that China has Hong Kong.

Smith: The financial secretary in Hong Kong recently said that he was surprised at the end of the first week of the turmoil not to have received a call from up north. In the good old British days the Bank of England or the UK treasury would have called up to find out if he knew what he was doing.

Gulliver: China has contributed some rescue money, which is the first evidence of China taking an internationalist stance in Asia. The amount of money was not that great, but psychologically China played the role that you would expect Japan to play in this crisis. Japan has yet again failed to take a leadership role, while China has acted proactively. It’s repeatedly said it was not going to devalue its currency.

Hanna: China has taken an economic crisis and made political gains from it. But Japan has put money into the system. Japan’s international role is fine. It just can’t seem to manage its domestic economy.