Short-selling: Merkel’s moment of madness

The German chancellor’s short-selling ban had no impact other than to increase speculation about the future of the eurozone.

It was out of the blue and somewhat baffling for all involved. Why has German chancellor Angela Merkel banned naked short selling in German markets of certain financials, debt securities of eurozone countries and eurozone country credit default swaps?

According to the German financial supervisory authority, BaFin, it is an attempt to stop excessive price movements in the securities. But BaFin itself does not appear to have been in the know, admitting that the new rules came as a complete surprise and that it was not entirely clear on what can and cannot be nakedly shorted. Now it seems Merkel wants naked shorting to be banned on all stocks, not just the handful of financial firms she first picked out. Perhaps she had hoped to frighten investors away from selling the euro. It did not work and the euro-dollar exchange rate remains unchanged, if not slightly worse. It’s unsurprising. Her message could be construed as a vote of no confidence.

Indeed, it is easy to infer from the fact that Merkel kept her intentions to herself, and sought no discussion with other key eurozone countries such as France, that she holds out little hope for the euro. The ban is for those securities traded domestically, and Merkel seems to be saying: follow my lead, or we will happily go it alone.

The decision has raised the stakes for the rest of the EU governments to make their position clear. The financial markets are in dire need of clarity, both on an EU unified front and on the detail of what they hope to achieve from the ban.

A ban on the short selling of stocks isn’t without precedent of course. Bans were put in place globally on mainly financial stocks in 2008 and it could be claimed that they helped restore some stability in prices, although they hardly outperformed the broader stock indices over that period. As for bans on shorting government debt and their derivatives, this is uncharted territory. There is no clear evidence that short positioning has had a significant influence in raising the cost of funding of eurozone governments. Indeed if anything, since the ban was put in place, bid-offer spreads on government bonds have actually widened, thus defeating the purpose of the ban in many respects.

In conducting its own analysis on Greek government debt in March, BaFin admitted that it hadn’t found any evidence that suggested credit derivatives were being increasingly used to speculate against the rising risk of owning Greek government bonds. Yet regardless of the empirical evidence, the German government is now attempting to force the hand of the rest of the EU.

Figures from the US Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, which operates a trade repository that records every single transaction in the credit derivatives market and identifies each counterparty, shows that the net positions on European peripheral sovereigns have been relatively small. On Greece it was $9 billion, against a stock of government debt of €360 billion and on Spain, which of Europe’s biggest debtors is probably most vulnerable to a rise in borrowing costs, the proportion of total debt to the net position was even smaller.

Peter Green, a capital markets partner at law firm Morrison & Foerster, points out that such restrictions can only be effective as part of a coordinated international approach. Germany is not the derivatives trading centre for banks, and participants have quickly realized that they can trade eurozone sovereign CDS through their London or New York offices, as the rules do not apply outside Germany anyway.

Whatever the details, Merkel’s move has led to a lot of speculation about her real intentions. None of it helps the market. Some observers in other eurozone territories have gone as far to suggest that Merkel wants the euro to depreciate further so that Germany’s exports become more appealing to the US and China, and that she knew the ban would put further pressure on the euro.

It’s unlikely. Merkel needs confidence to return to the eurozone so that investors won’t be spooked by negative sovereign events and take it out on the whole territory. Her clout would have been much more convincing, however, if she had got the backing of some of her peers in other countries first.